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ABSTRACT
In the ongoing philosophical debates between scientific realists and antirealists, scientific modeling is often taken as an exemplar antirealist scientific methodology due to the abstract, idealized,
and metaphorical nature of most scientific models. I argue against the antirealist view and in
favor of a realist view of scientific modeling as it is performed in biological morphology. On my
view, morphological modeling is a type of what I call multiperspectival modeling, which involves multiple related models deployed to represent a single target phenomenon. I show how
multiperspectival morphological modeling can be incorporated into the version of scientific
realism developed by Richard Boyd, known as accommodationism, based on the role modeling
plays in informing the definitions of natural kind terms and on the role theoretical judgments
play in model construction and deployment. I claim that multiperspectival morphological models contribute to the inductive and explanatory successes of biological morphology by playing a
central role in accommodating (on the one hand) the inferential, conceptual, and classificatory
practices of morphology to (on the other hand) independently existing causal phenomena. I
intend for the realist view of morphological models presented here to serve as an example for
how scientific modeling can be interpreted realistically across scientific disciplines.
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INTRODUCTION
Scientific modeling is a method scientists use to bring clarity and coherence to complex problems that cannot be addressed by scientific theories or direct observation alone. The role of
scientific models as mediators between theory and the world raises important philosophical
questions, such as the extent to which models can be employed to adequately and accurately
explain actual phenomena (see for example the papers in Morrison and Morgan (1999)). Antirealist philosophers of science argue that models are nothing more than reliable applications of
methodology and should not be taken as realistic representations of the world (Botha, 1986;
Horan, 1988; Suarez, 1999). According to the antirealist, the use of models as idealizations,
abstractions, or metaphors intentionally detaches the model from the actual world and, therefore,
while they may aid a scientist in understanding their phenomena under study, models cannot be
used in confirmation or explanation. For the antirealist, models serve only to (heuristically)
increase our confidence in our current scientific theories because models can provide a pictorial
representation of complex or ambiguous theoretical claims.
I intend to counter the general claims antirealists make about scientific models by providing a
realist account of scientific modeling as I understand it to be employed in biological morphology. I think the antirealist claims are based on a distorted view of scientific models, as the predominant philosophical work on models is strongly influenced by philosophy of physics (BailerJones, 2009). By arguing in favor of a realist view of models as used in morphology, I will
argue, as a consequence, that any approach to scientific modeling should be discipline dependent, avoiding any attempt at an en masse philosophical view of scientific models.
On my view, the process of modeling in biological morphology leads to the deployment of
multiple model types and expressions to bear on a particular target, such as a structure or func-
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tion of an organism. Each model acts as an independent “lens” through which the structure or
function can be viewed. While each separate model of a structure or function may not be able to
confirm theories or produce accurate and adequate explanations alone, the amalgamation of all
the models does provide confirmation for biological theories and is a source of morphological
explanations. I intend to argue that the view resulting from the amalgamation of morphological
models, a view I call multiperspectival modeling, can be readily integrated with the accommodationist version of scientific realism. The end result of model amalgamation is accommodation as
understood by Richard Boyd because the process by which morphological models are constructed, tested, and ultimately integrated with one another results in their tendency to track or represent the properties constituting their target phenomenon.
In Chapter 1, I discuss in detail the process of morphological modeling. My approach to
morphology and morphological modeling is strongly influenced by Walter Bock, Gerd von
Wahlert, and Dominique G. Homberger because they provide the most coherent view of the
inferential practices in morphology and the process of morphological modeling. The first two
parts of Chapter 1 address the technical aspects of morphology and modeling in morphology, and
I illustrate these aspects in the third part of Chapter 1 with a discussion of the morphological
modeling of the human lung. A clear exegesis of morphological modeling allows for a thorough
analysis of its philosophical attributes.
In Chapter 2, I discuss the philosophical aspects of morphological modeling by applying
philosophical studies on scientific modeling to modeling as it is performed in morphology. In
this chapter, I discuss the philosophical importance of representations produced by models and
the relationships between observational data, models, model users, and theories. I also introduce
my philosophical view of models, which I call multiperspectival modeling. My approach to the
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philosophy of scientific modeling is strongly influenced by the work of Daniela Bailer-Jones,
especially since she has (uniquely) approached the study of modeling without committing to a
discipline specific modeling process.
In Chapter 3, I describe the main tenets of Richard Boyd’s version of scientific realism
known as accommodationism. Accommodationism follows from an abductive argument for
scientific realism proposed and extensively developed by Boyd. His view incorporates a notion
of correspondence truth, the mind-independence of reality, a non-Humean account of causation,
a notion of discipline specific inferential architectures, an account of natural kinds as homeostatic property clusters, a causal notion of reference, a view of scientific methods as thoroughly
theory-dependent, and a reliance on (or at least a notion of) approximate truth. I briefly describe
each of these aspects of accommodationism before integrating them with my discussion of morphological modeling.
In Chapter 4, I discuss how my view of scientific modeling (multiperspectival modeling) can
be integrated with Boyd’s accommodationist view of scientific realism. I argue that the instrumental reliability of morphological modeling, which I take to be uncontroversial, can be explained by the accommodationist version of scientific realism due to the contribution models
make to defining natural kind terms and to the role theoretical judgments play in model construction and deployment. Models contribute to the definitions of natural kind terms through the
representations they provide of the natural kinds to which the terms refer. Because modeling is
largely a theoretical exercise, I contend that the best argument for the contribution models make
to defining natural kind terms is that the representations models produce are approximately true.
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In Chapter 5, I defend my realist view of modeling against possible objections from empiricism, constructivism, and an account of phenomenal complexity. My replies largely follow
Boyd’s defense of scientific realism against similar objections in the philosophy of science.
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1. MORPHOLOGICAL MODELING
Nearly every practicing morphologist eventually seems to feel
the need to philosophize. (Herring, 1988, p. 189)

Biological morphology is the study of organismal phenomena, which can loosely be thought of
as the properties (attributes, qualities, or characteristics) and relations that can be predicated of or
attributed to biological organisms. Scientific modeling is one of the primary methods morphologists use to carry out their studies of organismal phenomena. Morphologists use models to
interpret observational data collected about organisms and to produce from their interpretations
descriptions and explanations of particular organismal phenomena.1 Before providing a philosophical account of morphological modeling (see Chapter 2), I give a brief description of how
morphologists construct and deploy their models in practice. First, I describe a conceptual
scheme described by Walter J. Bock and Gerd von Wahlert that morphologists might employ to
theoretically organize organismal phenomena prior to modeling them (§1.1.). Then, I describe
how this conceptual scheme guides the modeling process (§1.2.). Finally, I illustrate the process
of morphological modeling using a case study of how morphologists have conceptualized and
modeled the human bronchial tree (§1.3.).

1.1. Morphological concepts
Organisms are complex entities comprised of a multiplicity of functionally interdependent parts
and processes. Because of the functional interdependence of organismal phenomena, morpholo-

1

Morphological models are deployed in four main morphological disciplines: theoretical morphology, which studies theoretically
possible and impossible morphological structures within an imaginary morphospace; constructional morphology, which studies
morphological structures within adaptational, morphogenetic, and historical constraints; morphometrics, which studies morphological structures through use of topological methods; and functional morphology, which studies the mechanical properties of morphological structures. In what follows, I focus on how models are constructed and deployed within functional morphology, but my
general analysis is applicable to the other morphological disciplines. When I use the terms ‘morphology’ and ‘morphologist’ it will
be in the context of functional morphology.
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gists have often compared organisms to machines (see for example Bock (1989) and Homberger
(1986, 2001)).2 Analogizing organisms to machines provides a conceptual framework that enables morphologists to study organisms as individual parts that together produce a functioning
whole. This is an especially helpful analogy for modeling organisms as Dominique G.
Homberger (1986) explains in the following passage:
By taking apart such a machine and reconstructing a model from its components, it should be possible to acquire an understanding of the functions, interactions, and interdependencies of the constituent parts, provided one knows the basic function of the machine, the structure and spatial arrangement of the constituent parts, the physical properties of the materials from which the parts
are made, and the physical and mechanical laws governing the interactions of the parts.
(Homberger, 1986, p. 78)

There is less agreement on what conceptual scheme morphologists should adopt to describe
the arrangement of these parts and their relationship to the entire organism, however. Bock and
von Wahlert (1965) describe a conceptual scheme that takes organisms to be dividable into
groups of related properties known as features, which can be subdivided into subgroups of related properties known as forms, functions, and faculties. I have decided to follow their conceptual
scheme for two reasons: 1) To my knowledge, their study is the first attempt at providing a
systematic account of the concepts morphologists have historically used to organize their studies
of organismal phenomena, and 2) while morphological studies following Bock and von Wahlert
(1965) have used various conceptual schemes for organizing organismal phenomena, the concepts those studies have employed (such as organismal structures, characters, traits, etc.) can be
incorporated within the conceptual scheme described by Bock and von Wahlert. Although the
conceptual scheme Bock and von Wahlert (1965) describe provides greater clarity in discussing
morphological modeling, its adoption is a contingent issue and is not necessary for the acceptance or the evaluation of the methodological or philosophical claims I make.

2

This is not to suggest that morphologists view organisms as machines as a Cartesian might.
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According to Bock and von Wahlert (1965), organisms are comprised of features. I take
features to be loosely defined by groups of related properties that co-occur within a population of
organisms. The aim of morphology is the identification and investigation of organismal features
and the roles they play in the lives and evolution of organisms. According to Bock and von
Wahlert, each feature can be subdivided into forms, functions, and faculties, which I take to be
loosely defined by subgroups of properties within the group of properties that defines a feature.
The forms, functions, and faculties of features are hierarchically related in the following way: the
subgroup of properties defining a particular form will partially constitute the subgroup of properties defining a related function, but not (necessarily) vice versa. Likewise, the subgroup of properties defining a particular function, including those it shares with related forms, will partially
constitute the subgroup of properties defining a related faculty, but not (necessarily) vice versa.
Forms are the lowest-level in the hierarchy, faculties are the highest-level, and functions are
situated in between forms and faculties. Although features are the groups of properties that are
subdivided into forms, functions, and faculties, they are not hierarchically related to forms,
functions, and faculties because not all properties used to define a feature will be used to also
define its forms, functions, and faculties.

1.1.1. Feature
According to my interpretation of Bock and von Wahlert (1965), a feature is a group of related
properties that corresponds to any part, region, or process of an organism that can be roughly,
that is, imprecisely, identified and demarcated by morphologists and made the focus of a biological study. For example, the mandible of chimpanzees, the heart valves of spiny dogfish sharks,
the chorion of roach eggs, and the biceps femoris muscle of humans are all features that have
been the target of morphological studies. According to Homberger (1988), a feature is “estab-
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lished” upon the formulation of a precise question posed by a morphologist within the theoretical
and inferential constraints of her discipline about a part, region, or process in an organism that is
characterized by a related group of properties. According to Homberger (1988), a feature under
study will be the target of a question “How does X contribute to the life or evolution of the organism?” where X is a group of related properties that co-occur within a population of organisms. In other words, features are those things about organisms that morphologists seek to explain.
Once a feature is established as the target of a particular study, the group of properties used
to define it can then be subdivided into subgroups of related properties to establish forms, functions, and faculties of the feature. However, forms, functions, and faculties cannot be described
prior to the establishment of a feature, because a group of properties must (obviously) come
before its subgroups. Furthermore, forms, functions, and faculties must be described and established in succession according to their hierarchical relationships. Therefore, a morphologist
cannot begin investigating the forms of a feature until that feature is established, and she cannot
begin investigating the functions or faculties of the feature until the feature’s forms have been
described and established. As such, the establishment of a feature through the posing of a precisely formulated question is the most important step in investigating organismal phenomena and
in deploying Bock and von Wahlert’s conceptual scheme.
Because a feature is taken to be some part, region, or process in an organism, the group of
properties that define it will never encompass all the properties that can be predicated of an
organism in its entirety; an organism is defined by a suite of parts, regions, and processes, but the
latter are not defined by reference to the former. That is, a whole organism cannot be a single
feature. On the other hand, a feature can be any part, region, or process in an organism, no mat-
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ter how small, as long as it is defined within the investigative scope of biological morphology.
For example, the collagen proteins in cartilage are candidate features for morphological study,
but the atoms composing these proteins are not. Atoms are beyond the scope of morphology (but
they are not beyond the scope of molecular chemistry or atomic physics). Regardless of what
part, region, or process in an organism a morphologist defines as a feature, the properties included in the group defining a feature will be contingent upon the morphological study of which it is
a focus. In other words, organisms do not possess essential features.3
The absence of essential features does not preclude the use of a common feature as the subject of multiple morphological studies or as a constituent in the formulation of broad explanations. In practice, different morphologists from different areas of expertise often study different
properties within a group defining a common feature in a joint effort to increase their understanding about the feature as a whole. For example, an osteologist, a biomechanist, and a physiologist can independently study different properties of the mandible of a chimpanzee, which acts
as the feature or common group of properties shared in each of their studies. Studies of some
features, especially those of “model organisms”, are often used in the construction of broad
explanations that make claims about multiple species of organisms. For example, extant alligators are often taken as model organisms for understanding the biology of dinosaurs (see for
example Sanders and Farmer (2012)). Furthermore, features established by morphologists are
often used in other disciplines such as taxonomy and embryology for the formulation of discipline specific explanations. Regardless of where and how they are used, the descriptions of
features, that is, the groups of properties that define them, are always susceptible to revision. For
example, the bones of the vertebrate skull were once thought to originate from the cranial most
3

By not possessing essential features, I mean that organisms are not defined by a set of necessary and sufficient features such that
checking off each feature indicates the presence of an organism of that type. However, as I argue later in the thesis, organisms do
have real essences, but not essential features.
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vertebrae as described in morphological studies of the 19th century. However, modern morphological studies have undermined this claim, and the bones of the skull have been redefined as
being unrelated to vertebrae. This susceptibility to revision also holds for forms, functions, and
faculties.

1.1.2. Form
Every feature can be subdivided into at least one form. According to my interpretation of Bock
and von Wahlert (1965), a form is a subgroup of related properties that corresponds to a temporally specific appearance, shape, configuration, or material composition of a part, region, or
process in an organism. For example, the width of a chimpanzee mandible, the collagen fiber
direction in the heart valves of a spiny dogfish shark, the configuration of proteins composing
the chorion of roach eggs, and the cross-sectional area of a human biceps femoris muscle are all
forms of their respective features.
Features can be subdivided into multiple forms, especially if a feature is partially defined by
a process or action. A feature defined by a process, such as a pumping human heart, is composed of a sequence of forms that can be identified at specific time slices during the process. For
example, the human heart pumps blood in two recurrent phases: a systolic phase and a diastolic
phase. If we want to study the internal changes the heart experiences during each phase, we can
take a time slice of the heart corresponding to the start of systole and study its internal configuration at that time. Each configuration isolated by a time slice corresponds to an individual form of
the heart. In other words, the configurations characterizing the pumping process of a heart can
be described as a series of forms.
A feature defined by a part or region may also have more than one form because it may
perform some action. For example, the biceps femoris muscle in humans adducts the forearm.
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Before this muscle contracts, it will have a particular configuration, and this configuration will
differ from its configuration after it flexes. These two configurations represent two different
forms of the biceps femoris muscle. In both cases of process and action, transition between
forms is caused by the feature’s function(s).

1.1.3. Function
Every function within a feature can be subdivided into one or more forms. According to my
interpretation of Bock and von Wahlert (1965), a function is a subgroup of properties that corresponds to a physical or chemical structure or process causally related to a form (a temporally
specific appearance, shape, configuration, or material composition of a part, region, or process)
in an organism. There are two kinds of functions: static and dynamic. A static function is a
physical or chemical structure associated with a specific form that confers a mechanical attribute. For example, the arrangement of collagen fibers in shark dermis (form) will cause the dermis to resist expansion in some directions but not others (function). A dynamic function is a
physical or chemical process associated with two or more forms that causes a transition from one
form to another. For example, the biceps femoris muscle changes from one form to another due
to the biochemical function of the proteins actin and myosin.
Functions and forms are hierarchically related such that the properties of forms partially
determine the nature or range of the properties and processes of the functions they underlie.
Functions are either the static or dynamic actions that arise from a given form, or they are the
static or dynamic actions that cause the transition from one form to another. In other words,
functions are the causal properties associated with the forms of a feature. Bock and von Wahlert
call the relationship between the forms of a feature and their emergent functions the formfunction complex. Form-function complexes underlie the faculties of a feature.
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1.1.4. Faculty
Every faculty of a feature can be subdivided into one or more form-function complexes. According to Bock and von Wahlert (1965), a faculty is a subgroup of properties that corresponds to a
role a function or functions (a physical or chemical property or process) causally related to a
form or forms (temporally specific appearance, shape, configuration, or material composition of
a part, region, or process) plays in the life of an organism. For example, one faculty of the human lungs is to supply the pulmonary blood vessels with oxygenated air so the organism can
respire. A faculty will usually arise from multiple functions, which act together to aid the organism in some way. A group of functions may also give rise to more than one faculty, especially if
they play a role in multiple environments in which the organism lives.
There are two types of faculties: internal faculties and external faculties. Internal faculties
play a causal role in the life of an organism independent of the organism’s external environment.
Internal faculties can be studied in a laboratory setting or in nature. External faculties play a
causal role in the life of the organism dependent on the organism’s external environment. External faculties can only be studied in nature. Internal and external faculties should not be confused
with the features of an organism, or else features will be equivalent to the role they play in the
life of an organism. Features would then be teleologically defined as the purpose they serve for
the organism. In order to avoid conflating a feature’s faculties with the feature itself, I follow
(with some alteration) an attempt by Ernst Nagel (1961, p. 403) to give a non-teleological explanation of what he called “function” in defining faculties as follows:
Internal faculties are defined explicitly as follows: Every organism O with faculty F engages in
process P; if O lacks F, then O cannot engage in P, and if O does not engage in P, then O will die.
The role F plays in O engaging in P is O’s internal faculty(s), f0,…,fn.
External faculties can be defined explicitly as follows: Every organism O with faculty F and in
environment E engages in process P; if O lacks F in E, then O cannot engage in P, and if O does
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not engage in P while in E, then O will die. The role F plays in O engaging in P while in E is O’s
external faculty(s), f0,…,fn.

It would be a mistake to substitute the notion of a faculty with the notion of a feature in the
above definitions. A feature does not play a direct role in the life of an organism, rather the
faculties of a feature do. With this distinction we can see how it is possible for a feature to be
made the focus of a morphological study without being required to play a role in the life of an
organism. In other words, some features may be nothing more than “spandrels” in the sense of
Gould and Lewontin (1979).
Morphologists adopt conceptual schemes such as the one described above to help guide their
studies of organismal phenomena because conceptual schemes provide a framework within
which morphological studies can be performed. On Bock and von Wahlert’s conceptual scheme,
the identification of a feature constrains the range of properties that can be used to establish the
feature’s form(s), function(s), and faculty(s) for study, which focuses the morphologist’s attention on the most relevant aspects for answering her initial question. Because the principle method employed in studying organismal phenomena is scientific modeling, the conceptual scheme
described above also guides morphologists in their construction of morphological models.

1.2. Morphological modeling
Morphologists use models as a method for interpreting their observational data in order to produce informative descriptions and morphological explanations, and they rely on their conceptualizations of organisms to guide the model building process. In the context of the conceptual
scheme given by Bock and von Wahlert (1965) and described above, the ultimate goal of morphological modeling is to produce explanations about organismal features and the properties that
constitute them through the use of models that describe their forms, functions, and faculties.
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Because the subgroups of properties that define the form, functions, and faculties of a feature are
hierarchically related, models deployed to explain them will also be hierarchically related.
Hence, an interdependent system of models that together describe and explain the feature will be
established. Morphologists build these models from observational data about the forms, functions, and faculties of features using a combination of background knowledge, biomechanical
methods, biomechanical principles, and morphological theories. These basic ingredients for
modeling are briefly described below.

1.2.1. Observational data
Morphologists collect observational data using a variety of techniques and instruments. Most
often, observations are made using unmediated eyes and visible light microscopy, and they are
documented using photography. Observations are also collected using scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and transmission electron microscopy (TEM). Computed tomographic (CT) imaging has become more widely used for the production of data in the last twenty years due to its
non-invasiveness and ability to document internal functions in living organisms.
Morphologists prepare organisms for observation using techniques such as dissection, sagittal and transverse sectioning, staining, histological techniques, and MRI and CT machines.4
Each technique produces a different class of observational data, which are about the same phenomenon, but perspectively different. That is, observational data can be collected about the
same thing by using different observational techniques. The observational data produced with
these techniques are the foundational material from which morphological models are built.

4

Gans (1974) describes investigative techniques such as these as just finer ways of dissecting.
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1.2.2. Background knowledge
I take background knowledge to be the relevant facts possessed by or readily available to a morphologist about a feature and its forms, functions, and faculties. Background knowledge is
acquired through the rigorous training associated with acquiring graduate degrees, reading available scientific publications, and research experience. In other words, background knowledge is
the knowledge-that or the knowledge-how morphologists possess prior to a morphological study,
and it can be found both in their minds and in the reference books located on the shelves in their
laboratory.

1.2.3. Biomechanics and biomechanical methods
I take biomechanics to be the study of living organisms in the context of the physical and mechanical constraints they must obey. Biomechanical methods apply the principles of engineering
to organisms to better understand their functions, actions, and processes. According to Y.C.
Fung, “biomechanics aims to explain the mechanics of life and living,” and “the method of
biomechanics is the method of engineering, which consists of observation, experimentation,
theorization, validation, and application” (Fung, 1990, p. vii).

1.2.4. Biomechanical principles
I take biomechanical principles to be general rules or principles about the application of biomechanical methods to organisms. For example, the claim that the cross-sectional area is directly
related to the contractile force in vertebrate muscle and the claim that nerves have a quantifiable
degree of elasticity are examples of basic biomechanical principles that are applicable to morphological studies. Homberger describes the importance of biomechanical principles for modeling as follows:
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The interactions and functioning of the various structures constituting a biomechanical apparatus
are governed by biomechanical principles or rules that are derived from the shape and physical
properties of the structures. These biomechanical principles must be clearly stated before one can
build a mechanical model based on the anatomical structures of a biomechanical apparatus, much
in the same way as engineers must know how cogwheels, pulleys, transmission bars, and pistons
function and interact before they can assemble a machine. (Homberger, 1986, p. 91)

1.2.5. Morphological theories
I take morphological theories to be general and abstract claims, that is, specific to neither a time
nor organism, about the nature of morphological phenomena. The hydraulic “principle” proposed by Wolfgang Gutmann is an example of a morphological theory. It states that organisms
are “systems composed of fluid contained within flexible membranes…. Every form and architectural arrangement has to be conceived as the result of the form-enforcing influence of mechanical elements that operate within an integrated mechanically coherent system” (Gutmann,
1988, p. 257). Morphological theories are distinct from biomechanical principles in that the
former make general claims about organisms and the latter make general claims about their
mechanical properties.
The conceptual scheme described by Bock and von Wahlert (or whatever conceptual scheme
a morphologist adopts) guides the collection of observational data and the application of background knowledge, biomechanical methods, biomechanical principles, and morphological theories to the construction of morphological models. Once a feature is established as the focus of a
morphological study, the source of potential observational data becomes restricted to the domain
covered by the identified feature. Likewise, the use of background knowledge, biomechanical
methods, biomechanical principles, and morphological theories also becomes restricted to the
scope of the established feature.
Not only does the conceptual scheme provide constraints on how models can be built, but it
also serves to guide the model building process. According to Bock and von Wahlert, faculties

16

cannot be identified and studied until form-function complexes have been established. But formfunction complexes cannot be established until the forms and functions of which they are comprised have been identified and studied. But functions can only be identified and studied with
reference to at least one underlying form. Therefore, the conceptual scheme identified by Bock
and von Wahlert requires that a feature’s forms be identified and studied first. Hence, once a
morphologist has identified a feature, the first subgroups of properties she should model are
those that underlie the feature’s forms. Then, the descriptions produced by models of forms can
be used to build models of functions, whose descriptions can in turn be used to build models of
faculties. The descriptive totality of these models can then provide an integrated description of
the feature they are contained within.
Each of these models share a common set of parameters that are “set” or chosen by a morphologist during the model building process, and each of these models are assessed by one or
more morphologically specific tests. The parameterization of a model sets boundaries on the
scope of a model’s descriptions and explanations such that only a limited amount of observational data can be accounted for by a single model. That is, any given model will be unable to account for all the available observational data. However, morphologists use a variety of tests to
ensure that a model adequately and accurately accounts for the observational data it describes as
judged by the standards of the model builder. The parameters and tests for models are discussed
below.

1.2.6. Model parameters
I identify three parameters of morphological models: a model focus, a model type, and a model
expression. I call the target phenomenon that a model describes and explains the model focus.
Forms, functions, and faculties are potential foci of morphological models. What I shall call the
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model type refers to the model’s kind, which can be conceptual, visual, or mathematical; conceptual models produce non-empirical descriptions and explanations, such as thought experiments,
visual models produce empirical descriptions and explanations, such as diagrams and pictures,
and mathematical models5 produce mathematical descriptions and explanations.6 The third
parameter is what Daniela Bailer-Jones (2005) calls the model expression, which is the model’s
medium of description and explanation. Diagrams, graphs, propositions, and computational
programs are examples of media that can be used to express descriptions and explanations. Each
model is characterized by only one focus, one type, and one expression.

1.2.7. Model tests
Morphological models are tested in the ways that are appropriate for assessing their descriptions
and explanations of their foci. Homberger (1988, 2001) discusses various tests morphologists
use to assess their models. With slight modification, I have distilled from those studies the
following tests: the descriptive test, the anatomical test, the theoretical test, laboratory experiments, and natural experiments.
-

The descriptive test compares a model’s descriptions to the observational data acquired
about the model’s focus.

5

These are not mathematical models as they are used in mathematics or logic. Rather, they are models of organismal phenomena
produced through the use of mathematical formulations.
6
In his Introduction to Dynamic Morphology, Edmund Mayer (1963) identifies two additional types of models, which he describes
as analogies and substitutes. According to Mayer, analogy models are comparisons between familiar systems such as glass blowing and unfamiliar systems such the production of the complicated gelatinous house of the tunicate Oikopleura (this analogy comes
from Hardy (1956)). I follow Daniela Bailer-Jones (2002a, 2009) by taking models as descriptions or explanations and by taking
analogies as relationships. On her view, analogies are useful for building models and models can act as analogues, but models are
not analogies themselves. According to Mayer, substitution models are models that describe an accessible phenomenon in order to
understand the properties of an inaccessible phenomenon. For example, to study the binding properties of different histological
(tissue) stains, a morphologist may want to apply the stains to an inanimate material (Singer and Morrison (1948) refer to the
inanimate material as ‘model tissue’) such as a solid fibrin film or a gelatinous material to study how the stains might react to
tissues. What Mayer calls substitution models appear to be clear instances of what Bailer-Jones (2002a) describes as models being
used metaphorically. That is, Mayer’s substitution models are metaphorical models on the view of Bailer-Jones. Metaphorical
models transfer descriptive information from one domain (say model tissues) to another, structurally similar domain (say the tissues themselves). However, this is not necessarily a particular type of model, since any type of model can be used metaphorically.
I decided not to include the two additional Mayer identifies for these reasons.
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-

The anatomical test compares a model’s anatomical descriptions and explanations to the
anatomical background knowledge about the model’s focus.

-

The theoretical test compares a model’s descriptions and explanations to the biomechanical principles and morphological theories relevant to the model’s focus.

-

Laboratory experiments compare a model’s descriptions and explanations to the descriptions and explanations of a duplicated model that differs from the original model in at
least one variable to assess the original model’s ability to account for the model’s focus.

-

Natural experiments, according to Homberger, assess the ability of a model’s descriptions and explanations to “permit the incorporation of naturally occurring individual variations of the structural elements while remaining ‘operational’” (Homberger, 1988, p.
227).

These tests are used to assess the model during and after its construction. During the model
building process, these tests help morphologists detect the underdeveloped aspects of a model
and the descriptions and explanations that need the most attention. These tests also help ensure
the coherent assembly of a model’s components. After a model is constructed, that is, after the
descriptions and explanations are satisfactorily finalized and able to produce hypotheses, these
tests are used to assess the accuracy and adequacy of a model’s descriptions and explanations of
its focus.
As described earlier, morphologists begin their studies of features by modeling a feature’s
forms. This is followed by modeling a feature’s functions, which is then followed by modeling a
feature’s faculties. Important aspects of form-, function-, and faculty-models are discussed
below.
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1.2.8. Form-models
Forms of a feature are described and explained by what I shall call form-models. Form-models
synthesize observational data with background knowledge and biomechanical principles using
biomechanical methods and morphological theories to produce descriptions and explanations
about a feature’s forms. Each form-model has a single form as its focus, which it describes and
explains with a single model type and through a single model expression. Because a single
model will be unable to incorporate all of the available observational data about a form in its
descriptions and explanations, a morphologist will deploy multiple form-models of differing
types and expressions to adequately describe and explain a given form. The empirical and theoretical accuracy and adequacy of each form-model is ensured by subjecting them to the descriptive test, the anatomical test, and the theoretical test. Failure of an individual form-model to pass
either of these tests will signal to the morphologist that she needs to either add or subtract observational data or refine the model’s descriptions and explanations (or both).
Morphologists will often deploy multiple form-models to adequately describe and explain the
observational data acquired about a single form. Although each of these models will describe
and explain a subset of the total available data, they will be related by sharing a common focus.
Although any given model in the group will be unable to account for the entire set of observational data, the descriptions and explanations it produces from its subset of data must be coherent
with the descriptions and explanations produced by other models within the group. That is,
descriptions and explanations produced about the same focus should not contradict one another.
As in the case of individual model assessment for accuracy and adequacy, groups of formmodels are also subjected to the descriptive test, the anatomical test, and theoretical test. The
failure of a group of form-models to pass either of these tests will indicate to the morphologist
that one or more models in the group must be revised. Reapplication of these tests to the indi20

vidual models can aid the morphologist in detecting the model(s) in need of revision. Once at
least one form-model has been constructed, the morphologist can proceed with the construction
of function-models.

1.2.9. Function-models
Functions of a feature are described and explained by what I shall call function-models. Function-models synthesize observational data with background knowledge and biomechanical principles, as well as the descriptions and explanations produced by the form-models, using biomechanical methods and morphological theories to produce descriptions and explanations about a
feature’s functions. A function-model will incorporate only those descriptions and explanations
produced by form-models that are relevant to the forms underlying the function to be modeled.
Without the descriptions and explanations of underlying forms, a function-model will be grossly
incomplete in that it will lack precisely the information it needs to describe how a transition
occurs between two or more forms.
Because there are two modes of function, static and dynamic, a model describing and explaining a given function will either be a static function-model or a dynamic function-model.
There is no qualitative difference between static and dynamic function-models other than their
use of appropriate model types and media to best describe and explain their static or dynamic
foci. Whenever I discuss function-models, it will be in the sense of both static and dynamic
function-models, unless otherwise specified.
Like form-models, a single function-model, especially one focused on a dynamic function,
will be unable to account for the total available observational data about a function. Therefore,
as in the case of form-models, groups of function-models will be deployed to fully describe and
explain the available observational data. Hence, the same three tests (the descriptive test, the
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anatomical test, and the theoretical test) a morphologist uses to assess individual form-models
and groups of form-models are also used to assess individual function-models and groups of
function-models for their descriptive and explanatory adequacy and accuracy.
Also like form-models, function-models that describe and explain a single function are related in that they share the same set of observational data. Along with the three tests previously
mentioned, the coherence of function-models is also assessed using laboratory tests. Laboratory
tests are used because function-models lend themselves to experimental assessment given the
mechanical nature of their foci. From the descriptions and explanations produced by functionmodels, predictions about mechanical actions (both static and dynamic) can be derived, which
can be converted into an experimental design. The results of laboratory tests will indicate
whether a group of function-models is incoherent and whether one or more models should be
revised by the morphologist.
The descriptions and explanations produced by form-models and their corresponding function-models when taken together produce a form-function complex. Comparison between a
form-function complex and its biological importance for the organism allows a morphologist to
describe and explain its role for the organism through the construction of a faculty-model.

1.2.10. Faculty-models
Faculties of a feature are described and explained by what I shall call faculty-models. Facultymodels synthesize observational data with background knowledge and biomechanical principles,
as well as the descriptions and explanations produced by both form- and function-models, using
biomechanical methods and morphological theories to produce descriptions and explanations
about a feature’s faculties. As in the case of function-models, the construction of faculty-models
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requires the inclusion of the descriptions and explanations of the form- and function-models that
compose the form-function complex that the faculty-model is to describe and explain.
Similar to the dichotomy of function-models that describe and explain static and dynamic
functions, two variations of faculty-models are used for the description and explanation of internal and external faculties. There is no fundamental difference in the basic structure of internal
and external faculty-models other than the respective content they describe and explain. Therefore, the discussion of faculty-models that follows will apply to both internal and external faculty-models unless otherwise specified.
Faculty-models share many of the properties that I described above with form- and functionmodels. As with form- and function-models, a single faculty-model will be unable to account for
the total available observational data about any given faculty. Therefore, multiple facultymodels will be deployed to describe and explain a single faculty using different model types and
expressions. Similarly, the group of faculty-models will be related in that they will produce
descriptions and explanations of a common set of observational data. Like function-models, the
coherence between the models in a group of faculty-models can be assessed using the descriptive
test, the anatomical test, the theoretical test, and laboratory experiments, which can be applied to
the whole group or individual models. Failure of either the group or an individual model to pass
these tests will alert the morphologist that she needs to make refinements to one or more of the
models.
Faculty-models can also be subjected to a fifth type of test, natural experiments. Facultymodels describe and explain the faculties of a feature, which are the roles played by formfunction complexes in the life of an organism. However, the roles played by the form-function
complexes in the life of organisms will vary in extent and significance from one organism to
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another. A natural experiment is a comparison between a faculty-model (or group of facultymodels) and the natural variation in the faculty (being described and explained by the model or
group of models) across a range of individuals.
Natural experiments assess how well faculty-models are able to account for individual variation. Each time a faculty-model successfully passes the test of a natural experiment, its scope of
prediction expands, that is, the faculty-model can be said to account for a larger amount of organismal variation. If a faculty-model fails a natural experiment, then it will be unable to account for the level of variation used in the test. This may be due to a faculty-model’s limitations
or to an anomalous variant in the natural experiment. Because the descriptions and explanations
of faculty-models are in part based on the inclusion of the descriptions and explanations of formand function-models, natural experiments serve to assess how well form- and function-models
are able to account for individual variation as well. As a result, a morphologist is faced with the
difficulty of determining which models in the hierarchy need to be revised in order for the higher-level faculty models to successfully pass natural experiment tests. This total assessment is
integral to ensuring the accuracy and adequacy of the feature-model.

1.2.11. Feature-models
A feature is described and explained by the totality of the form-, function, and faculty-models. I
shall call the summation of these models the feature-model. The feature-model synthesizes the
totality of descriptions and explanations of its form-, function-, and faculty-models with background knowledge and biomechanical principles using biomechanical methods and morphological theories to produce descriptions and explanations about an organism’s feature. Given the
relationships described above between form-, function-, and faculty-models, feature-models are
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characterized as interdependent systems, such that alterations in one of its underlying models
could potentially affect other models as well as the whole.
Feature-models are amalgamations of their underlying form-, function-, and faculty-models,
but they are also distinct models such that discarding one or more of the form-, function-, or
faculty-models that underlie it will not necessitate discarding the feature-model itself. However,
feature-models are dependent on their underlying models in that the content of a feature-model’s
descriptions and explanations is predominantly derived from the descriptions and explanations
produced by its underlying models. A feature-model lacking underlying form-, function-, and
faculty-models is empirically impoverished and unable to produce novel descriptions and explanations.
The accuracy and adequacy of descriptions and explanations produced by feature-models are
a measure of how well the feature-model is able to account for the available observational data
about a feature within a given morphological scope. However, feature-models are only tested
indirectly through the assessment of their underlying models. Because feature-models are amalgamations of their underlying models, the predictions derived from feature-models will always
be made in reference to some aspect of the feature, such as its forms, functions, and faculties.
Therefore, any tests of the feature-model must be performed with reference to an individual
form-, function-, or faculty-model, or to a related group of form-, function-, and faculty-models.
Only the models underlying a feature-model can be directly tested. However, refinements made
to the underlying models as a result of testing serve to indirectly refine the descriptions and
explanations produced by the feature-model. Once its underlying models have been refined, the
descriptions and explanations of the feature-model can be reassessed for how well they are able
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to account for the available observational data. The underlying sub-models of the feature-models
can then be further refined. And so on.

1.3. Modeling the human bronchial tree
To illustrate how morphologists conceptualize and model organismal phenomena in practice, I
present a brief analysis of the morphological modeling of the human bronchial tree as a representation of an organismal feature. Following the structure of §1.2., I first discuss some relevant
background knowledge, biomechanical principles, biomechanical methods, and morphological
theories needed for modeling the bronchial tree. I then describe how the forms, functions, and
faculties of the bronchial tree are modeled and how they ultimately contribute to the formation of
a feature-model. Like nearly all anatomical structures, the human bronchial tree is too complex
to give a full rendering in just a few pages. Hence, I present only the basic elements needed to
appreciate the process of morphological modeling.

1.3.1. Background knowledge about the human bronchial tree7
The human bronchial tree facilitates the transport of air from the upper respiratory tract, which
includes the pharynx (mouth cavity) and larynx (voice box), down to the respiratory tissues in
the lungs. The “trunk” of the bronchial tree is called the trachea, and it lies superior8 to the

7

Background knowledge is acquired through years of education, training, and research, which cannot be adequately summarized in a
few paragraphs. I have instead used Gray’s Anatomy (2008) and a collection of journal publications as the source for the background knowledge presented here, because they represent an authoritative summary and/or review of the current knowledge we
have about the human bronchial tree.
8
Morphologists use specific terms to indicate location and directionality relative to the specimen under study. A standing human
with arms hanging on the sides of the body represents the standard anatomical position. Superior means “toward the head”. The
superior side of an anatomical structure is the side closest to the head, and likewise a blood vessel running superiorly means the
blood flow is toward the head. The opposite of superior is inferior. Lateral means “toward the external surface”, and medial
means “away from the external surface”. The lateral sides of the lungs are the sides closest to the ribs, and the medial sides of the
lungs are the sides closest to the heart. Distal means “away from a point of origin”, and proximal means “toward a point of origin”.
The elbow is more proximal to the shoulder than the distal phalanges (fingers).
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“branches”, that is, the bronchial “tree” resembles an upside down tree. During inspiration, air
enters the larynx from the pharynx before entering the trachea as it makes its way to the lungs.
The trachea runs inferiorly for approximately 10 cm before bifurcating just above the level of
the heart into the left and right principle (primary) bronchi. The left principle bronchus enters
the left lung without branching further, but the right principle bronchus bifurcates again to give
off the superior lobar (secondary) bronchus before entering the right lung as the right intermediate bronchus. Within each lung, the bronchi bifurcate multiple times to form ten structurally
separate and functionally independent respiratory regions within each lung called bronchopulmonary segments.
The right lung is divided into three lobes: a superior, middle, and inferior lobe. The superior
lobe is supplied by the superior lobar bronchus (secondary), which branches into three segmental
bronchi (tertiary) to supply the three bronchopulmonary segments (I, II, and III) that compose the
superior lobe. The middle lobe is supplied by a branch from the intermediate bronchus called the
middle lobar bronchus (secondary), which branches into two segmental bronchi (tertiary) to
supply the two bronchopulmonary segments (IV and V) that compose the middle lobe. After
giving off the middle lobar bronchus, the remnant of the intermediate bronchus becomes the
inferior lobar bronchus (secondary), which supplies the inferior lobe of the right lung. Within
the inferior lobe, the inferior lobar bronchus branches into five segmental bronchi (tertiary) to
supply the bronchopulmonary segments (VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X) that compose the inferior
lobe.
The left lung is divided into only two lobes: a superior and inferior lobe. After entering the
lung, the left principle bronchus (primary) bifurcates into the superior and inferior lobar bronchi
(secondary) to supply the superior and inferior lobes, respectively. Within the superior lobe, the
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superior lobar bronchus branches into five segmental bronchi (tertiary) to supply the bronchopulmonary segments (I, II, III, IV, and V) that compose the superior lobe. Likewise, the
inferior lobar bronchus branches within the inferior lobe to give the five segmental bronchi
(tertiary) that supply the bronchopulmonary segments (VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X) that compose
the inferior lobe.
Within each bronchopulmonary segment, the bronchi continue to bifurcate until their diameter decreases to reach approximately 1 mm. At this point, the bronchi are referred to as bronchioles, which are the last non-respiratory passages of the bronchial tree before reaching the alveoli
and alveolar sacs. The last bronchiole, the terminal bronchiole, carries air into the respiratory
bronchioles and the alveolar sacs. Alveoli are distributed along the sides of respiratory bronchioles. Alveoli are thin walled respiratory surfaces that facilitate gas exchange between the air
inside the lung and the surrounding pulmonary blood vessels. Respiratory bronchioles open into
chambers of alveoli called alveolar sacs. There are on average 300 million alveoli within the
lungs of an adult human, which provide approximately 143 m2 of respiratory surface area.
There are three widely used classification schemes for tracking the bifurcations of the bronchi distal to the segmental bronchi. The first and most intuitive scheme classifies the branches
by generations. The first generation usually begins at the trachea and continues to the bronchioles, with each child branch from the trachea on being one generation higher per bifurcation. For
example, the trachea, left principle bronchus, left superior lobar bronchus, and left segmental
bronchus (I) would be classified as generations 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The human bronchial
tree has a maximum of 23 generations, but generations can be assigned starting from any part of
the tree.
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The other two classification schemes are types of ordering schemes. Horsfield ordering
classifies the most distal bronchiole as order 1, and, moving proximally to the trachea, each
parent branch is assigned one order higher than the child branch of the highest order. For example, the parent branch of a child branch with order 1 and a child branch with order 5 will be
assigned order 6. In contrast to Horsfield ordering, Strahler ordering assigns the parent branch
one order higher only if both child branches have the same order. Otherwise, the parent branch in
Strahler ordering is assigned the same order as the highest ordered child branch. For example, a
parent branch with two child branches of order 3 will be assigned order 4, but a parent branch
with a child branch of order 3 and a child branch of order 2 will be assigned order 3. Unlike the
use of generations, ordering must begin at the terminal bronchioles, and, therefore, full
knowledge of the bronchial tree’s branching pattern is required before it can be ordered.

1.3.2. Biomechanical principles relevant to the human bronchial tree
There are many biomechanical principles about vertebrate lungs that a morphologist can utilize
in her study of the human airways. Karel F. Liem provides two important principles about vertebrate lungs. He states that a vertebrate “lung must be built as an elastic bag which must be able
to move freely so as to allow expansion and contraction of all its parts. Elasticity is important so
that its gas content can be ventilated” (Liem, 1988, p. 742). These two principles can be stated
more concisely as 1) vertebrate lungs must be able to change in volume, and 2) vertebrate lungs
must be continuously ventilated. Other principles can be derived from the two given by Liem.
For example, the second principle necessitates a route by which air can enter and exit the lungs.
By combining the first principle with the ideal gas law (PV = nRT)9, the changes in lung volume
will be due to a change in pressure, since the principle of homeostasis rules out changes in tem9

In the ideal gas law, PV=nRT, P stands for the gas pressure, V stands for the gas volume, n stands for the amount of moles of gas, R
stands for the gas constant, and T stands for temperature. Interestingly, the ideal gas law is itself a mathematical model.
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perature. As a token of vertebrate lungs, human lungs must adhere to these principles, so a study
of the airways in the lower respiratory tract must take into account these biomechanical principles.

1.3.3. Biomechanical methods relevant to the human bronchial tree
Fluid mechanics is a standard biomechanical method for studying the airways in the lower respiratory tract of human lungs because airflow through the airways is governed by the laws,
principles, and mechanical relationships of fluid of mechanics.

1.3.4. Morphological theories relevant to the human bronchial tree
There are two main theories about the process of ventilation in vertebrate lungs: the buccal pulse
pump theory and the aspiration pump theory. The buccal pulse pump theory10 says that air is
taken in through the mouth of an organism to fill a buccal chamber, from which the air is
pumped via muscular action into the lungs. This theory explains how air-breathing fish and
amphibians respire. According to the aspiration pump theory, air is not pumped into the lungs.
Rather the volume of the lungs is changed directly due to their placement within the pump itself.
This theory explains how many reptiles, birds, and mammals respire.
In mammals, air is drawn into the lungs by increasing the volume of the pleural cavity, which
decreases the internal pressure. According to theory, contraction of the diaphragmatic muscles
and costal muscles increases the volume of the pleural cavity and provides space for the lungs to
expand. The increased volume causes a decrease in internal pressure, which draws external air
into the lungs. Once expanded, the elasticity of the lungs and the relaxation of the diaphragmatic
muscles decrease the volume within the pleural cavity and the lungs, which increases the internal
10

Brainerd and Owerkowicz (2006) discuss a variation of the buccal pump theory, which explains gular pumping in tetrapods. It’s
status as a distinct theory, the gular pump theory, is undetermined.
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pressure, causing the air to be pushed out of the lungs. The airways in the lower respiratory tract
facilitate the transport of air in and out of the lungs in accordance with this mechanism. Therefore, a study of the airways must be able to integrate with other studies about the features of this
mechanism.
Modeling the human bronchial tree allows morphologists to address questions about the flow
rate, pressure, and distribution of air as it passes down the trachea and into the bronchi and bronchioles for respiration. Answers to these questions can provide important insights into respiratory physiology, the fluid dynamics of breathing, and how inhaled particles are deposited. The
studies discussed below are focused on answering the following question: What is the transport
pattern of air as it flows throughout the human bronchial tree?

1.3.5. Form-models of the human bronchial tree
Schmidt et al. (2004) described and explained the human bronchial tree using 18 visual and
mathematical form-models. Observational data for the models were collected from an individual
human lung that was excised from an adult male cadaver. Through the use of visual models
expressed through physical and 3D-virtual mediums and mathematical models expressed as
graphs, Schmidt et al. (2004) investigated the branching pattern and diameter diversity of bronchi in the lung’s bronchial tree.
First, they built two physical models using a liquid rubber solution. The first physical model
was made by injecting the rubber into the lumen of the entire bronchial tree. I refer to this model
as the rubber tree model. A second physical model was built by injecting the rubber solution
into the pulmonary blood vessels of the left lung. I refer to this model as the rubber vessel model. Once the rubber hardened, the surrounding lung tissue was digested away, leaving only the
rubber injected into the bronchial tree and pulmonary blood vessel models. Both models repre-
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sent the three dimensional configuration of the bronchial tree and the major left pulmonary vessels. Because these models were made using the actual specimen, they were used as reference
models for construction of the 3D-virtual and mathematical models.
In order to build the 3D-virtual and mathematical models, Schmidt et al. (2004) scanned the
rubber models using high-resolution computed tomography (HRCT). HRCT digitally “slices” a
specimen to produce image slices, which can be “stacked”, as shown in Figure 1, to virtually
reconstruct the three dimensional spatial configuration using computational programs. Because
raw HRCT data are acquired as x-ray absorption values in a 3D array, algorithms can be used to
mathematically analyze the data. The 3D-virtual and mathematical models were built using
computational programs and sophisticated algorithms.
First, a basic 3D-virtual model was built from the HRCT data using a threshold based segmentation algorithm. I refer to this model as the bronchi segmentation model. The bronchi
segmentation model is a 3D-virtual representation of the volume in the bronchial tree. This
means only the voxels11 pertaining to the absorption values of the rubber models are rendered.
Therefore, the bronchi segmentation model was compared to the rubber models for coherence
and so that imperfections on the rubber models could be removed from the bronchi segmentation
model. Schmidt et al. (2004) also used the rubber models as guides for distinguishing between
the bronchi and the pulmonary vessels rendered in the bronchi segmentation model. The order at
which bronchi could be distinguished from the pulmonary vessels in left lung was set as the
rendering threshold. That is, all branching below this order was eliminated from the right lung
in the bronchi segmentation model.

11

Voxels can be thought of as three dimensional or cubic pixels.
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Figure 1: Max-intensity projection of a 6 cm horizontal slab of the HRCT data displayed
with inverted grey scale. Taken from Schmidt et al. (2004, p. 204).
The bronchi segmentation model was used to build the second 3D-virtual model, which I
refer to as the bronchi surface model. A marching cube algorithm was applied to the bronchi
segmentation model, which removed the voxels inside the rendered bronchi to leave only a
smooth surface representing the external edge of each bronchial tube as shown in Figure 2. A
surface rendering can be further processed to acquire quantifiable data about the specimen, so the
representation produced by the bronchi surface model was used to build the mathematical model.
The mathematical model was built by skeletonizing the bronchi surface model. Skeletonization is an image processing module that erodes each surface down to a center line, which produces numerical data that can be further processed into a mathematical model. I refer to the
mathematical model as the bronchi skeleton model. A visual representation of the mathematical
model can be made using an abstracted graph, which describes the bronchial tree topology. I
refer to this visual rendering of the mathematical model as the bronchi topology model.
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Figure 2: Bronchi surface model extracted from the bronchi
segmentation model. Taken from Schmidt et al. (2004, p.
204).
In turn, the bronchi topology model was then used to produce a third 3D-virtual model that I
refer to as the geometric surface bronchi model. The geometric surface bronchi model represents the geometrical surface of the bronchial tree, shown in Figure 3, which can be used to
evaluate the volume and cross-sectional area of the bronchi, as well as to perform statistical
analyses of the bronchi branching patterns.
The fourth and final major 3D-virtual model built by Schmidt et al. (2004) represents the
spatial configuration of the lungs. The original HRCT data was “closed” using a morphological12 module to produce a surface rendering of the lungs. Zones where bronchial structures are
least dense were identified as boundaries of the lobes, and they were isolated using watershed
transformation. I refer to this model as the lung model. The lung model, along with the bronchi
12

Here, morphological refers to an image processing module, not biological morphology.
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Figure 3: Geometric surface bronchi model produced from
the bronchi topology model. Taken from Schmidt et al.
(2004, p. 204).
segmentation model, is shown in Figure 4. By combining the lung model with the geometric
surface bronchi model, the drainage volume of each lobe can be calculated.
From their study of the human bronchial tree form, Schmidt et al. (2004) concluded that the
branching pattern in the bronchial tree is highly asymmetric, meaning the child branches differ
greatly in their cross-sectional area. Bronchi with diameters between 2 mm and 3.5 mm showed
especial asymmetry in their branching, although asymmetric bifurcation is found throughout the
orders. Their results are important for the construction of function-models. According to
Schmidt et al. (2004), “any modeling and functional simulation of organs critically relies on the
precision and representativeness of the structural models available” (Schmidt et al., 2004, p.
209).
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Figure 4: Lung model with bronchi segmentation model. Taken from
Schmidt et al. (2004, p. 204).
1.3.6. Function-models of the human bronchial tree
Gemci, Ponyavin, Chen, Chen, and Collins (2008) built computational function-models using the
form-models built by Schmidt et al. (2004). Gemci et al. (2008) used computational simulations
to represent the changes in pressure and flow rate as air enters the trachea and travels down to the
leaves of the bronchial tree. The computational fluid dynamic algorithms were applied directly
to the geometric surface bronchi model and the underlying bronchi topology model built by
Schmidt et al. (2004).
To assess changes in pressure, the bronchi topology model was combined with computational
software called GAMBIT® to generate a mesh of computational cells, which were parameterized
for measuring the decrease in pressure from the tracheal opening to the lowest order bronchioles.
I refer to this model as the bronchi pressure model, which is shown in Figure 5. The bronchi
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Figure 5: Pressure distributions across the 17-generation bronchi
pressure model for a volumetric flow rate of 30 L per min. Taken
from Gemci, Ponyavin, Chen, Chen, and Collins (2008, p. 2050).

topology model was also used to perform a large eddy simulation (LES) to assess the presence of
inter-bronchial turbulent airflow.
The computational fluid dynamic analysis revealed that at a volumetric gas flow rate of 28.3
L/min into the trachea, the internal bronchial pressure dropped 50 Pa upon reaching the distal
bronchioles. This large pressure drop is due, according to Gemci et al. (2008), to the downstream increase in total cross-sectional area of bronchi, as described in the form-models built by
Schmidt et al. (2004). In their study, Gemci et al. (2008) also observed asymmetric pressure
drops, especially when comparing the pressure profile in the right and left lungs. This too is
most likely due to the asymmetric branching pattern indicated by the form-models of Schmidt et
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al. (2004), indicating the close dependence of the results from the computational analysis on the
results from the configuration analysis. The implications of combining the form-models with the
function-models serve to underwrite potential faculty-models.

1.3.7. Faculty-models of the human bronchial tree
There are many possible faculties of the bronchial tree. Based on the results of the form- and
function-models described above, Nakayama, Kuwahara, and Sano (2009) propose a facultymodel, which they call a simple one-dimensional mass transfer model, for the bronchial tree. I
refer to their model as the mass transfer model. According to the mass transfer model, the
branching pattern and pressure drop described by the models above results in “minimum overall
mass transfer resistance for the mass transport from the external air to the red blood cells”
(Nakayama et al., 2009, p. 351). In other words, the form-function complex of the bronchial tree
maximizes the transfer of oxygen from the alveolar sacs to the blood and, conversely, the transfer of carbon dioxide from the blood to the alveolar sacs. The form and function of the bronchial
tree maximizes the respiratory capacity of humans.

1.3.8. A feature-model of the human bronchial tree
The form-, function-, and faculty-models described above represent a fraction of the published
studies on the airflow within the human bronchial tree. Furthermore, these studies say nothing
about the blood supply, the innervation, and the histological structure of the bronchial tree. A
feature-model of the bronchial tree would require the inclusion of the form-, function-, and faculty-models about these areas relevant to the bronchial tree. Nevertheless, the brief analysis above
indicates the dependence of higher-level-models, such as a faculty-model, on the results of lower-level-models, because any change in the form-models described above would directly alter the
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function- and faculty-models that incorporated their representational results. Likewise, the chain
of airway models described above could be equally relevant for form-, function-, and facultymodels about the bronchial vessels and the tissues lining the inside of the bronchi that they supply. This multiple perspectival dependence characterizing morphological modeling necessitates
a philosophical analysis of this methodology, which I present in the following chapter.
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2. A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC MODELING
Scientific models appear to be, contrary to past research traditions, as central in scientific practice for describing and
communicating aspects of the empirical world as metaphors
are in ordinary language. (Bailer-Jones, 2002a, p. 124)

In the previous chapter, I described how models are deployed in morphology and how they aid
morphologists in their studies of organismal features. In this chapter, I focus on the philosophical aspects of morphological modeling by addressing the role models play in the interpretation
of morphological data and in the representation of organismal features to produce descriptions
and explanations about them. My philosophical analysis largely follows the work on scientific
models done by Daniela Bailer-Jones (1999, 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2005, 2009; Bailer-Jones
& Bailer-Jones, 2002). Although her work has primarily focused on the use of models in physics, I think her general views on scientific modeling can adequately account for morphological
models.
There are many philosophically interesting facets of morphological modeling, but I shall
focus on four main themes: the relationship between morphological data about an organismal
feature and the organismal feature itself (§2.1.); the relationships between morphological data,
morphological models, and organismal features (§2.2.); the relationships between organismal
features, morphological models, and morphological theories (§2.3.); and multiperspectival morphological models (§2.4.).

2.1. Morphological data and organismal features
When a morphologist sets out to model an organismal feature, one of her first and primary tasks
in the modeling process is to acquire morphological data about the feature being modeled. Acquiring data about a feature implies that morphological data and organismal features are distinct
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from one another. If we want to understand the role morphological models play in morphological investigations, we must first understand the relationship between the morphological data
upon which the model is based and the organismal feature that the model is intended to represent.
In order to understand the distinction between morphological data and organismal features,
much can be learned from a more general distinction between scientific data and natural phenomena. James Bogen and James Woodward (1988, 1992, 2005) (see also Bogen (2011) and
Woodward (1989, 2000)) argue that we should distinguish the phenomena scientists study from
the data scientists acquire about phenomena. They emphasize this distinction because of important differences they identify between data and phenomena. According to Bogen phenomena
“are processes, causal factors, effects, facts, regularities, and other pieces of ontological furniture
to be found in nature and in the laboratory…. Some phenomena are observable, but many are
not” (Bogen, 2011, p. 8), and according to Woodward, phenomena “are relatively stable and
general features of the world which are potential objects of explanation and prediction by general
theory” (Woodward, 1989, p. 393). Ian Hacking further elaborates by claiming that the word
‘phenomenon’ “has a fairly definite sense in the common writings of scientists. A phenomenon
is noteworthy. A phenomenon is discernible. A phenomenon is commonly an event or process
of a certain type that occurs regularly under definite circumstances” (Hacking, 1983, p. 221).
Morphologists are interested in modeling and explaining organismal features. Based on
Bogen and Woodward’s notion of phenomenon, we can take organismal features as being kinds
of phenomena, specifically kinds of organismal phenomena. Organismal phenomena can be
directly observed (processes, effects, and facts) or indirectly detected (causal factors and regularities). Direct observations are made by our unmediated (although not necessarily unaided when
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instruments such as microscopes are used) senses, whereas indirect observations are made by
mediated senses (x-ray tomography). Therefore, organismal phenomena are discernible by
morphologists and are often the subject of systematic investigation. That is, morphologists can
acquire data about organismal phenomena using various means of observation. If we return to
the distinction made by Bogen and Woodward between phenomena and data, we can begin to see
that data about phenomena are distinct from phenomena themselves. When a morphologist
acquires data about a particular organismal phenomenon, she is not collecting parts or aspects of
the phenomenon itself. Rather, the data she is acquiring are something distinct from, yet nevertheless related to the phenomenon of interest. So, what are data?
According to Bogen and Woodward, data are records of “effects produced by elaborate
causal processes that may involve the operation of the human perceptual and cognitive systems
as well as measuring and recording devices and many other sorts of natural and manufactured
non-human systems” (Bogen & Woodward, 2005, p. 234). According to Woodward (2000),
these effects result from a systematic causal interaction between an observer and a phenomenon,
which may be facilitated by experimentation, photography, and other measuring or recording
devices. Woodward describes this interactive process as data production. So, while morphologists are not collecting actual parts or aspects of organismal phenomena, they are recording or
reporting the detectable effects the parts and aspects of organismal phenomena produce as a
result of our causal interaction with them.
According to Bogen and Woodward (1988, 1992), there are many causal factors involved in
data production, such as the experimental setup, the measuring or recording devices used, and,
most importantly, the beliefs of the observer. The observer’s beliefs play an important role in
how data are produced, because the observer’s beliefs determine the methods used to produce
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data. The choices regarding the experimental setup, such as determining the controls and variables, the observational medium, such as microscopes and CT scanners, the observational perspective, such as the specimen orientation and lighting, etc., are all dependent upon the beliefs of
the observer. Because each of these choices leads to different possible scenarios of data acquisition, the beliefs of an observer play a central role in what kinds of data are produced.
According to Bogen and Woodward the content of the data an observer produces is not,
however, dependent upon the observer’s beliefs. Data can be shared and analyzed in the form of
public reports or records by a community of scientists without reference to the beliefs of the
observer who produced the data. That is, data can be assessed independently of the mental states
of the observer who produced them. For example, a morphologist can adjust the focal point or
magnification of a microscope while acquiring photographic data about an organismal feature in
order to accommodate her beliefs about the best conditions for data acquisition. Her beliefs may
differ from her colleague’s beliefs about how best to acquire the data, and as a result, she and her
colleague will produce different photographs, that is, they will each produce different datasets.
However, the content of each photograph will be independent of the beliefs behind their production. That is, once the photograph is produced, the content of the image cannot be materially
altered by the beliefs of the scientist viewing it. In summary, while the data production process
is heavily theory-laden, the content of the data produced is not.
According to Bogen and Woodward, the production of data about a phenomenon is not
equivalent to the observation of a phenomenon. The large number of causal factors involved in
data production can potentially (and most likely do) contribute to observational error. Observational error occurs when effects not produced by the phenomenon of interest are recorded as if
they were. If data about a phenomenon is equivalent to the phenomenon itself, then the constitu-
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tion of the phenomenon will be dependent upon the influences of the causal factors present
during observation. Because the beliefs of the observer are also causal factors themselves, conflating data with phenomenon means equating an observer’s beliefs about a phenomenon to the
phenomenon’s constitution. If this is so, then the beliefs a morphologist has about the constitution of a particular organismal feature will directly affect its material nature. But, it seems unlikely (see Chapter 3) that the beliefs a morphologist has about the constitution of her own lung
will play a role in dictating its constitution. So, how do scientists determine which reported or
recorded effects are caused by the phenomenon of interest and which are not?
According to Woodward, phenomena are detected within a data report or record through a
process he calls data interpretation. He describes data interpretation as
the use of arguments, analytic techniques, and patterns of reasoning which operate on the data so
produced to reach conclusions about phenomena. Typical components of this stage are techniques
of data analysis and reduction, including statistical procedures of various sorts and procedures for
smoothing, transforming, and discarding data. Data interpretation may also include the explicit
use of background or theoretical assumptions… (Woodward, 2000, p. S165)

In other words, data interpretation is a theory-laden process used to derive claims about phenomena from data reports or records. For example, once a morphologist produces a set of photographs of an organismal feature, she and her colleagues must interpret the photographs using
their expertise, which may lead to different conclusions about the phenomenon the photographs
represent. However, data interpretation does not dictate the content of data reports or records;
the content of data reports or records is equally independent from the beliefs involved in data
interpretation as it is from the beliefs involved in data production. Rather, data interpretation
determines which subsets of data within data reports or records shall count as evidence for the
detection of a phenomenon. In other words, evidence for a phenomenon will be whatever data a
morphologist determines by theoretical judgment to be caused or produced by the phenomenon
itself. For example, not all of the pixels composing a photograph of an organismal feature will
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be useful to a morphologist; only certain regions of the photograph will provide evidence for the
feature, and these regions must be identified by the theoretical judgment of the morphologist.
That is, data interpretation is a process in which only those reported or recorded effects that are
produced by the phenomenon of interest are isolated and used to make claims about the phenomenon. According to Bogen, data’s “epistemic usefulness depends on features whose possession
reflects the causal influence that phenomena or closely related causal factors exert on their production” (Bogen, 2011, p. 8).
An important consequence of Bogen and Woodward’s view is that some data may be epistemically useless. Some data thought to be about a phenomenon may actually not be about it,
because not all of the data produced are necessarily produced by the phenomenon of interest.
Remember, many causal factors play a role in data production, including the beliefs of the observer. According to Bogen, scientists “apply background knowledge and inferential techniques” (Bogen, 2011, p. 8) to datasets in order to determine which parts are relevant and which
are not. This has an even more interesting consequence: when scientists say they have “observed” a phenomenon, what they mean is that they have, according to Bogen and Woodward,
detected an evidential pattern or signal within the dataset they have collected.13
Morphologists acquire morphological data about organismal phenomena, and they interpret
the data they produce in order to cull epistemically useless data and to acquire an accurate description of their feature of interest. For example, after acquiring data from high-resolution
computer tomography (HRCT) imaging of a human lung, Schmidt et al. (2004) interpreted their
large datasets by applying a threshold-based algorithm to isolate only those data they judged to
13

McAllister (1997) argues against the claim by Bogen and Woodward that phenomena can be detected as patterns in a dataset, since
there are a multitude of possible patterns that can be “detected” depending on theoretical assumptions of the interpreter. BailerJones (2009), therefore, suggests that we identify phenomena as things, processes, etc. that have the potential to be theoretically
explained. It follows from her view that phenomena can be identified prior to the production of data, although we won’t be able to
say much about them until the data is interpreted.

45

be epistemically useful. As I illustrated in Chapter 1, morphologists often rely to a large degree
on the aid of morphological models for the interpretation of their data. As I describe in the next
section, morphological models play a key role in the interpretation of data about organismal
features, and the representations models produce as a result of their role in data interpretation
serve as a key source of information and explanation about those features.

2.2. Morphological data, models, and organismal features
The intended result of the process of data interpretation is the production of new and informative
(and testable) claims about phenomena of interest that can be used with scientific theories to
produce explanations and predictions. Morphologists use a variety of methods to interpret their
data, including statistics, image processing modules, and data thresholding.14 However, due to
the complexity of organismal phenomena and the likely consequence of acquiring large datasets,
morphologists often deploy models to aid in the data interpretation process. Modeling is a helpful methodology because, according to Bailer-Jones, models “only address aspects of the phenomenon and only take into consideration selected pieces of information about the phenomenon”
(Bailer-Jones, 2000, p. 51). That is, models help morphologists focus on limited subsets of data
at a time without having to account for the entire dataset. By using models, datasets can be
broken down into manageable sizes, which can be analyzed in greater detail than would be possible by analyzing the dataset as a whole.
If we follow the distinction Bogen and Woodward make between data and phenomena, then
it should be apparent that the process of modeling phenomena from data will not be straightforward. Bailer-Jones identifies three types of models that scientists, including morphologists, may
deploy during the data interpretation process: a data production model, a data model, and a theo14

Data thresholding works when each datum within a dataset is assigned a numerical value and a threshold is set such that all data
above or below the threshold are eliminated.
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retical scientific model. On my view, a data production model is an interpretative description of
the procedures, both experimental and non-experimental, used for the production of data.15 A
data production model may be as simple as a diagrammatic model of a microscope used to aid
observation or as intricate as a model of the steps involved in the methods for the statistical
analysis of phylogenetic trees such as maximum likelihood or bootstrapping. However, data
production models are not models of the data produced. According to Bailer-Jones, data production models are models “about the conception of the experiment and not about the actual empirical results that the experiment may produce” (Bailer-Jones, 2009, p. 171). Nevertheless, data
production models lead to claims about experimental or observational setups, and these claims
can be assessed based on their ability to produce reliable data, that is, data that serve as evidence
for phenomena.
According to Bailer-Jones and Bailer-Jones (2002) and Bailer-Jones (2009), data models are
interpretative descriptions about datasets. They serve “to put raw data in canonical form”
(Bailer-Jones, 2009, p. 171) by correcting measurement errors or detecting trends or patterns.
Data models can be as simple as graphs, which link formally disparate data points together in a
relationship, such as a quadratic, linear, or polynomial relationship, or they can be as complicated as multilevel flow charts that describe various algorithms of error analysis. According to
Bailer-Jones (2009), data models identify relevant facts about datasets, but they do not identify
facts about phenomena. In other words, data models help scientists eliminate irrelevant data or
noise from datasets, but they do not lead to claims about the phenomenon that played a role in
producing the data. According to Bailer-Jones and Bailer-Jones, data models

15

What I call data production models, Bailer-Jones refers to as models of experiments. I felt that the name she used was too restrictive based on her analysis, since data can be acquired using both literal experiments with precisely defined controls and variables,
and less precisely defined empirical investigations that may involve nothing more than a microscope. I intend for my use of the
terms ‘data production’ to cover the use of both strictly experimental and non-experimental methods of data production.
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are application-neutral. They are specific to a type of data analysis problem, but not to the nature
of the specific empirical problem…. From which empirical phenomenon the data derive, or if they
even derive from an empirical phenomenon, is secondary, just as long as the problem representation conforms to some very general requirements. (Bailer-Jones & Bailer-Jones, 2002, p. 14,
emphasis in original)

Bailer-Jones and Bailer-Jones (2002) and Bailer-Jones (2009) refer to models that lead to
claims about phenomena as theoretical scientific models.16 According to Bailer-Jones, a theoretical scientific model
is an interpretative description of a phenomenon that facilitates access to that phenomenon…. This
access can be perceptual as well as intellectual.17 If access is not perceptual, it is often facilitated
by visualization, although this need not be the case. Interpretative descriptions may rely, for instance, on idealizations or simplifications or on analogies to interpretative descriptions of other
phenomena. Facilitating access usually involves focusing on specific aspects of a phenomenon,
sometimes deliberately disregarding others. As a result, models tend to be partial descriptions only. (Bailer-Jones, 2009, pp. 1-2) Scientific models are singularly about empirical phenomena (objects and processes), whether these are how metals bend and break or how man has evolved.
(Bailer-Jones, 2002a, p. 109)

In contrast to data models, theoretical scientific models (theoretical models hereafter) are specific to particular phenomena, and they are theoretical because they are developed using scientific
theories and concepts that apply to the phenomena of interest (Bailer-Jones & Bailer-Jones,
2002, p. 13). Theoretical models lead to new information or facts about phenomena that can be
described and explained using higher level theories. These models lead to facts about phenomena by identifying theoretical links between the claims identified by data models. That is, theoretical models serve as a bridge between empirical data and theory about phenomena (Bailer-Jones,

16

The notion of theoretical models Bailer-Jones subscribes to should not be confused with the notion of theoretical models typically
associated with the semantic view of scientific theories (as understood by Giere (1988); Suppe (1972, 1977, 2000); Suppes (1960);
Van Fraassen (1980)). Rather, Bailer-Jones’ notion of theoretical model is similar to what Demetris Portides describes as phenomenological models, which “are constructed by the deployment of semi-empirical results, often by the use of ad hoc hypotheses, or
by the use of a conceptual apparatus that is not directly related to fundamental theory and not always straightforwardly compatible
with the theoretical calculus” (Portides, 2011, p. 335).
17
Theoretical scientific models may be more interpretative or more descriptive depending on the particular problems they are
deployed to help address. Ankeny (2000) argues that descriptive models address “what” forms of questions instead of “how” or
“why” forms of questions that are addressed by more interpretative or explanatory models. He argues that descriptive models are
precursors to more interpretative or explanatory models. Chin (2011) argues that we should further distinguish between interpretative models and explanatory models. He claims that explanatory models are concerned with explaining how some parts of a phenomenon fit together or behave, whereas interpretative models bring new meaning or new conceptualizations to a phenomenon’s
behavior or construction.
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2009). The relationship between theoretical models, data models, and phenomena is described
by Bailer-Jones as follows:
The theoretical model plays an important role in applying theory to phenomena because it provides the link to the data model of data derived from the phenomenon. The theory is applied to
the phenomenon only via the theoretical model, and the theory is only every confirmed via the
theoretical model that links it to the data model. So theories are linked to empirical findings indirectly: via the theoretical and via the data model (and whatever else lies in between). Finally, the
way a phenomenon is delineated is closely tied to the theoretical model about the phenomenon,
which in turn is shaped by theoretical assumptions that go into its formulation. (Bailer-Jones,
2009, pp. 173-174)

Theoretical models are a source of claims about phenomena through their role in representing phenomena.18 Representation is a complex and controversial philosophical notion, which I
do not have space to fully explore here. Instead, I follow the account of representation and its
relationship to models as given by Bailer-Jones. At base, representations of phenomena are
descriptive and interpretative depictions of phenomena. According to Bailer-Jones,
[m]odels are, in the widest sense, a description of the phenomena they are about. ‘Description’ is
here intended as a term wide enough to admit various different forms of external representations,
propositional and nonpropositional—for example, texts, diagrams, plots of empirical data, objects,
or mathematical equations. These ‘external representations’ are tools in terms of which the model
is expressed. These tools are chosen such that the description is not purely phenomenal, but one
that aims at an interpretation of the phenomenon in question. (Bailer-Jones, 2009, pp. 185-186)

In other words, the interpretative descriptions of models are expressed through various media,
such as diagrams, clay figures, or propositions, and these expressions represent the phenomenon
or some aspect of the phenomenon that the model is about.
Bailer-Jones identifies three factors that play an important role in representation: function,
selection, and the model user. According to Bailer-Jones, each model is deployed to fulfill a
particular function. She identifies two levels at which models fulfill their functions. At the first
level, models can fulfill different types of functions such as explanation (Achinstein, 1968;
18

Some philosophers, such as Murad (2011), identify representation as a position within the philosophical view known as scientific
realism. However, De Regt (2005) argues that antirealists can adopt a view of representation, which only includes reference to
observables. Therefore, I do not think my discussion of representation at this point necessarily commits my philosophical analysis
of models to a realist view prior to my discussion of realism in Chapter 3.
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Harré, 1960; Hesse, 1966), technical application (Morrison, 1998, p. 73), guiding experimentation (Hesse, 1953, p. 199; Hutten, 1954, p. 289), promoting creative insight (Harré, 1970; Hesse,
1966), and imagination (Harré, 1970, pp. 34-35; Hutten, 1954, p. 285).19 For example, a plastic
model of the human lungs will fulfill its function of helping a young medical student imagine the
spatial configuration of the lungs within her cadaver to aid her dissection, but it will not fulfill
the function of explaining respiratory biomechanics to the student. Rather, an explanation of
respiratory biomechanics requires a different model with a different representation. That is, the
representation a model produces will depend on the type of function it must fulfill.
According to Bailer-Jones, the second level where models fulfill their functions occurs when
models fulfill different functions within the same type of function. This occurs when multiple
models are deployed to represent different aspects of the same phenomenon. These multiple
sub-models are deployed to represent a subset of data claims produced by data models instead of
all the claims about the entire dataset. For example, form-, function-, and faculty-models are
sub-models deployed to represent particular aspects of an organismal feature, and neither of
these models represents the organismal feature in its entirety.
The second factor Bailer-Jones identifies in representation is selection. Because phenomena,
especially organismal phenomena, exhibit a high degree of complexity, scientists must be selective about which aspects they focus on and model. This factor, as discussed above, is a necessary consequence of models having multiple functions within a single type of function. In order
to explain a complex phenomenon, it must be “deconstructed” into isolatable aspects that can be
independently modeled by the deployment of sub-models. By localizing models to specific
aspects, scientists are better able to manage the complexity of the entire phenomenon. For ex-

19

These are the references Bailer-Jones (2003, p. 70) cites to support her claims.
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ample, form-models are deployed by morphologists to represent only the forms of an organismal
feature, function-models are deployed to represent only the functions, and faculty-models are
deployed to represent only the faculties. In other words, models will represent what they are
selected to represent.
The selective deployment of sub-models depends on what Bailer-Jones identifies as the third
factor in representation, the model user. Models are selectively deployed to fulfill chosen functions. The selection and function of a model are dependent upon the intentions of model users,
and determining the function of a model and the deployment of sub-models requires a certain
amount of creativity (Bailer-Jones, 1999). The creativity of the model user is especially important for bringing the sub-models and their representations together into a unified model of a
phenomenon. Bailer-Jones describes the process of amalgamating sub-models into one unified
model as embedding. Embedding is a process by which a model user eliminates or minimizes
inconsistencies between sub-models and produces a unified representation of the entire phenomenon (or at least the sum total of the aspects represented by the sub-models). In morphology, for
example, the form-, function, and faculty-models are embedded by a morphologist within a
feature-model to produce a representation of the entire feature.
These three factors play an important role in determining the epistemic worth of a model’s
representation and the claims derivable from it. Bailer-Jones claims that model representations,
which are usually expressed in non-propositional forms (visual), can sometimes entail propositions. According to Bailer-Jones,
the propositions thus entailed by a model state what the model is taken to state about the phenomenon modelled. The propositions are not the model, but the model can be transcribed into propositions that express its ‘message’. Some propositions are (trivially) entailed by the model because they
may be necessary to constitute that particular model, e.g. certain assumptions made in the model.
Propositions are less trivially entailed by a model if, for instance, a geometrical configuration may be
a substantial element of the model. Such a configuration can then be captured and described by
propositions, but is not itself propositional. (For example, one may propositionally state the angle
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which the oxygen and hydrogen atoms form in a water molecule; the angle may otherwise be expressed by a rods and balls model.) So, propositions can be entailed by a model whether the model
is expressed by propositional or by non-propositional means. Thus I do not limit myself to models
being either propositional or non-propositional. In fact, partial propositionality may be not all that
uncommon in models. (Bailer-Jones, 2003, p. 60)

Because propositions can be true or false, the entailment of propositions by models can provide
some indication as to the truth or falsity of models. As Bailer-Jones points out, the assessment of
the truth and falsity of entailed propositions is an ominous possibility for models, since models
are notorious for entailing false propositions due to the abstractions, idealizations, and simplifications of their representations as compared to the phenomena they represent. Yet, models seem
to play an important role in the inductive and explanatory successes of our scientific practices no
matter how abstract (Love, 2008; Morrison, 1999), idealized (Greaves, 1995; Love, 2010;
McMullin, 1985), or false (Wimsatt, 1987) they may be. The entailment of false propositions
combined with the important role their representations play in scientific research precludes a
straight up or down judgment as to the truth and falsity of models. They are neither absolutely
true nor absolutely false.
We can, however, assess the partial truth or falsity of models by closely examining which
entailed propositions are true and which are false. Bailer-Jones (2009) identifies three possible
reasons why a model’s representation might entail false propositions: representational inaccuracy, inconsistency, and incompleteness. According to Bailer-Jones, models may inaccurately
represent phenomena because their interpretative descriptions are based on approximations and
simplifications. Approximations and simplifications result from a process Bailer-Jones calls
idealization, “whereby existing properties of a phenomenon are changed deliberately to make
modeling easier” (Bailer-Jones, 2009, p. 148).
Following Ernan McMullin (1985), Bailer-Jones identifies two different ways in which
idealization can affect the truth or falsity of the propositions entailed by a model’s representa-
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tion: construct idealization and causal idealization. According to Bailer-Jones (2003), construct
idealization involves the simplification of the conceptual representation of the phenomenon, not
the phenomenon itself. We enact a form of construct idealization, for example, when we assume
the Earth’s orbit is circular, rather than slightly elliptical. Construct idealizations are often used
in morphology where complexity can be overwhelming. In their studies of air flow within the
bronchi of the human lung, Schmidt et al. (2004) modeled the walls of the bronchi as smooth
tubes without taking into account the surface imperfections within the bronchi caused by the
topography of surrounding cartilaginous rings. This simplification allows for easier air flow
calculations, because localized turbulence caused by the imperfections of the bronchial walls,
which are not directly related to the overall air flow, are not included in the parameters. These
simplifications can be “de-idealized” at a later stage if localized turbulence becomes explanatorily relevant.20
In contrast to construct idealization, causal idealization, according to Bailer-Jones, involves
the simplification of the problem situation or phenomenon itself. Causal idealization ignores
relevant causes or factors that could play a role in the model’s representation by focusing on one
or two causes. For example, we commit a causal idealization if we assume there are no other
planets in our solar system when we study the orbit of the Earth around the Sun. Causal idealizations are quite common in morphological models, and most commonly occur in biomechanical
models, which represent organismal structures as levers and pulleys (see for example Greaves
(1995)). In other words, causal idealization assumes the phenomenon is something it is not in
order to make modeling it easier.21 This is in contrast to construct idealization, which acknowledges the complexity of the phenomenon, but selectively idealizes certain aspects not directly
20

Portides (2005) describes “de-idealization” as a process of concretization, since the model is becoming more like the concrete
phenomenon it represents.
21
In my view, the classic technique of “rounding the cow” is a form of causal idealization.
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related to the function of the model. In short, construct idealization leads to simple models,
whereas causal idealization leads to models of simple phenomena.
In the case of construct idealizations, a model’s representation can entail propositions about
the selected aspect or about its idealized parts. For example, a model of the bronchi in the human lungs can entail propositions about the overall air flow through the bronchi, which is the
selected aspect, or about localized turbulence due to internal imperfections. The former entailed
propositions are more likely to be true than the latter, since the latter refer to intentionally idealized parts. False propositions about the idealized parts will be tolerated so long as the propositions about the selected aspect are approximately true. After all, only the latter propositions are
relevant to the model’s function.
In the case of causal idealization, a model’s representation will be based on an idealized
phenomenon. Hence, most of the propositions it entails will be false, regardless of whether they
are about the selected aspect or not. While these models may provide an interesting metaphor
(Bailer-Jones, 2002a; 2009, pp. 117-121; Black, 1962), act as an analogue (Bailer-Jones, 2002a;
2009, p. 56; Hesse, 1966), or play some other heuristic role, their representations should not be
taken as accurate depictions of the aspects they have been selected to represent. Although models produced with causal idealization are more obviously false than those produced with construct idealization, causally idealized models can still play an important role in scientific explanation (see for example Love (2010)).
According to Bailer-Jones, models may inconsistently represent phenomena because their
interpretative descriptions may contradict accepted principles or known facts. For example, the
models deployed by Gemci et al. (2008) representing the airflow in the bronchi of the human
lungs did not account for the differences in viscosity between “normal” air and air inside the
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lungs. Air inside the lungs is heated and humidified, which changes the viscosity of the air and
affects its rate of flow and flow vector. Because the models deployed by Gemci et al. (2008)
neglect this information, their representations are inconsistent with known facts. Therefore,
entailed propositions about airflow will not be as accurate as they could be by taking these
known facts into account.
According to Bailer-Jones, models often represent phenomena incompletely. As I discussed
above, models are usually deployed to represent a particular aspect of a phenomenon, and, as a
consequence, they usually neglect to include a large portion of data about a phenomenon in their
representations. For example, form-models are deployed to represent the forms of an organismal
feature, but they say nothing about the functions and faculties the feature possesses. Hence,
propositions entailed by model representations will only be about a part of a total phenomenon,
and so while they tell us something about the phenomenon, they will be strictly false when compared to the phenomenon as a whole.
In summary, representational inaccuracy, inconsistency, and incompleteness are three possible reasons why the representations of models might entail false propositions. However, only the
entailed propositions that are deemed relevant will play a role in the assessment or test of a
model. That is, propositions not directly relevant to a model’s function will have a negligible
impact on a model’s assessment if they turn out to be false. Because a model’s function is determined by model users, model users decide which entailed propositions are important and
which can be accepted if false. This means that the important question a model user must ask is
not whether a model is strictly true or strictly false, but rather which part of a model is accurate
or inaccurate. This judgment is especially important since, according to Bailer-Jones, not all of a
model’s representational content will necessarily entail assessable propositions, because some
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information contained within a representation may only be conveyed through non-propositional
means.
We can now gain a clearer understanding of how modeling works in morphology. I think the
picture is something like the following: Morphologists deploy data production models to guide
their acquisition of data about organismal phenomena. These models may describe a formal
experimental procedure to be carried out in a laboratory setting, or they may describe a plan of
action for carrying out field work in the Amazon Rainforest. Once data are produced, morphologists set about analyzing them with the help of data models. A data model might provide a
detailed mathematical representation of a data set, or it might describe a simple algorithm for
chronologically arranging hundreds of pictures acquired during field work in the Amazon. Then,
morphologists attempt to link the descriptions given by data models with the phenomenon they
intend to study by deploying theoretical models. Theoretical models, such as form-, function-,
faculty-, and feature-models help morphologists interpret the claims derived from their data
models by providing interpretative descriptions of the phenomenon by reference to data model
claims using morphological theories. The representations produced by theoretical models are
empirically confirmed (disconfirmed) by comparing the propositional and non-propositional
content they contain to the claims derived from data models. The results of testing provide an
indication to morphologists whether the representations produced by theoretical models should
be changed or discarded.

2.3. Organismal features, models, and morphological theories
Morphologists use the interpretations provided by data models as a bridge to relate observational
data with theoretical models, which allow data models to connect with organismal phenomena.
In other words, morphological models serve as a link between observational data and organismal
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phenomena. I now want to address how morphological models also serve to link individual
organismal phenomena to morphological theories. This latter link is important, because morphologists study particular organismal phenomena in order to generate explanations about classes of phenomena in the form of morphological theories. Without a link between particular
phenomena and theory, it will not be possible to build or test theories from observations of individual phenomena. So, what role do morphological models play in connecting particular organismal phenomena to morphological theories?
Bailer-Jones (2005, 2009) argues that an important difference between models and theories is
that models are about concrete empirical phenomena, but theories are not.22 Models produce
interpretative descriptions of particular or concrete phenomena. In other words, models provide
descriptions of the properties phenomena possess. Theories, according to Bailer-Jones, are
abstract descriptions distilled from particular descriptions about phenomena. Bailer-Jones takes
abstraction to be “a process where properties are taken away from a phenomenon, and are not
replaced by another property” (Bailer-Jones, 2005, p. 249).23 We can, therefore, think of theories
as general descriptions that cover a wide range of phenomena and are not particular to a specific
set of phenomenological properties. That is, theories do not provide direct descriptions about
phenomena in the way that models do. According to Bailer-Jones, “if at all, theories are about
concrete phenomena only in a very derivative sense” (Bailer-Jones, 2005, p. 248). For example,
the hydraulic principle proposed by Gutmann (1988) is a morphological theory that describes the
functional aspects of morphological forms across a wide range of taxa. The hydraulic principle
is as applicable to a lamprey as it is to a jellyfish. That is, the hydraulic principle is not a de-

22

Her distinction between models and theories largely follows the analogy Cartwright and Le Poidevin (1991) make between models
and fables, which tell a concrete story, and theories and morals of fables, which those concrete stories instantiate.
23
Bailer-Jones (2005) distinguishes abstraction from idealization, which she claims involves the changing of properties rather than
their omission.
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scription particular to the properties of lampreys or jellyfish. Rather, the hydraulic principle has
been distilled from particular descriptions of lampreys, jellyfish, and a host of other taxa.
Bailer-Jones claims that models and theories are dependent upon one another, such that it
would be unlikely for one to exist without the other. She claims that without models, theories
would have no way of relating to observational data, because observational data are acquired
from particular phenomena and theories apply to wide ranges of phenomena. Models link observational data to theories by providing interpretative descriptions of particular phenomena, which
taken together can be distilled down into a theory. Models depend on theories, because, according to Bailer-Jones (2005), the interpretative descriptions characterizing models are produced
within a theoretical framework with certain ramifications and boundary conditions. For example, the hydraulic principle would not play a role in models about volcanism, because volcanism
is a phenomenon outside the framework of morphology.
In summary, theories only apply to concrete phenomena via models, and models are only
able to produce interpretative descriptions within the appropriate frameworks indicated by reference to theories. This means that the successful use of theories in deriving explanations and
predictions depends in large part on the interpretative descriptions of models. Furthermore, it
means that the accuracy of the interpretative descriptions produced by models depends in large
part on the guidance they receive in their formulation from relevant theories.24

2.4. Multiperspectival morphological models
As a final component in my philosophical analysis of morphological modeling, I now argue that
feature-models are kinds of what I call multiperspectival models. Multiperspectival models are
types of what Bailer-Jones (1999, 2000, 2009) calls over-all models. Over-all models are mod24

Due to the theoretical dependence of the descriptions and representations produced by models, I do not think they should be
considered strictly autonomous in the sense of Morrison (1999).
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els composed of embedded sub-models. Morphological models are types of over-all models
because form-, function-, and faculty-models (sub-models) are embedded within feature-models
(over-all models). On my view, there are three ways sub-models must be related in order to be
multiperspectival: they must stand in a focused-based-relation, a combinatorial-based-relation,
and a hierarchical-based-relation with one another. These three relations describe how the representations sub-models produce can influence one another as well as the over-all model itself.
Recall from section 1.2.6. Model Parameters in Chapter 1 that a model’s focus is the aspect
of a phenomenon the model represents, that a model’s type is a model’s kind, which can be
conceptual, visual, or mathematical, and that a model’s expression is its medium of representation, which can be non-propositional, such as diagrams, graphs, or virtual renderings, or it can be
propositional. Also recall that form-, function-, and faculty-models are hierarchically related.

2.4.1. Focused-based-relations
On my view, two or more sub-models stand in a focused-based-relation if they share a common
focus, that is, if they represent the same aspect of a phenomenon. For example, in the study by
Schmidt et al. (2004), two form-models, a segmentation model and a geometric model, were
deployed to represent the form of the human bronchial tree. Although the representations of submodels that share this relationship may differ in their medium of expression, they can be compared for informational consistency and adequacy. For example, if the segmentation model
represents a smaller number of bronchial bifurcations than the geometric model, then the representations of the models will be inconsistent. Inconsistent representations indicate that one or
more sub-models are either inadequately or inaccurately representing their focus, which will alert
the morphologist that she needs to collect more data or to revise a sub-model’s representation of
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data that are currently available. Focus-based-relations are horizontal relations that hold among
two or more sub-models on the same level in a hierarchy of sub-models.

2.4.2. Combinatorial-based-relations
On my view, two or more sub-models on the same level in a hierarchy of sub-models stand in a
combinatorial-based-relation if the information contained in their representations is combined
within a higher-level model to produce a higher-level representation. For example, the representations produced by the segmentation and lung form-models built by Schmidt et al. (2004) were
combined in the study by Gemci et al. (2008) to build a function-model of airflow within different regions of the lungs. If the information contained within the representations of two or more
lower-level sub-models cannot be consistently combined within a higher-level sub-model, then
one or more of these lower-level sub-models, as in the focus-based-relation, are either inadequately or inaccurately representing their foci, which will alert the morphologist that she needs to
collect more data or to revise a lower-level sub-model’s representation. Combinatorial-basedrelations, like focus-based-relations, are horizontal relations that hold among two or more submodels on the same level within a hierarchy of models.

2.4.3. Hierarchical-based-relations
On my view, two or more sub-models on different levels in a hierarchy of sub-models stand in a
hierarchical-based-relation s if the information contained within the representations of the lower-level sub-models is used to produce the representations of higher-level sub-models. For
example, the representation of the cross sectional area in the bronchial tree produced by the
geometric model in the study by Schmidt et al. (2004) was used by Gemci et al. (2008) to produce the bronchi pressure function-model of airflow within the tree. As a consequence of this
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relation, the representational accuracy of higher-level sub-models will be directly dependent on
the representational accuracy of the lower-level sub-models it contains. The accuracy of a function-model representing the fluid dynamics in the primary bronchus depends directly on the
accuracy of the form-models’ representations of the cross sectional area. In contrast to focusand combinatorial-based-relations, hierarchical-based-relations are vertical relations that hold
between two or more sub-models at different levels.
The representations of two or more sub-models will be dependent upon one another if the
sub-models share one or more of the relationships described above. As a result of this dependence, two or more sub-models are said to be amalgamated into an interdependent system, such
that alterations in one sub-model could potentially affect the representation of another. For
example, because cross sectional area is directly related to the flow rate of a fluid, any alteration
in a form-model representing the cross sectional area of the bronchial tree will directly affect a
function-model that uses this area in its representation of the bronchial tree’s fluid dynamics. In
a large system composed of more than two sub-models, changes in one sub-model can potentially affect multiple other sub-models that may incorporate the representational content of the
altered sub-model directly or indirectly via intermediary sub-models. If a morphologist alters a
single sub-model within an interdependent system of sub-models, then her alterations will likely
generate a propagating wave affecting the representational content of related sub-models such
that the sub-models more closely related to the altered sub-model will be affected to a greater
extent than those more distantly related.
There are two ways in which a morphologist may alter an individual sub-model. A submodel may be altered either because 1) it produces an inadequate representation or because 2) it
produces an inaccurate representation. Inadequate representations are due to the lack of suffi-
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cient observational data and are rectified by the collection or incorporation of more observational
data. However, the inclusion of more data may affect the altered sub-model’s representation,
which may also affect the representations of other sub-models that are related to the altered submodel in the ways described above. The sub-models affected by the altered sub-model will have
to be resynthesized and their representations will have to be reassessed for changes in adequacy
or accuracy. Inaccurate representations (or misrepresentations) are due to an incoherent synthesis of the observational data contained within the sub-model with the theoretical principles and
background knowledge. Inaccurate representations can be rectified either by the inclusion of
more observational data or by a revised synthesis. Regardless of whether a sub-model is altered
to rectify an inaccurate or inadequate representation, the representations of related sub-models
may be affected and may require similar rectification.
As each datum, each theoretical principle, and each representation is locally refined in individual sub-models by the morphologist, the adequacy and the accuracy of the total representational content of the interdependent system of sub-models will increase. Because the system is
composed of form-, function-, and faculty-models that represent the components of a feature, the
total representational content produced by the amalgamation of these sub-models constitutes the
feature-model. According to the view I am advancing, multiperspectival modeling, it is only at
the level of the amalgamated over-all model, the feature-model, that we are able to derive important morphological explanations and confirmation for morphological theories.
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3. AN ACCOMMODATIONIST VIEW OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM
The philosophical methods here are not conceived of as prior
to scientific methods in any sense. (Boyd, 1985a, p. 33)

According to scientific realism, we have good reason to believe in the approximate truth of the
claims made by our currently accepted scientific theories about observable and unobservable
(theoretical) phenomena.25 Richard Boyd (1972, 1973, 1982, 1983, 1985a, 1985c, 1989, 1990a,
1990b, 1991b, 1992, 1993, 1999a, 1999b, 2001a, 2001b, 2010b, 2013) has developed a version
of scientific realism known as accommodationism. There are four central theses of Boyd’s
version of realism:
1. ‘Theoretical terms’ in scientific theories (i.e., non-observational terms) should be thought of as
putatively referring expressions; scientific theories should be interpreted ‘realistically’.
2. Scientific theories, interpreted realistically, are confirmable and in fact often confirmed as approximately true by ordinary scientific evidence interpreted in accordance with ordinary methodological standards.
3. The historical progress of mature sciences is largely a matter of successively more accurate approximations to the truth about both observable and unobservable phenomena. Later theories typically build upon the (observational and theoretical) knowledge embodied in previous theories.
4. The reality which scientific theories describe is largely independent of our thoughts or theoretical commitments. (Boyd, 1983, p. 45, emphasis in original)

These four theses assume a thoroughgoing naturalistic view of natural kinds, reference, causation, and epistemology. Thesis 1 assumes a naturalistic view of reference such that claims made
using theoretical terms are not reducible to claims made by replacing the theoretical terms with

25

In the debates between scientific realists and antirealists, the main point of contention is the metaphysical status of the unobservable phenomena our scientific theories postulate. (Because they are postulated by scientific theories, unobservable phenomena are
also referred to as theoretical phenomena (see for example Maxwell (1962)). Examples of unobservable phenomena include electrons, causation, natural selection, and force. There are two main foils opposing the realist view of unobservables: Neo-Kantian
constructivism and empiricism. According to Neo-Kantian philosophers, such as Kuhn (1996) and Hanson (1965), unobservables
are mere constructs or conventions postulated by our scientific theories and do not have a metaphysically real existence. That is,
on the constructivist view scientists invent unobservables within a paradigmatic framework. According to empiricists, such as
Logical Empiricists (see Ayer (1959)) or Van Fraassen (1980), claims about unobservables are reducible to claims about observables, meaning that unobservables do not exist independently of reference to observables. That is, on the empiricist view whatever
our scientific theories say about unobservables can be reduced to claims about observables.
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observational terms. For example, claims about the natural selection of peppered moths are not
reducible to the observable predatory patterns of the birds that eat them. Thesis 2 assumes a
naturalistic epistemology such that both the theoretical and observable claims of our scientific
theories are confirmed by observational evidence when that evidence is in their favor. For example, the observed predation rate of birds on peppered moths will confirm both the observational predictions about said predation entailed by our scientific theories as well as the theoretical
claims involved in the entailment of those predictions. Thesis 3 assumes both a naturalistic view
of reference as well as a naturalistic epistemology such that the contribution theoretical terms
made to past theories are often retained in replacement theories. For example, although Lamarck’s claims about evolution have been rejected, Darwin retained much of Lamarck’s theoretical claims about adaptation when formulating his theory of natural selection. Thesis 4 assumes
a naturalistic view of natural kinds such that there are phenomena in the world that exist independently of our claims about them. For example, the acceptance of the current Darwinian
paradigm does not necessitate the actual occurrence of Darwinian evolution. That is, saying it is
so does not make it so.
Boyd’s version of scientific realism is intended to provide an abductive argument for the
instrumental reliability of our scientific theories and methods. According to Boyd, our scientific
theories are said to be instrumentally reliable insofar as they produce approximately true claims
about observable phenomena, and our scientific methods are said to be instrumentally reliable
insofar as their use contributes to the invention and acceptance of instrumentally reliable theories. According to what Boyd calls the accommodation thesis (see especially Boyd (1993,
1999a, 1999c, 2001b, 2010b, 2013)), the instrumental reliability of our scientific theories and
methods can only be explained by the tendency of the conceptual features of our scientific disci-
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plines, such as their theories, concepts, classificatory practices, inferential standards, and standards of experimental design to accommodate to naturally occurring causal phenomena.26
My aim in this chapter is to describe the following important elements of accommodationism
underlying the four theses described above and the role each plays in achieving accommodation:
correspondence truth (§3.1.); the mind-independence of reality (§3.2.); a non-Humean account of
causation (§3.3.); disciplinary matrices, inferential and social architectures, and accommodation
demands (§3.4.); homeostatic property cluster natural kinds (§3.5.); a causal notion of reference
(§3.6.); the theory-dependence of methods (§3.7.); and approximate truth (§3.8). Note that there
are ongoing debates about each of these components, and Boyd’s views are no less controversial
than the rest. However, due to space constraints I will not be able to fully flesh out Boyd’s
arguments in favor of his positions or detail the criticisms he gives against alternative positions.
Rather, my purpose in this chapter is merely to explicate the main ideas of Boyd’s version of
scientific realism in order to evaluate their appropriateness for the realistic view of scientific
models I argue for in Chapter 4.

3.1. Correspondence truth
Boyd argues that the only way to explain the inductive and explanatory successes of our scientific practices is to adopt a correspondence theory of truth (á la Tarski (1935)) rather than a
theory of socially constructed truth. According to the correspondence theory of truth, the truthvalue of a belief (statement, sentence, proposition, etc.) is determined by whether or not there
exists a fact corresponding to it. For example, the claim “Snow is white” is true if and only if
snow is in fact white. How this correspondence is carried out and how we determine the approx-

26

I use the terms ‘causal phenomena’ to refer to a class of phenomena, which include (but is not limited to) casual powers, mechanisms, processes, entities, structures, regularities, and relations.
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imate truth of the claims made by our scientific theories according to Boyd will be discussed
below. Here, it is enough to keep the following claim by Boyd in mind:
We are animals. Like other animals, we have non-linguistic representational capacities—
perceptual and memorial ones, for example…. Explaining the representational semantics of these
capacities requires positing some sort of correspondence between internal representational structures and features of the empirical world. Since our linguistic representational capacities are evolutionarily continuous with the non-linguistic representational capacities of our ancestors, and
since our linguistic representations are psychologically integrated with many of our non-linguistic
representations, it is to be expected that, at least in the empirical domain, our linguistic representations too should have a correspondence semantics. They do. (Boyd, 2001b, p. 57)

3.2. The mind-independence of reality
Boyd argues that “reality is prior to thought” (Boyd, 1982, p. 613) in the sense that reality is
theory-independent.27 According to Boyd and mainstream scientific realists (see for example
Psillos (1999, 2000); Smart (1963)), reality is theory-independent in the sense that our linguistic
conventions, social practices, as well as the claims of our scientific laws, theories, and methods
do not a priori dictate the truth-value of our metaphysical propositions. Rather, the laws, theories, and methods of our sciences are developed a posteriori as a result of the ongoing struggle of
our scientific language and practices in their accommodation to independently existing observable and unobservable phenomena. And this struggle is only possible because our scientific
conventions and practices themselves are causal phenomena, and they are capable of causally
interacting with causal phenomena in the world. On Boyd’s view, humans and their political,
social, cultural, and linguistic practices are nothing above ordinary natural phenomena.
According to what Boyd calls the metaphysical innocence thesis, human social practices are
metaphysically innocent such that the adoption of a particular social convention or practice will
have no effect on the truth-value of our metaphysical claims (Boyd, 1988, 1990b, 1992, 1999b,
2001b). However, given the ability of our scientific practices to causally interact with causal
27

Neo-Kantian antirealists, such as Kuhn (1996) and Hanson (1965), argue that reality and truth are the products of social constructions. They hold that our claims about the states of affairs in the world determine a priori their metaphysical actuality; for NeoKantians, the world is structured in a theory-dependent way.
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phenomena, our scientific practices do make a contribution to the determination of the truthvalues of our causal claims through a process of accommodation. According to Boyd,
Reality is prior to thought not only in that its structure is largely independent of what we believe,
but also in that the very machinery of thought (or, at any rate, of the public expression of thought)
undergoes continuous accommodation to the structure of a largely independent causal reality….
Reality is prior to thought not only with respect to the correctness of theories and the appropriateness of the language in which they are expressed, but also with respect to the standards by which
the rationality of thought is to be assessed. (Boyd, 1982, p. 614)

Boyd calls this version of the metaphysical innocence thesis the No Non-Causal Contribution
Thesis (2N2C) (Boyd, 1988, 1990b, 1999b, 2001b). According to 2N2C, “the adoption of theories, frameworks, paradigms, projects, intellectual or practical interests, and so forth, makes no
non-causal contribution to the causal structure of the world scientists study” (Boyd, 1990b, p.
183).28

3.3. A non-Humean account of causation
Boyd’s accommodationist version of scientific realism relies on a non-reductive account of
causation. According to Boyd (especially Boyd (1985c)), causation, that is, unobservable causal
powers, mechanisms, processes, relations, forces, etc., is a theory-independent phenomenon in
the sense that its metaphysical existence is not dependent upon our theoretical claims. Boyd’s
view opposes the Humean account of causation, which takes causation as a concept reducible to
observable patterns of events.29 Against the Humean view, Boyd argues in favor of a non-

28

2N2C does not, however, guarantee that the causal interaction of our scientific practices with causal phenomena will always
positively contribute to determining the truth-value of our claims. In fact, Boyd (2001a) argues that the linguistic and methodological practices of evolutionary psychology (also known as sociobiology in the sense of Wilson (1975)) have so far negatively contributed to determining the truth-values of their claims.
29
David Hume defined a cause as “an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former
are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter” (Hume, 2005, p. 114). According to the Humean account, causation is not an independently existing phenomenon scientists can discover and explain. For the
Humean, causation is nothing more than a conceptual manifestation of the attempts by our scientific practices to explain detectable
patterns of observable phenomena. Furthermore, the Humean holds that the cognitive content of our causal statements is linked to
the cognitive content of our observational statements such that our causal notions can always be reduced to non-causal observational notions that do not invoke reference to “secret powers” or unobservable “inner constitutions” (see Hume (2007) Section IV).
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reductive notion of causation.30 According to Boyd, if the Humean notion of causation is correct
“it would have to be the case that…causal relations could be discerned in nature without recourse
to knowledge of unobservable ‘theoretical entities’ and their causal powers” (Boyd, 1985c, p.
68). However, because the derivation of observational consequences from our background
theories depends just as much on the theoretical claims they make about unobservable causal
powers as on the observational claims they make about phenomena, Boyd argues that we do have
good reason to believe that we cannot (and should not) ignore what our theories say about unobservable causal powers. In fact, the reliability of our scientific practices depends on the theoretical claims our theories make about causation. That is, claims about causation cannot be reduced
to observational patterns.
According to Boyd, the theoretical claims our theories make about casual powers cannot be a
priori established due to the metaphysical restrictions imposed by 2N2C. Rather, the notion of
causation scientists employ will be the result of a theoretical inquiry into the causal powers of
natural phenomena and not a conceptual analysis about deductive procedures or linguistic conventions. Because our notion of causation plays a reliable role in the inductive and explanatory
successes of our scientific theories, then, according to Boyd, it must be accurately reflecting a
posteriori facts about theory-independent phenomena. That is, a naturalistic notion of causation
is partially dependent upon independently existing, unobservable causal powers and partially
dependent upon the inductive and explanatory successes of our scientific practices. In other
words, our notion of causation will depend on the inferential role it plays in the inductive and
explanatory successes of our scientific practices in the process of their accommodation to inde-

30

The Humean notion of causality has played an integral part in the philosophy of science, especially for the first half of the 20th
century, and has served to underwrite the once widely adhered to deductive-nomological (D-N) account of explanation. Enthusiasm for this form of explanation can still be found in theoretical discussions of morphological explanation (see for example Bock
(2000, 2004, 2007, 2010)).
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pendently existing phenomena in the world. According to Boyd, “what causation is and what
causal interaction amounts to are theoretical questions about natural phenomena” (Boyd, 1985c,
p. 79).

3.4. Disciplinary matrices, architectures, and accommodation demands
According to Boyd (1999a, 1999b, 2001b), our scientific practices are performed within contingently defined social and inferential systems know as disciplinary matrices. He defines a disciplinary matrix as “a family of inductive and explanatory aims and practices, together with the
conceptual resources and vocabularies within which they are implemented” (Boyd, 1999b, p.
57). Disciplinary matrices can be divided into two parts: an inferential architecture and a social
architecture. The inferential architecture is comprised of the inductive and explanatory aims and
practices of a disciplinary matrix; the social architecture is comprised of the social, economic,
political, and cultural factors of a disciplinary matrix, such as hiring practices, funding formulas,
and publication expectations. The social architecture may or may not influence (positively or
negatively) the inferential architecture.31 Disciplinary matrices do not necessarily correspond to
our established academic disciplines and practices.
According to Boyd, each disciplinary matrix has to satisfy a set of accommodation demands
in order to be considered successful. Accommodation demands consist of the required “fit”
between the disciplinary matrix’s inferential architecture and the relevant causal phenomena that
would be required in order for the characteristic inductive and explanatory aims of the disciplinary matrix to be achieved. It is a contingent question whether or not a given disciplinary matrix
can satisfy all of its accommodation demands, and the answer depends on the presence of the
31

Occasionally, the social architecture of a disciplinary matrix can serve to suppress scientific knowledge and progress. According
to Boyd, “the lone, underfunded, socially marginalized researcher who makes the relevant inductive inference from background
theories to the correct answer to a scientific question, but whose research does not get published in established journals, does not
thereby make a contribution to the reliability of scientific practice.” (Boyd, 1999b, p. 62)
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relevant causal phenomena. For example, the disciplinary matrices dedicated to the explanation
of phlogiston and the luminiferous ether failed because the relevant causal phenomena required
for the satisfaction of their accommodation demands, namely phlogiston and luminiferous ether,
did not exist. Nevertheless, even when there is no doubt as to the existence of the relevant causal
phenomena, satisfying accommodations demands may be quite difficult. Our inability to treat
the phenomena collectively referred to as ‘cancer’ is a case in point.

3.5. Homeostatic property cluster natural kinds
Boyd’s version of scientific realism advocates for a natural-kind structure of the world in the
sense of Quine (1969). The traditional view of natural kinds has been shaped by the work of
philosophers, such as Putnam (1972, 1973) and Kripke (1981), on reference and essence. According to the traditional view of natural kinds, kinds possess metaphysically real essences that
are detectable and describable by our scientific practices. Naturalists have emphasized the central role played by natural kinds in the inductive and explanatory successes of our scientific
practices. For example, Quine (1969) and Goodman (1983) argue that our ability to judge the
plausibility of a scientific theory is only possible with reference to natural kinds, because only
those theories that employ the natural kinds embedded within current scientific practices will be
judged as most plausible. For example, theories in modern chemistry no longer refer to phlogiston because phlogiston is no longer embedded within our chemical practices.
Boyd’s account of natural kinds denies that natural kinds have typological or eternal essences.32 According to Boyd, natural kinds are 1) open textured, 2) historically situated, 3) relation-

32

The traditional view of natural kinds has been criticized by antirealist philosophers of science (see for example Hanson (1965) and
Kuhn (1996)), who have argued that kinds are mere social constructions, and by philosophically astute scientists, predominantly
biologists (see for example Mayr (1982, 1988)), who have argued against essentialistic or typological thinking about mutable
phenomena such as biological species. As a result, the traditional notion of natural kinds has become stereotypically defined as 1)
completely independent of human practices, and 2) as having eternal, unchanging, ahistorical, and intrinsic necessary and sufficient
membership conditions that hold across all possible worlds (Boyd, 1999b). (A possible world can be quite similar to our own
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ally and historically defined, and thus 4) non-eternal, 5) non-intrinsic social constructions (Boyd,
1999b). Nevertheless, Boyd maintains that natural kinds have real essences and play an integral
role in the reliability of our scientific practices. These constructive and naturalistic properties of
natural kinds are reconciled in the view developed by Boyd, which takes natural kinds as what he
calls homeostatic property clusters. Homeostatic property cluster kinds (HPC kinds) are entities
(observable and unobservable), processes, or relations comprised of unified families of cooccurring properties.33 Families of properties are unified either because the presence of some
properties favors the presence of others or because underlying homeostatic (in both a metaphorical and literal sense) causal mechanisms sustain their co-occurrence. According to Boyd, HPC
kinds “possess a posteriori real essences or natural definitions, as opposed to nominal essences”
(Boyd, 1999b, p. 54). These real essences are the causal powers, processes, mechanisms, and
relations possessed by independently existing causal phenomena.
For example, the natural kind Water possesses various properties, such as a boiling point of
100° C, a density of 1 g/mL and a molecular structure comprised of two hydrogen atoms and an
oxygen atom, that have a tendency to co-occur because of the underlying chemical and physical
mechanisms (causal powers, mechanisms, processes, relations, etc.).34 These chemical and
physical mechanisms maintain a degree of homeostasis such that from day to day or year to year
we have little doubt as to the physical properties and behavioral characteristics we can expect of
Water.

actual world, such as imagining different climatological conditions to assess the evolutionary responses of current fauna to future
climate change, or it can be as different as we can possibly imagine, such as a world where the laws of physics are drastically
different from those of this world.) A classic example illustrating these stereotypes is the natural kind Water. According to the
stereotypes, the presence of a particular molecular structure, H2O, is a necessary and sufficient condition for membership in the
natural kind Water in all possible worlds. That is, the molecular structure, H2O, is an intrinsic, essential, and unchanging property
such that if something has it, then it is a sample of the natural kind Water. Boyd’s view of natural kinds rejects these stereotypes.
33
Boyd (1988) attributes his inspiration for this view to the property-cluster conception of definitions of “ordinary language”
philosophy.
34
When referring to a natural kind proper, I will use a capitalized word, and when referring to the natural kind term, I will place the
term in quotations. For example, we refer to the natural kind Water by using the term ‘water’.
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There are two important characteristics of HPC kinds. First, the presence of a given property
in a family of properties defining a particular HPC kind and the presence of a particular underlying causal mechanism sustaining that family are a contingent matter. The family, F, of properties, P1,…,Pn defining a given HPC kind, as well as the causal powers, mechanisms, and relations
that homeostatically sustain the family, are the real essences of natural kinds. However, determining which properties have membership within a given family is not an a priori conceptual
matter about necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, membership in an HPC kind is a theoretical a posteriori matter that depends on what Boyd (1999b) calls its causal role in contributing
to the inductive and explanatory successes of our scientific practices. According to Boyd, the
definition of an HPC kind depends upon its role in helping our scientific practices meet their
accommodation demands.
Second, it follows from this that HPC kinds are individuated historically rather than extensionally. Over time the properties and/or causal powers, mechanisms, and relations vary such
that a profile of the properties in a family F at time t1 will likely differ from a profile of F at t2,
but F will nevertheless be the same family at both times. For example, the properties used to
define Homo sapiens today will not include all of the properties used to define Homo sapiens as
the species existed 30,000 years ago because species change over time. But, Homo sapiens
remains the same family of properties today as it was then even though some of its properties
have changed. Hence, the membership conditions are not only contingent upon theoretical
judgments, but are apt to vary over time and space for the same family. Boyd argues, for example, that biological species are paradigmatic HPC kinds, because their membership conditions are
dependent upon theoretical judgments and the inductive and explanatory successes of biological
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classification. Furthermore, their constant evolution and/or migration means the membership
conditions for any given species will depend upon the time and place it is studied.35
In summary, according to Boyd’s account of natural kinds, they are always interest and
practice dependent social constructions, and they are often defined by open textured (neither
necessary nor sufficient properties), historically situated, relationally and historically defined,
and thus non-eternal and non-intrinsic properties, but they nevertheless possess real essences
which can be studied and explained by our scientific practices (Boyd, 1999b, p. 68). It is the real
essences of natural kinds, that is, causal powers, mechanisms, processes, relations, etc., that our
scientific practices are constantly attempting to accommodate.

3.6. A causal notion of reference
Boyd argues that the inductive and explanatory successes of our scientific practices, their epistemic achievements, can only be explained by a naturalistic theory of reference for natural kind
terms that refer to both observable and theoretical phenomena within the inferential architectures
of our sciences.36 According to Boyd, “what is to be explained is the ways in which the accommodation of classificatory and linguistic practices to causal factors in the world contributes to the
reliability of those practices” (Boyd, 2010b, p. 214). In other words, if we want to understand
why our sciences are so successful, we have to understand how reference works within the inferential architectures of disciplinary matrices.
According to Boyd, natural kind terms are deployed within the discourse central to the inferential architecture of a particular disciplinary matrix to track naturally occurring causal phenomena via the tracking of (homeostatically clustering) families of properties. Their role in tracking
35

Splitting and lumping our classifications of species are exercises of denotational refinement in the sense of Field (1973), but more
on this later.
36
Henceforth, my use of ‘natural kinds’ will be in the sense of HPC natural kinds.
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causal phenomena plays an inferential role within the disciplinary matrix deploying them such
that the use of the natural kind terms within the inferential architecture of the disciplinary matrix
contributes to the satisfaction of its accommodation demands. For example, the natural kind
term ‘trachea’ plays an inferential role in the inferential architecture of respiratory biology such
that its use contributes to the epistemic achievements of respiratory biology, and it plays this role
because it successfully tracks naturally occurring families of properties. That is, the word ‘trachea’ is associated with a family of properties identifiable by practitioners of the discipline such
that use of the word ‘trachea’ has a tendency to pick out the same family of properties over and
over again.
The deployment of a natural kind term within a disciplinary matrix to track a naturally occurring family of properties to satisfy the accommodation demands of the disciplinary matrix establishes a natural kind. That is, a natural kind is defined by the family of properties tracked by the
natural kind term. For example, the natural kind term ‘trachea’ is deployed in respiratory biology to track a naturally occurring family of properties. The natural kind Trachea is defined by the
family of properties tracked by the deployment of the natural kind term ‘trachea’ within the
inferential architecture of respiratory biology. Because natural kinds are defined by naturally
occurring families of properties, natural kinds, according to Boyd, play a causal role in the
accommodation of the inferential architecture of disciplinary matrices to naturally occurring
families of properties. For example, the natural kind Trachea plays a causal role in the accommodation of the inferential architecture of respiratory biology such that reference to Trachea by
the natural kind term ‘trachea’ contributes to the epistemic achievements of respiratory biology.
Deployment of the natural kind term ‘trachea’ in the theories and explanations of respiratory
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biology leads to claims about the natural kind Trachea, and the accuracy of these claims can be
assessed through causal interaction with the family of properties that underlie the natural kind.
Boyd (1999a, 1999b, 2003, 2010b) describes reference to natural kinds more precisely as
follows:
Let M be a disciplinary matrix and let t1,…,tn be the natural kind terms deployed within the discourse central to the inductive/explanatory successes of M. Then the families F1,…,Fn of properties provide definitions of the kinds referred to by t1,…,tn, and determine their extensions, just in
case:
1. (Epistemic access condition) There is a systematic, causally sustained, tendency—established
by the causal relations between practices in M and causal phenomena in the world—for what is
predicated of ti within the practice of M to be approximately true of things which satisfy Fi, i =
1,…,n. In particular, there is a systematic tendency for things of which ti is predicated to have
(some or most of) the properties in Fi.
2. (Accommodation condition) This fact, together with the causal powers of things satisfying
these explanatory definitions, causally explains how the use of t1,…,tn in M contributes to the accommodation of the inferential practices of M to relevant causal phenomena. It explains whatever
tendency there is for participants in M to identify causally sustained generalizations, to obtain correct explanations, or to obtain successful solutions to practical problems.

This means that the definition of a natural kind term is determined (on the one hand) by its use
within a disciplinary matrix and the inferential connections between it and other natural kind
terms that are also used within a matrix, and (on the other hand) by the naturally occurring causal
phenomena the term is tracking. The deployment of a natural kind term and its use in the epistemic achievements of a disciplinary matrix alone establishes a natural kind, and the natural
kind’s definition is nothing more than the naturally occurring causal phenomena being tracked
by the natural kind term.
There are three noteworthy consequences of Boyd’s account of reference that may appear to
be potential weaknesses of his view: 1) “A natural kind is nothing (much) over and above a
natural kind term together with its use in the satisfaction of accommodation demands” (Boyd,
2010b, p. 220), 2) natural kinds are discipline relative, and 3) natural kind terms may fail to refer
due to the limiting approximation of natural kind definitions.
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1) According to Boyd, natural kinds are theory-dependent social constructions that are employed to meet the needs of disciplinary matrices in satisfying their accommodation demands.37
He further claims that “natural kinds are features, not of the world outside our practice, but of
the ways in which that practice engages with the rest of the world” (Boyd, 1999b, p. 66,
emphasis is mine). However, Boyd argues that while natural kinds are indeed social artifacts,
that is, they do not exist independently of our scientific practices, their definitions are the result
of a bicameral legislative process between the linguistic and inferential practices of our sciences
that establish natural kinds and that detect naturally occurring causal phenomena in the world.
Our disciplinary matrices “get on” to the real essences of the natural kinds they employ within
their inferential architectures, because the real essences just are the causal powers in the world
that causally interact with the inferential practices of our sciences in the process of accommodation. So, when we say that the natural kind Water is H2O, we are saying nothing more than that
most of the liquids we call ‘water’ are mainly made of H2O molecules and that this explains the
epistemic achievements of the use of the term ‘water’ in our theories, explanations, and scientific
discourse. Therefore, “if questions about the systematic relations of our epistemic practices to
causal structures are not metaphysical questions, then it’s not a metaphysical fact that water is
H2O” (Boyd, 2010b, p. 222). The claims our scientific theories make about natural kinds are just
as much about the natural kinds we invent as the causal phenomena that underlie them.
2) Because natural kinds and natural kind terms are employed in the inferential practices of
disciplinary matrices pursing the satisfaction of their accommodation demands, and because the
definitions of natural kinds and natural kind terms are dependent upon the causal phenomena
relevant to the satisfaction of a given disciplinary matrix’s accommodation demands, Boyd

37

This idea is borrowed from Locke. Locke claims that “such a manner of sorting of things is the workmanship of men” (Locke,
1996, Book III, Chap. 6, Sec. 37)
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argues that natural kinds and the terms referring to them are discipline relative. This initially
seems obvious. For example, the natural kind Trachea will not be a natural kind employed in the
inferential architecture of particle physics, but it will be a causally important natural kind in
respiratory biology. If the natural kind Trachea was only employed in respiratory biology, and if
for some reason this discipline ceased to exist, then as far as scientists working in particle physics are concerned, the natural kind Trachea does not exist. But this raises an interesting and
potentially problematic question for Boyd’s account: if natural kinds are discipline relative, then
can there be instances in which a natural kind with a seemingly indubitable definition, such as
the natural kind Water being H2O, nevertheless be contingently defined? Even if Boyd grants
that the well-confirmed definition of Water is shared by all disciplinary matrices here in the
actual world, the skeptic can still inquire about Water’s definition on other possible worlds.
Boyd’s reply is relatively straightforward: if what is being asked is whether the natural kind
Water as defined in the disciplinary matrices of the actual world would also be defined by the
molecular structure H2O in other possible worlds if we exported our disciplinary matrices, then
the answer will depend on whether or not the relevant causal phenomena are present on the other
possible worlds such that the exported disciplinary matrices are still able to satisfy their accommodation demands by reference to Water. However, if what is instead being asked is whether
the natural kind Water as defined in this world would be defined by the molecular structure H2O
in other possible worlds if a new disciplinary matrix was established in that world, then the
answer is most likely “no” since our definition of Water as H2O is dependent upon the accommodation demands of our disciplinary matrices, which are unlikely to be the same as a disciplinary matrix established on another world. On Boyd’s account, natural kinds are not eternally
defined by necessary and sufficient conditions.
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3) Because the definition of a natural kind is contingent on the epistemic achievements of a
particular disciplinary matrix, it may occasionally be the case that a natural kind term either fails
to refer or partially denotes two or more natural kinds. Any history buff of science can produce a
plethora of examples where natural kind terms have failed to refer, which has been the case with
the terms ‘phlogiston’, ‘luminiferous ether’, ‘vital forces’, and ‘Brontosaurus’. These terms have
failed to refer because the relevant causal phenomena that were thought to be the referents of
these words turned out to be non-existent. So, at some point these natural kind terms no longer
contributed to the epistemic achievements of the disciplinary matrices in which they were deployed and were subsequently dropped.
Sometimes natural kind terms may refer to two or more natural kinds, which can impede the
satisfaction of accommodation demands, since one term is tracking two or more kinds. This is
known as partial denotation.38 Partial denotation can be remedied through denotational refinement in the sense of Field (1973). Boyd provides a nice example of how denotational refinement
works within his accommodationist view of scientific practices:
Roughly, a term t partially denotes different kinds k1 and k2 in a disciplinary matrix M when the
epistemic connection between the uses of t in M and k1 explains very nearly the same achievements in M as does the connection between t and k2. In practice, practitioners in M do not distinguish between k1 and k2; their use of t corresponds, in a sense, to something like the union of k1
and k2. Nevertheless, the reliability of their practice is compromised by this feature of their conceptual and linguistic practices. An improvement in reliability could be achieved by drawing the
k1-k2 distinction and by replacing the existing use of t with the use of two terms (one of which
might, but need not, be t), one referring to k1 and the other to k2. (Boyd, 2010b, p. 216)

3.7. The theory-dependence of scientific methods
Boyd argues that scientific methods are profoundly theory-dependent because of the central role
contingently defined natural kinds play in the epistemic achievements of scientific theories, and
because of the reliance on nonexperimental criteria, that is, standards given by background theo38

Partial denotation should be quite interesting for biologists, since they are often confronted with having to decide whether to split
or lump species.
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ries, for theory invention and testing. According to Boyd, our scientific laws and methods are
socially and historically situated, irreducibly political, and non-foundational.
Boyd’s view on the theory-dependence of scientific laws can be best illustrated by reference
to his account of natural kinds.39 As discussed above, the definitions of natural kinds are the
result of an ongoing process of accommodation between the inferential and social architectures
of our scientific practices and naturally occurring causal phenomena in the world. Furthermore,
the definitions of natural kinds are contingent upon the satisfaction of accommodation demands
specific to a disciplinary matrix. If our scientific laws are going to quantify over natural kinds
with contingent definitions, whose use in epistemic achievements is discipline relative, then our
scientific laws cannot be fundamental, exceptionless, eternal, and ahistorical. That is, if our
scientific laws are going to apply to contingently defined natural kinds, then the laws too must be
contingent or else they will fail to accurately reflect our current understanding of independently
existing causal phenomena. Because natural kinds “are always interest and practice dependent
social constructions, and often defined by open textured (neither necessary nor sufficient), historically situated, relationally and historically defined, and thus non-eternal and non-intrinsic properties,” (Boyd, 1999b, p. 69) our scientific “laws” must also be interest and practice dependent
social constructions, whose statements are contingent upon an ongoing process of accommodation. According to Boyd, “the notion of a causally sustained regularity should replace that of a
LAW, as that notion was (and is) understood in much of analytic philosophy” (Boyd, 1999b, pp.
59-60).
In addition to our scientific laws, Boyd argues that our scientific methods are profoundly
theory-dependent because they rely on nonexperimental criteria in theory invention and confir-

39

Remember, these are natural kinds in the sense of homeostatic property clusters.
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mation. Nonexperimental criteria are standards, rules, or principles of experimental design,
evidential assessment, theory testing, etc., that are not reducible to observational patterns. That
is, nonexperimental criteria are the result of theoretical judgments. This theory-dependence of
our scientific methods is a consequence of the accommodation thesis.40 Boyd identifies four
important contexts in which our scientific methods are dependent upon non-experimental criteria, that is, theoretical judgments: 1) judgments of projectibility, 2) the critique, modification, or
extension of measurement and detection procedures for theoretical phenomena, 3) theory testing,
and 4) theory invention.
1) Goodman’s (1983) notion of projectibility plays an important role in Boyd’s theory of
accommodation. Goodman sought to address a problem scientists confront on a daily basis,
namely the justification for the acceptance of some theories (inductive predictions or generalized
explanations) rather than others from an infinite number of available alternatives. According to
Goodman (1983), scientists should only adopt projectible theories. A theory is projectible if and
only if it is supported by favorable evidence, it is unviolated by unfavorable evidence, it is testable, and it is better supported by background theories than other conflicting theories. Otherwise,
a theory is not projectible.
We can now modify Goodman’s notion of projectibility using Boyd’s account of natural kind
terms. On Boyd’s account, a theory is projectible within a given disciplinary matrix if and only
if it a) makes an appropriate use of natural kind terms deployed in the discourse of the disciplinary matrix and b) makes appropriate claims about natural kinds embedded within the disciplinary matrix as indicated by currently accepted background theories. That is, out of the infinite
number of possible theories that can be invented or adopted within a disciplinary matrix, only
40

Remember, the accommodation thesis states that the instrumental reliability of our scientific theories and methods can only be
explained by the tendency of the conceptual features of our scientific disciplines, such as their theories, concepts, classificatory
practices, inferential standards, and standards of experimental design to accommodate to naturally occurring causal phenomena.
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those that are relatively similar to our currently accepted background theories will be taken
seriously.
For example, the traditional theory explaining our observations of the fossil record is known
as gradualism, which claims that the fossil record is evidence that organisms have incrementally
changed over the past 500 million years. Let’s say scientists want to know which of the following two theories is a projectible alternative to gradualism: creationism or punctuated equilibrium.
According to creationism, the fossil record is evidence for a worldwide flood, such as the Flood
of Noah, and is consistent with geological catastrophism (Ham, 1982). According to punctuated
equilibrium, the fossil record is evidence that organisms undergo periods of sudden or accelerated change, which results in the apparent imperfect preservation of “gradually” changing organisms in the fossil record (Eldredge & Gould, 1972). In assessing creationism and punctuated
equilibrium in light of the currently accepted background theories about geology, evolution,
physics, etc., scientists will clearly favor punctuated equilibrium over creationism because the
former makes appropriate use of natural kind terms and natural kinds embedded within paleontology, whereas the latter rejects currently accepted theories about evolution, geological processes (uniformitarianism), physics (dating), etc. In this example, punctuated equilibrium is the
projectible alternative to gradualism because when compared to currently accepted background
theories, punctuated equilibrium will be judged theoretically plausible.41
Because judgments of theoretical plausibility are dependent upon currently accepted background theories, and because the acceptance of our current background theories is dependent
upon their role in the epistemic achievements of our scientific practices engaged in accommodation with the world, the criteria for judgments of theoretical plausibility are also contingent upon

41

Boyd (1982, 1985c) also argues that judgments of simplicity and parsimony are actually types of judgments of theoretical plausibility.
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their role in satisfying the accommodation demands of the disciplinary matrix employing them.
In other words, the ongoing process by which scientists choose which theories to take seriously
is itself the result of an ongoing process of accommodation.
2) The second way our scientific methods are theory-dependent according to Boyd involves
the critique, modification, or extension of measurement and detection procedures for unobservable or theoretical phenomena. Boyd illustrates the theory-dependence of our measurement and
detection procedures in the following example:
Suppose that T1 (t) is a well confirmed theory containing the theoretical term t, and supported by
observations in some class D. Suppose that ‘measurements’ of t have thus far been possible only
using measurement procedures m1,…,mr whose reliability is asserted by ‘mini-theories’ M1,…,Mr.
Now imagine that some new theory T 2 (t), only distantly related to T1, is confirmed by entirely different observations. T2 has the happy consequence, Mr+1, that a new procedure mr+1 is suitable for
the ‘measurement’ of t under circumstances well outside the range of application of m1,…,mr.
Under these circumstances, if T1 and T2 are each quite well supported by experimental evidence,
we shall confidently expect T1 (t) to yield true (or approximately true) predictions when employed
with the new measurement procedure mr+1. (Boyd, 1982, pp. 619-620)

This example shows that the use of measurement and detection procedures within one theory
often depends on the theoretical claims made by another, indirectly related theory. For example,
the ability to use electron microscopes to detect microorganisms or micro-structures in biology is
dependent on the physical and chemical theoretical claims about theoretical entities such as
electrons and electromagnetic forces.
As Boyd’s illustration implies, the critique, modification, or extension of measurement and
detection procedures of theoretical phenomena is only possible if the theoretical term t is univocal in the conjunction of T1 and T2. That is, the definition of the theoretical term t is the same in
both T1 and T2 such that the deployment of t in both theories has a tendency to track the same
family of properties. Univocality underwrites the “unity of science” principle, which states that
the observational consequences of two or more theories can be combined such that new or more
complex observational consequences can be derived because the terms used in those theories
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share the same definitions. The derivation of observational consequences from two or more
theories is only possible if their theoretical terms are univocal, and since univocality is the only
explanation for the successful use of theory-dependent methods for measurement and detection,
we have good reason to believe in the “unity of science” principle. (Remember, theoretical
terms are types of natural kind terms, so their definitions are determined by their inferential role
in the epistemic achievements of the matrices deploying them.) Furthermore, because all theories are apt to change as a result of the accommodating process taking place between them and
causal phenomena, the reliability of our current measurement and detection procedures is dependent upon their role in the epistemic achievements of our scientific practices.
3) The third important way in which our scientific methods are theory dependent according
to Boyd concerns theory testing. We have already seen that scientists prefer theoretically
plausible (projectible) theories (gradualism and punctuated equilibrium) over those that are not
theoretically plausible (creationism). Because judgments of theoretical plausibility rely on
currently accepted background theories, and because background theories are currently accepted
due to their reliable role in satisfying accommodation demands, a judgment of theoretical
plausiblility for a theory is (at least) directly confirming. So how do we determine if a given
theoretically plausible theory is the best one?
Boyd identifies three rules scientists seem to follow in determining whether or not a given
theoretically plausible theory T is the (contingently) best one:
Rule 1: Basic methodological rule of science: Carefully choose from among relevant alternatives
(that is, theories recommended by best current theories), controlling for artifacts suggested by best
current theories.
Rule 2: Basic ‘falsificationist’ rule for objective testing: Try to falsify T. Test T where it’s most
vulnerable, i.e., under circumstances where it’s observational consequences are most likely to go
wrong if they can go wrong.
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Rule 3: Rule for identifying such circumstances: Identify the most plausible alternatives to T: its
projectible rivals. Similarly for identifying experimental artifacts. Use these rivals in devising
tests for carrying out Rule 2. 42

According to Rule 1, only (but not all) those theories that are theoretically plausible as indicated
by the currently accepted background theories as well as the contingent beliefs and concepts
making up the inferential architecture of a disciplinary matrix should be adopted. According to
Rule 2, theories should be tested in ways most likely to lead to their “falsification” if they are
falsifiable.43 And according to Rule 3, theories should be tested by comparing their observational consequences to those of their most plausible rivals. Once theories are tested against their
theoretically plausible rivals, scientists evaluate the gathered evidence according to currently
accepted standards of evidence to determine whether or not their chosen theory T is confirmed or
disconfirmed. According to Boyd, a chosen theory T will be confirmed by evidence E if and
only if T is theoretically plausible, E favors T over its theoretically plausible rivals, and E was
gathered to control for experimental or observational artifacts in the ways indicated by currently
accepted background theories about experimental design and data collection.44
Each time a scientific theory is directly confirmed (or disconfirmed) by a given class of
evidence, the methodology and background theories used to invent, test, and evaluate that theory
will also be confirmed (or disconfirmed). In other words, the nonexperimental criteria “turn out
to be nonexperimental only in the sense that they do not reflect the assessment of direct experimental evidence” (Boyd, 1985c, p. 374). Rather, nonexperimental criteria reflect the assessment
of indirect experimental evidence due to the role they play in the accommodation process. Our
scientific practices can be characterized as a dialectic interaction between scientific methodology
and scientific theories shaped by their ongoing accommodation to causal phenomena in the
42

This formulation of the three rules is taken from Boyd (2010b, p. 213) with slight alterations.
I do not intend for my use of ‘falsification’ to be in the sense of Popper (1963) and his philosophy of falsificationism.
44
“Data are not ‘raw’; there are no ‘brute facts’.” (Shapere, 1969, p. 119)
43
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world; theory modification informs method modification, which informs theory modification,
and so on.
The reliability of this “theory of theory confirmation” is itself dependent upon its contribution to the epistemic achievements of the disciplinary matrix that employs it (Boyd, 1999b, p.
61). In other words, there is no a priori “scientific method”. According to Boyd, the scientific
method just “is a paradigm dependent paradigm-modification strategy: a strategy for modifying
or amending our existing theories in the light of further research, which is such that its methodological principles at any given time will themselves depend upon the theoretical picture provided
by the currently accepted theories” (Boyd, 1989, p. 9).
4) The theory-dependence of our scientific methods is seldom more obvious than in the case
of theory invention. Theory invention is the process in which scientists create generalizations
about phenomena. As we have seen up to now, theory invention within a disciplinary matrix
involves all the theory-dependent ingredients contained within the inferential architecture, such
as natural kinds, natural kind terms, experimental and evidential standards, etc. However, theory
invention also involves everything associated with the social architecture of our scientific practices. Boyd summarizes the influence of the social architecture on theory invention in the following passage:
It is not sufficient that accepted background theories be such as to, in fact, inductively support answers to scientific questions which (often enough) include good approximations to the truth. What
is required is that the availability of relevant information, the structure of inductive practices and
cognitive resources within the relevant scientific communities, and the social practices of communication and evaluation within them, be such that suitably articulated formulations of good approximations actually get formulated and that their predictive and explanatory resources be sufficiently widely appreciated. The lone, underfunded, socially marginalized researcher who makes
the relevant inference from background theories to the correct answer to a scientific question, but
whose research does not get published in established journals, does not thereby make a contribution to the reliability of scientific practice. (Boyd, 1999b, pp. 61-62)
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Not only do scientists have to be sufficiently imaginative to produce projectible theories,45 but
they have to successfully communicate and disseminate their hypotheses in order to contribute to
the epistemic achievements of our scientific practices. Although scientific communities are no
less political than any of our other institutions, the politics of science play a substantial role in
the epistemic successes of our scientific practices. “The epistemology of science is necessarily a
(partly) political discipline” (Boyd, 1999b, p. 85, emphasis in original).

3.8. Approximate truth
That our scientific methods and theories are instrumentally reliable is much less controversial
than the explanation for why this is the case. As discussed above, Boyd maintains that the best
explanation for the reliability of our scientific practices is a realist one that is characterized by a
dialectic interaction between theories and methods as they undergo a process of accommodation
to the causal phenomena in the world. Furthermore, he maintains that the epistemic achievements that result from a process of accommodation are only possible if scientists do in fact possess knowledge of observables and unobservables alike. On Boyd’s account, knowledge of
phenomena is not socially constructed, but rather reflects something approximately true of the
world. However, this suggests that realists require a well-defined notion of approximate truth in
order to explain the reliability of our scientific practices from a realist viewpoint.
Tarski (1935) and subsequent workers have produced a formalized, uniform correspondence
theory of exact truth (although this is controversial). However, a theory of exact truth is inadequate for the assessment of most of our scientific achievements, because the epistemic achievements of our sciences depend on historically dependent criteria for theory confirmation. For
example, it is not clear how a theory of exact truth can help us arbitrate between the Lamarckian
45

According to Boyd, “failures of theoretical imagination can thus render the methodological practices we are discussing epistemologically unreliable in particular cases” (Boyd, 1985c, p. 90).
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and Darwinian theories of evolution since neither seems to be totally true or false and both were
once considered the best explanation of their day. Rather, scientific realism requires a notion of
approximate truth in order to explain what the realist views as the successive approximations to
truth our sciences have made over the last five hundred years. Boyd (1990a) argues for a notion
of approximate truth based on his views of scientific methodology and theory confirmation,
which is thin enough to account for the numerous times in the history of science that scientific
theories have got it wrong, but thick enough to avoid being so trivial that any consistent theory or
group of theories can be approximately truth.
Boyd claims that knowledge of theory-independent phenomena (both observables and unobservables) is possible and often actual (Boyd, 1982, 1989, 1990a). His account of approximate
truth just is an account of how scientific knowledge of theory-independent phenomena is possible. According to Boyd,
truth is definable from ‘primitive denotation’ (Field, 1974), and denotation, on the realist’s account, is an epistemic and thus a causal matter; truth is correspondence truth and correspondence
is a matter of complex causal interactions. Similarly, to talk of respects of approximation to the
truth is to talk of respects of similarity and difference between actual causal situations and certain
possible ones. (Boyd, 1990a, p. 376)

Boyd argues that scientists acquire knowledge of theory-independent phenomena as the result of
an ongoing process of accommodation between their methodological and theoretical practices
and independently existing causal phenomena. Acquiring knowledge through accommodation is
only possible if the important relevant features of our scientific practices are approximately true.
And what features must be approximately true in order to explain the instrumental reliability of
our scientific practices?
For starters, the background theories in mature scientific practices must be approximately
true if we are to explain the contribution judgments of theoretical plausibility make to the epistemic achievements of those practices. The current best available theory will be amongst the
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current projectible theories, because the currently accepted background theories from which
projectibility judgments are derived are currently accepted because of the role they played in the
epistemic achievements of the past. This is not to say that once accepted, background theories
cannot be amended or discarded. Their current approximate truth is indicated by their current
contribution in satisfying accommodation demands. As these demands change and as the accommodation process proceeds, the worth of currently accepted background theories is contingent on their future contributions.
For example, in his Zoological Philosophy Lamarck described the adaptation and evolution
of organisms based on a mechanism of inheritance of acquired characteristics. Lamarck got it
approximately right, and there was a time when Lamarckian evolution did contribute to the
epistemic achievements of its day (and even later according to Spencer (1899)). However, as the
accommodation demands changed during the 19th century, the contribution Lamarckian theories
made to the success of scientific practices precipitously declined. In his Origin of Species, Darwin provided an alternative to Lamarckian evolution in his formulation of the theory of natural
selection. Yet, Darwinian evolution only succeeded Lamarckian evolution because the former
was considered a theoretically plausible alternative to the latter. Since the 1860s, Darwinian
evolution has surpassed the epistemic achievements of Lamarckian evolution because Darwinian
evolution gets it approximately right to a greater degree.
Background theories are approximately true and contribute to the reliability of scientific
practices because the natural kind terms they deploy get it right in tracking the causal phenomena
in the world. Denotational refinement (in the sense of Field (1973)) can lead to an increase in
epistemic achievements and is only possible if natural kind terms reflect an approximate
knowledge of independently existing causal structures. Similarly, the definitions of natural kinds
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must be approximately correct when their causal role contributes to the successful accommodation of our theories and methods to the world. Furthermore, the inductive methods that guide the
process of theory invention, the application of nonexperimental criteria such as background
theories, and theory confirmation must be approximately correct when they contribute to the
instrumental reliability of scientific theories. According to Boyd, “scientific methodology,
dictated by currently accepted theories, is reliable at producing further knowledge precisely
because, and to the extent that, currently accepted theories are relevantly approximately true”
(Boyd, 1990a, p. 362, emphasis in original).
In summary, Boyd argues that the best explanation for the instrumental reliability of our
scientific theories and methods is that the theoretical claims our theories make are approximately
true and the theoretical judgments our methods require are approximately correct. Such reliability is the result of an ongoing process of accommodation between our scientific theories, methods, linguistic practices, including the deployment of contingently defined natural kind terms and
the employment of contingently defined natural kinds, and naturally occurring causal phenomena
in the world. It follows from this that whatever methodologies scientists employ in achieving
their inductive and explanatory successes will be taken as approximately correct or adequate
tools for investigating causal phenomena. As I argue in the following chapter, scientific models
are an integrally reliable method in morphology and serve as an important and indispensable tool
for establishing reliable morphological theories.
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4. A REALIST VIEW OF MORPHOLOGICAL MODELS
A priori model building approaches have not been very successful in functional morphology, due in part to the enormous
difficulty in building a model that reflects biological reality
from first principles…(Lauder, 1995, p. 5)

I contend that 1) morphological models contribute to the instrumental reliability of morphological methods and to the epistemic achievements of morphological theories produced by those
methods, because 2) the process of morphological modeling just is the process of accommodation as described by Boyd. I take it as uncontroversial that morphological models contribute to
the instrumental reliability of morphological methods and to the epistemic achievements of
morphological theories. Morphological modeling is a widely used method in morphological
studies, and its methodological prevalence is best explained by its instrumental reliability.46
My aim here is to argue that the best explanation for the instrumental reliability of morphological modeling is that it is a process of accommodation occurring between (on the one hand)
the models constructed and developed by morphologists and (on the other hand) independently
existing organismal phenomena. That is, morphological models are not mere heuristic devices
adopted by convention, and their construction and deployment are not based on a priori rules and
methods. I claim instead that morphological models are constructed from theory-dependent
methods and are deployed in theory-dependent ways to aid morphologists in their quest to explain independently existing causal phenomena.

46

A search for the word ‘modeling’ in the publication titles of the top ten major journals in morphology (ranked by impact factor
from 1981-2007) returned 17,016 results. This total does not include publications that have incorporated modeling into their materials and methods, but did not mention ‘modeling’ in the publication title.
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4.1. Morphological modeling: A process of accommodation
4.1.1. The theory-independence of organismal phenomena
Morphology is the study of organismal phenomena or phenomena involving biological organisms. We can think of the terms ‘organismal phenomena’ as referring to a natural kind, Organismal Phenomena. As such, Organismal Phenomena are homeostatic property cluster kinds,
whose definition consists of whatever causal phenomena, such as causal structures, powers,
mechanisms, processes, relations, etc., underwrite the epistemic achievements associated with
the use of the natural kind terms, ‘organismal phenomena’, within morphological practices. The
causal phenomena that define Organismal Phenomena are theory-independent, and claims about
their metaphysical existence are subject to the restrictions imposed by the No Non-Causal Contribution Thesis (2N2C). However, the properties and underlying causal powers, mechanisms,
processes, relations, etc., underwriting the definition of Organismal Phenomena are determined
by theoretical judgments that are based on the epistemic achievements of morphological practices. That is, the definition of Organismal Phenomena is contingent upon its contribution to the
epistemic achievements of morphology. So, the members of the natural kind Organismal Phenomena just are the causal phenomena morphologists seek to explain, and the accuracy of morphological theories will be determined by how well they correspond to the phenomena they
purport to describe.

4.1.2. Is morphology a disciplinary matrix?
Boyd defines a disciplinary matrix as “a family of inductive and explanatory aims and practices,
together with the conceptual resources and vocabularies within which they are implemented”
(Boyd, 1999b, p. 57). So, is morphology a disciplinary matrix? Suppose we take the following
textbook description of morphology given by Kardong:
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Morphology embraces the study of form and function, of how a structure and its function become
an integrated part of an interconnected design (the organism), and of how this design itself becomes a factor in the evolution of new forms. The term morphology is not just a synonym for the
word anatomy. It has always meant much more; for Cuvier, it meant the study of structure and
function; for Owen, it meant the study of archetypes behind the structure; and for Huxley, it meant
a study of structural change over time (evolution). Today, diverse schools of morphology in North
America, Europe, and Asia all generally share an interest in the structural integration of parts, the
significance of this for the functioning of the organism, and the resulting limitations and possibilities for evolutionary processes…. Morphological analysis focuses on higher levels of biological
organization—at the level of the organism, its parts, and its position within the ecological community. (Kardong, 2009, p. 14, emphasis in original)

It is clear from this description that morphology is indeed an (historically) established academic
discipline, whose domain of research is “the study of form and function” of organisms. However, this is a broad description, and it is not clear whether it encompasses a single disciplinary
matrix. In fact, Kardong mentions “schools of morphology”, which implies that morphology is
comprised of multiple disciplinary matrices. It is possible that these schools do share the same
inductive and explanatory aims, utilize the same conceptual resources and vocabularies, and are
demarcated solely upon their geographic location. But I think this is unlikely. For example,
Asian schools of morphology probably differ to a large extent in their conceptual resources and
vocabularies from European schools due to the differing cultural, political, and social factors.
Therefore, I think it is safe to say that morphology broadly defined cannot be a disciplinary
matrix.
Furthermore, morphologists often distinguish between various morphological sub-disciplines
such as comparative morphology (or comparative anatomy), functional morphology (or functional anatomy), structural morphology, developmental morphology, paleomorphology, vertebrate morphology, invertebrate morphology, human morphology, veterinarian morphology, etc.
These sub-disciplines differ in their explanatory aims and practices, and they employ vocabularies and concepts that differ from one another to various degrees. For example, the word ‘muscle’
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has different definitions and is used in different contexts in vertebrate, invertebrate, and human
morphology.
These academic sub-disciplines of morphology are not obvious disciplinary matrices either.
For example, Homberger (1988) claims that studies within functional morphology vary to such
an extent in the types of organismal phenomena they study, in the methods they use, and in the
environmental context in which their studies are performed that they cannot be concisely described. Yet, according to Homberger (1988) studies in functional morphology share three
things in common: they study the relationships between functional and structural aspects of
biological systems, they utilize modeling as a primary method for investigating these relationships, and they usually commence with an initial question. This initial question may be about
either proximal interests, such as “How does this organismal phenomenon work?”, or ultimate
interests, such as “Why does this organismal phenomenon differ in different animals?”
(Homberger, 1988). Nevertheless, having these three common elements does not necessarily
establish functional morphology as a distinct disciplinary matrix.
Similar questions like those proposed in functional morphology can be posed in the context
of the other morphological sub-disciplines. As Homberger (1988) argues, not only do initial
questions about organismal phenomena mark the “start” of morphological investigations, but
they also serve to guide the research methodology. Because there is nothing in this analysis
peculiar to functional morphology, I think the description by Homberger (1988) can be expanded
to include all morphological sub-disciplines. That is, all morphological sub-disciplines study
organismal phenomena, deploy models to aid their studies, and begin their studies with a proximate or ultimate question about a particular organismal phenomenon.
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Given the role initial questions play in guiding research methodology, it is reasonable to
attribute the establishment of disciplinary matrices to the formulation of initial questions. That
is, these questions “establish” the inductive and explanatory aims of the studies pursuing their
answers and inform the adoption of the conceptual schemes and vocabularies those studies
should utilize. Therefore, the morphological studies pursuing the answers to direct proximal or
ultimate questions are the disciplinary matrices of morphology. In other words, initial questions
generate accommodation demands for the disciplinary matrices that attempt to answer them.
This means that each sub-discipline may contain numerous disciplinary matrices and that some
research labs may even be characterized by multiple disciplinary matrices.47

4.1.3. Organismal phenomena, features, and research roles
Morphologists in all disciplinary matrices study organismal phenomena, which are homeostatic
property cluster kinds. This means that the natural kind Organismal Phenomena has the same
definition in all disciplinary matrices. In other words, the definition of Organismal Phenomena
is not discipline specific. Rather, the natural kind Organismal Phenomena is contingently defined by the union of the sets of causal phenomena that underwrite the accommodation demands
in each morphological disciplinary matrix.48 Organismal phenomena are the causal phenomena
studied by morphologists, with each morphological sub-discipline focusing on a contingent
subset of causal phenomena. For example, the set of causal phenomena vertebrate morphologists
study is not the same set of causal phenomena invertebrate morphologists study, but together the

47

By this point, the importance of posing the initial question about an organismal feature for the modeling and investigative process
should be clear. To be undoubtedly clear I defer to Kant: “It is already a great and necessary proof of cleverness or insight to know
what one should reasonably ask. For if the question is absurd in itself and demands unnecessary answers, then, besides the embarrassment of the one who proposes it, it also has the disadvantage of misleading the incautious listener into absurd answers, and
presenting the ridiculous sight of one person milking a billy-goat while the other holds a sieve underneath” (Kant, 2009, p. 197).
48
The natural kind Organismal Phenomena can be thought of as a higher-order natural kind, whose definition is dependent upon its
use in multiple lower-level disciplinary matrices within the academic discipline of biological morphology.
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two sets contribute to the set of organismal phenomena. So, what are the causal phenomena
specific to each disciplinary matrix called?
As described in Chapter 1, a particular organismal phenomenon made the focus of an initial
question, that is, studied within a particular disciplinary matrix, is called a feature (Bock & von
Wahlert, 1965). Within each disciplinary matrix, morphologists “pick out” for study instantiations of the natural kind Feature. I shall refer to an instantiation of a natural kind Feature within
a given disciplinary matrix, D, as FeatureD. FeaturesD, like organismal phenomena, are homeostatic property cluster kinds, and their definitions, unlike organismal phenomena, are discipline
dependent. The natural kind Feature is partially defined by the collective definitions of FeaturesD employed within a range of disciplinary matrices, which are accommodating to the relevant causal phenomena that underwrite the accommodation demands for each disciplinary matrix. So, we can distinguish the natural kind FeatureD from the natural kinds Feature and Organismal Phenomena as follows: The natural kind FeatureD is directly defined by the causal phenomena studied within disciplinary matrices; the natural kinds Feature and Organismal Phenomena are indirectly defined by the causal roles the natural kind FeatureD plays within a range of
disciplinary matrices such that they are indirectly defined by the causal phenomena directly
defining each FeatureD. Therefore, in order for a given causal phenomenon to have membership
in the natural kinds Feature and Organismal Phenomena, it must be associated with the definition
of a FeatureD, whose use within a disciplinary matrix has contributed to that disciplinary matrix’s
epistemic achievements.
The distinction between organismal phenomena and features is important for understanding
the former’s role in “defining” morphology as an academic discipline and the latter’s role in
establishing disciplinary matrices. Reference to features plays what Boyd (2010a) describes as a
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“research guiding role” for disciplinary matrices. Here is an illustration of how reference to a
feature might play a research guiding role in morphology: When a morphologist poses a question about an observable phenomenon related to an organism, such as “How does this phenomenon work?” or “What is the explanatory significance of this phenomenon versus that phenomenon?”, the phenomenon under inquiry becomes a feature of interest, F, for the morphologist.
There are two possible ways in which a morphologist can follow-up on her initial question, each
answering to one of the following two cases:
Case 1: If the morphologist can determine that F has the relevant properties constituting the
definition of a currently accepted natural kind term, t, then the morphologist can use t to refer to
F. She can now rephrase her question to ask “How does t work?” Now, the inferential role
played by t that refers to F will determine the inferential architecture the morphologist will adopt
for her study of F. That is, reference to F using t engages the theoretical resources associated
with the definition of t in the disciplinary matrix deploying it to bear on F.
Case 2: If the morphologist cannot determine whether F has the relevant properties constituting the definition of a currently accepted natural kind term (which might occur if the causal
phenomena initially defining F have never been studied), then the morphologist will either adopt
an inferential architecture deemed appropriate for the study of F as the result of a theoretical
judgment, or the morphologist will develop a new inferential architecture for the study of F using
relevant background theories as her guide. That is, the similarities of the properties initially
defining F to the properties of other natural kinds embedded within her disciplinary matrix, will
“direct” the morphologist to adopt an appropriately relevant inferential architecture or to develop
an appropriately structured inferential architecture.49

49

For example, an inferential architecture developed for and by the study of “aliens” is not currently available (as far as I know).
However, if E.T. were to crash-land on Earth, morphologists would assemble a new inferential architecture that draws upon the
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So, reference to F largely determines how F will be studied.50 However, no matter what
inferential architecture is initially adopted, its continued use is contingent upon its contribution to
satisfying accommodation demands.

4.1.4. Forms, functions, faculties, features and HPC kinds
Within a disciplinary matrix, FeatureD are defined by the independently existing causal phenomena that serve to underwrite the disciplinary matrix’s accommodation demands. The definition
of the natural kind FeatureD is dependent upon the causal role reference to it plays in the epistemic achievements of a particular disciplinary matrix. Like all homeostatic property cluster kinds,
the natural kind FeatureD is defined by naturally occurring families of properties (causal phenomena). Let’s call the family of properties defining a given FeatureD within a disciplinary
matrix the feature-family of properties. In order for a property to have membership within the
natural kind FeatureD, it must be part of the feature-family of properties that contributes to the
causal role that reference to the natural kind FeatureD plays within a particular disciplinary matrix’s inferential architecture.
Because a feature-family of properties can contain an extraordinary number of properties and
because the underlying causal powers, mechanisms, relations, etc., sustaining the clustering of
those properties often form complex causal systems, morphologists subdivide feature-family
properties into subfamilies of properties called form-families, function-families, and facultyfamilies of properties to better organize organismal complexity. Recall that Bock and von

theoretical resources of currently established inferential architectures. In other words, we could custom build an inferential architecture for E.T. without having to reinvent morphology (although this may happen as we study E.T. over time and learn more about
astrobiology).
50
Of course, the social architecture is also in play. For example, the morphologist may be forced to adopt the inferential architecture
that’s most likely to bring funding into her scientific community, or she may be forced to adopt the one that will make a greater
contribution to her efforts in achieving tenure, although neither may be explanatorily the best.
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Wahlert (1965) define a form as a temporally specific appearance, shape, configuration, or material composition of an organismal feature. Because these properties do not describe a biological
process or mechanism, let’s call them non-contributing properties, that is, they do not consist of
the underlying causal powers, processes, mechanisms, relations, etc., that sustain their clustering.
So, a form-family of properties will be comprised of those non-contributing properties within the
feature-family of properties that correspond to the appearance, shape, configuration, or material
composition of a feature. The form-families of properties contingently define the FormsD of a
FeatureD.
Recall that Bock and von Wahlert (1965) define a function as a physical or chemical property
or process associated with a form of an organismal feature. Because these properties describe
biological processes, mechanisms, and relations, let’s call them contributing properties, that is,
they consist of the underlying causal powers, processes, mechanisms, relations, etc. that sustain
the clustering of a form-family of properties. So, a function-family of properties will be comprised of those contributing properties that sustain a form-family. That is, a function-family is
comprised of those phenomena that hold a form-family together. Think of a form-family as a
cluster of relevant properties, and think of a function-family as the “glue” holding those properties together.51 The function-families of properties contingently define the FunctionsD of a FeatureD.
Recall that Bock and von Wahlert (1965) define a faculty as the role a function (or functions)
associated with a form (or forms) plays in the life of an organism. Also recall that faculties are
known as form-function complexes because the roles faculties play are determined by the relationship between forms and their requisite functions. So, a faculty-family of properties will be
51

As described in Chapter 1, this glue can have static or dynamic properties.
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comprised of both the non-causal form-family properties and the causal function-family properties that contingently define a group of FormsD and FunctionsD within a form-function complex.
The faculty-families of properties contingently define the FacultiesD of a FeatureD.

4.1.5. A causal notion of model deployment
Morphologists deploy models to produce interpretations and representations from observational
data collected from independently existing causal phenomena. The interpretations and representations produced by morphological models are incorporated into the definitions of the natural
kinds FeatureD, FacultyD, FunctionD, and FormD, that are embedded within disciplinary matrices.
Reference to these natural kinds contributes to the inductive and explanatory successes within
disciplinary matrices, and, as a result, morphological models, like natural kind terms, have a
tendency to track the causal phenomena they interpret and represent. That is, morphological
models contribute to the accommodation of the inferential architectures of disciplinary matrices
to causal phenomena in the world by underwriting the definitions of the natural kinds used within the inductive and explanatory claims of disciplinary matrices. Therefore, morphological
modeling is an important methodology because it contributes to the instrumental reliability of
morphological theories. So, how do morphological models contribute to the definitions of the
natural kinds FeatureD, FacultyD, FunctionD, and FormD?
I argue that feature-models help determine the definition of the natural kind FeatureD within a
given disciplinary matrix in the following way: Recall from Chapter 1 that morphologists deploy
feature-models to interpret and represent organismal features. A morphologist deploys a featuremodel to interpret and represent a collection of observational data about particular causal phenomena that are theoretically judged by the morphologist to have membership within a natural
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kind FeatureD, FD. The interpretations and representations produced by the feature-model provide new information about FD, and, therefore, begin or extend the definition of FD. The new or
extended definition of FD becomes incorporated into the inferential architecture of the disciplinary matrix and underwrites the natural kind term t that refers to FD.
The natural kind term t plays an inferential role within the disciplinary matrix, which is
determined by how it is used to produce new inductive and explanatory claims. If the use of t
contributes to the epistemic achievements of the disciplinary matrix, then the definition of FD
will be confirmed. If the definition of FD is confirmed, then the interpretations and representations produced by the feature-model will also be confirmed. So, the use of t to produce instrumentally reliable theories indicates that the methodology used to produce the feature-model’s
interpretations and representations, which contribute to the definition of t, is also instrumentally
reliable.
The inductive and explanatory successes attained when referring to the natural kind FD indicate that the definition of FD is approximately correct, which also indicates that the interpretations and representations of the feature-model underwriting FD are approximately correct as well.
The best explanation for the contribution reference to FD makes to the epistemic achievements of
the disciplinary matrix is that the feature-model is approximately, yet successfully, tracking a
feature-family of properties. Because membership within the feature-family of properties is
dependent upon the causal role FD plays within the inferential architecture of the disciplinary
matrix and because the causal role FD plays is largely a consequence of the interpretations and
representations produced by the feature-model, the feature-model helps to determine which
properties have membership within feature-families. Furthermore, because the interpretations
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and representations produced by the feature-model are subject to the various model tests described in Chapter 1, the membership conditions prescribed by the feature-model are contingent
upon the contribution its interpretations and representations make to the epistemic achievements
of the disciplinary matrix. Therefore, the definition of FD is contingent upon the role featuremodel interpretations and representations play in the epistemic achievements of the disciplinary
matrix.
What I have just described is how I think feature-models contribute to the definitions of
FeaturesD. But, this does not address how I think the definitions for the natural kinds FormsD,
FunctionsD, and FacultiesD are determined. I think their definitions are determined and are related to the definition of their Feature in the following ways: Recall from Chapter 1 that the representations and interpretations of feature-models are dependent upon the interpretations and representations of their hierarchically related sub-models: form-models, function-models, and faculty-models. The deployment of these sub-models follows the same methodology as the deployment of the feature-model, because, like the feature-model, the sub-models are deployed to
interpret and represent a set of observational data about particular organismal phenomena. The
key difference between the feature-model and its sub-models is that the former interprets and
represents the entire feature-family of properties while the latter interprets and represents subsets
of properties within the feature-family of properties.
Form-models are the first of the sub-models to be deployed, and they interpret and represent
the forms of an organismal feature as determined by a morphologist. That is, form-models interpret and represent a subset of (non-contributing) properties within the feature-family of properties that are theoretically judged by a morphologist to have membership within the natural kind
FormD. The relationship between a form-model and the definition of the natural kind FormD and
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the relationship between the natural kind FormD and the natural kind term referring to it are the
same as the relationships between feature-models, natural kinds, and natural kind terms. And the
best explanation for the contribution made by form-models, kinds, and terms to the epistemic
achievements of the disciplinary matrix is that form-models are approximately, albeit successfully tracking form-families of properties. Furthermore, the definition of the natural kind FormD is
contingent upon both its causal role within a disciplinary matrix as well as the results of the
model tests described in Chapter 1.
The deployment of a form-model is the first step to the deployment of a function-model.
Recall from Chapter 1 that a function-model is deployed to interpret and represent the functions
of an organismal feature. Also recall that a function is a physical or chemical property or process
associated with a form. The functions of a feature are related to a particular form or group of
forms as described in Chapter 1. Therefore, the interpretations and representations of a functionmodel will be dependent upon those of a least one form-model. In other words, function-models
are deployed to interpret and represent a subset of causal properties with a feature-family of
properties that are theoretically judged by a morphologist to be associated with one or more
form-families of properties. Because the morphologist’s judgment is based on the form-families
of properties and, therefore, the interpretations and representations form-models produce, formmodels play a sort of research guiding role for the deployment of function-models.
The same relationships hold between function-models, natural kinds, and natural kind terms
as they do for form-models, natural kinds, and natural kind terms. Similarly, the best explanation for the contribution made by function-models, natural kinds, and natural kind terms to the
epistemic achievements of a disciplinary matrix is that function-models are approximately, yet
successfully tracking function-families of properties. And, as with the definition of the natural
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kind FormD, the definition of the natural kind FunctionD is contingent upon both its causal role
within the disciplinary matrix as well as the results of the model tests described in Chapter 1.
Like function-models, the interpretations and representations produced by faculty-models are
dependent upon those produced by lower-level models. Recall from Chapter 1 that facultymodels are deployed to interpret and represent faculties of organismal features. Also recall that
faculties are also known as form-function complexes. Therefore, the interpretations and representations of faculty-models are dependent upon those produced by associated form- and function-models. In other words, faculty-models are deployed to interpret and represent a subset of
properties within a feature-family of properties that are theoretically judged by a morphologist to
be comprised of a union of at least one form-family of properties with its associated functionfamily of properties. Similarly, because the morphologist’s judgment is based on the combination of form-families of properties and function-families of properties, and, therefore, the interpretations and representations both types of models produce, form- and function-models play a
sort of research guiding role for the deployment of faculty-models.
Likewise, the same relationships hold between faculty-models, kinds, and terms as they do
for form- and function-models, natural kinds, and natural kind terms. Similarly, the best explanation for the contribution made by faculty-models, natural kinds, and natural kind terms to the
epistemic achievements of a disciplinary matrix is that faculty-models are approximately, yet
successfully tracking faculty-families of properties. And, as with the definition of the natural
kind FormD and FunctionD, the definition of the natural kind FacultyD is contingent upon both its
causal role within the disciplinary matrix as well as the results of the model tests described in
Chapter 1.
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In summary, the interpretations and representations produced by feature-models are dependent upon those produced by its form-, function-, and faculty-models. Because the interpretations
and representations of each type of model underwrite the definition of their corresponding natural kind, and because the interpretations and representations produced by the feature-models are
dependent upon those of its sub-models, the definition of the natural kind FeatureD and the inferential role played by the natural kind term that refers to it will be dependent upon the definitions
of the natural kinds FormD, FunctionD, and FacultyD and the inferential roles played by the natural kind terms that refer to them. And the definitions of these natural kinds and the inferential
roles of their natural kind terms are contingent upon the role they play in the inductive and explanatory successes of the disciplinary matrix deploying them.
We can now describe the general role morphological models have within Boyd’s account of
reference described in Chapter 3. As described in Chapter 3, the deployment and successful use
of a natural kind term establishes a natural kind, and when used in successful inductive and
explanatory claims, natural kind terms have a tendency to track independently existing causal
phenomena. In turn, the definition of the natural kind being referred to by the natural kind term
is dependent upon the causal role the natural kind plays and the inferential role the natural kind
term plays within the inferential architecture of a disciplinary matrix. Models, like natural kind
terms, also track independently existing causal phenomena, and as a result models produce interpretations and representations. Model interpretations and representations produce new information about the causal phenomena they are tracking, and, therefore, provide new information
about the natural kinds defined by the same causal phenomena. Hence, the definition of natural
kinds is partially attributed to the causal role they play within a disciplinary matrix and partially
attributed to the interpretations and representations produced by models. But because the defini-
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tion of natural kinds is largely dependent upon the interpretations and representations produced
by models, the causal role they play is also dependent upon the interpretations and representations of models. So, models contribute to the satisfaction of accommodation demands for a
disciplinary matrix by facilitating the accommodation of natural kind definitions to independently existing phenomena.

4.2. The theory-dependence of model interpretation and representation
The account of model deployment I describe above is consistent with Boyd’s version of reference, but my account is not obviously realistic. To see how morphological models and their
deployment can be viewed through Boyd’s version of realism, we need to take a closer look at
the role theoretical judgments play in modeling and in the production of interpretations and
representations. In this section, I argue that the interpretations and representations models produce are highly theory-dependent and that the best explanation for the reliability of the interpretations and representations models produce for defining natural kinds is that the interpretations
and representations produced by morphological models must get it approximately correct, that is,
they are approximately true. There are two important ways that morphological modeling is
theory-dependent: 1) Theoretical judgments are a large component in the production of the interpretations and representations from models, and 2) theoretical judgments are necessary for establishing the representational relationships shared between multiperspectival models as described
in Chapter 2.
1) The production of interpretations and representations from morphological models results
from a series of theoretical judgments a morphologist makes in accordance with nonexperimental
criteria. There are three important theoretical judgments morphologists as model users must
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make: judgments about model function and selection, judgments about model synthesis, and
judgments about model type and expression.52
First, morphologists must determine the function and selection of their models. Recall from
Chapter 2 that a model’s function is roughly its purpose for deployment. In morphological modeling, form-, function-, and faculty-models have the functions (or purpose) of representing their
respective aspects (forms, functions, and faculties) of an organismal feature. Because organismal features and the aspects that comprise them are contingently defined natural kinds, determining the function of a morphological model is an a posteriori theoretical exercise performed by a
morphologist within the inferential architecture of her disciplinary matrix. In other words, the
functions of morphological models reflect the intentions of the morphologists that use them, and
these intentions are purely theoretical. Furthermore, the processes morphologists use to determine model functions is dependent upon and directly reflects the contributions they make to the
epistemic achievements of the disciplinary matrix in which they are deployed.
Directly related to the determination of a model’s function is the determination of a model’s
selection. Recall from Chapter 2 that to determine the selection of a model is to determine the
particular aspect of a given phenomenon the model shall represent. By selecting a particular
aspect of a phenomenon for a model to represent, a morphologist implicitly selects the subset of
data from the total available dataset about the phenomenon to interpret and represent. And, this
selection procedure is guided solely by nonexperimental criteria such as morphological theories,
background knowledge, and other accepted practices and standards within the morphologist’s
disciplinary matrix. Unfortunately, datasets are not produced by nature with ready-made subdivisions that precisely indicate which data fall into which subsets. So, if a morphologist is to
52

These judgments are made for each theoretical model as well as their underlying data and data production models. Due to space
constraints, I shall only discuss how these judgments are made to produce theoretical models and how such judgments directly
affect the representations of organismal phenomena they provide.
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deploy a model to interpret and represent a particular subset of data about an aspect, she must
first determine which data belong in that subset. This too is an a posteriori theoretical exercise,
and the process the morphologist will use to carry it out will be dependent upon the contribution
it makes to the epistemic achievements of the disciplinary matrix in which it is deployed.
Second, morphologists must synthesize their models. Recall from Chapter 1 that form-,
function-, faculty-, and feature-models are made by synthesizing (on the one hand) observational
data (or at least the claims made by data models) with (on the other hand) biomechanical and
background knowledge by using biomechanical principles and morphological theories. Also
recall that I did not provide a detailed account of the synthesis process. This is because the
notion of synthesis will be dependent upon the modeling practices within the disciplinary matrix
in which models are deployed. That is, synthesis is a process guided by the model building
standards and practices morphologists adopt as they work within a disciplinary matrix. There is
no a priori method of model building. Model building is a purely a posteriori and largely theoretical endeavor. This means, as we have already seen in the contexts of function and selection,
that the representations provided by models are largely the result of theoretical judgments that
are made by reference to the background knowledge, morphological theories, biomechanical
principles, and other accepted practices morphologists utilize. Hence, a notion of synthesis will
be dependent upon the contribution it makes to the epistemic achievements of the disciplinary
matrix in which it is deployed.
Finally, morphologists must determine the model type and expression of their models for the
production of interpretations and representations. Recall from Chapter 1 that a model’s type is
the kind of model it is (conceptual, visual, or mathematical), and a model’s expression is its
medium of description or explanation, that is, its form of representation (diagrammatic, graph-
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ical, propositional, and virtual). Also recall from Chapter 1 that each model is characterized by
only one model type and one model expression; to change either is to change to a different model. The determination of a model’s type and expression is crucially important to the representation it will produce and the information it will provide about its selected aspect. If a morphologist is a skilled modeler, then she will be able to produce a representation “worth a 1,000 words.”
However, if she is a less than able modeler, her representation will be less able to produce the
information needed for explanation of the aspect being modeled. A good representation will
provide a morphologist with a bounty of information about a phenomenal aspect, which can then
be incorporated into better explanations and theories about her phenomenon of interest. However, the production of a good representation is dependent upon her modeling know-how.
Choosing the “right” model type and expression is an a posteriori theoretical exercise. That
is, there are no a priori rules for choosing the right model type and expression in order to ensure
the best representational output possible. Rather, morphologists must depend on their background knowledge, their understanding of morphology, and their understanding of modeling to
produce a theoretical judgment as to which model type and expression are best for representing a
selected aspect. The “correctness” of their choices will be dependent on the contribution they
make to the epistemic achievements of the disciplinary matrix morphologists are working within.
2) Theoretical judgments also play an important role in the ability of morphologists to establish or identify the relationships that exist between multiperspectival models. Recall that multiperspectival models are types of over-all models, that is, a group of sub-models embedded
within an amalgamated model, that possess the following three relations: focused-based-relation,
combinatorial-based-relation, and hierarchical-based-relation. Determining which sub-models
share which of these three relations within the over-all model is a purely theoretical exercise.
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This means that establishing the coherence of sub-models within an over-all model is dependent
upon the ability of a morphologist to detect the appropriate relations between models and upon
her ability to rectify inconsistencies between related models.
The imaginative capacity and theoretical knowledge of a morphologist are especially important for establishing multiperspectival models and ensuring their coherence. The relations
between currently available models may not be obvious and there may be more than one way to
link them together. This has the consequence that the total representational output of the multiperspectival model will have multiply realizable forms. The determination of which representational output is satisfactory for each individual model and for the total multiperspectival model
will be that which is theoretically plausible. The representations of the multiperspectival form-,
function-, faculty-, and feature-models will be dependent upon judgments of theoretical plausibility by morphologists by reference to their background knowledge, morphological theories, and
other accepted nonexperimental criteria.53 And, the theoretical plausibility of a morphologist’s
judgment is dependent upon the contribution it makes to the epistemic achievements of her
disciplinary matrix.
In summary, I have discussed two ways in which morphological models contribute to the
instrumental reliability of morphological practices. First, morphological models play a central
role in helping morphologists determine the definitions of the natural kinds used within their
theories and explanations. The best explanation for why morphological models are able to contribute to the inductive and explanatory successes of morphological theories achieved through
the use of natural kinds within disciplinary matrices is that their representational output is ap-

53

This is not to suggest that the knowledge obtained from the deployment of a multiperspectival model will be perspectival
knowledge. I discussed in Chapter 2 the methods model users employ to cull unnecessary or biased or idealized representational
content from the total available representational content. For additional reasons why multiperspectival modeling avoids perspectival knowledge see Chakravartty (2010).
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proximately true. Second, the theoretical judgments required for the production of morphological models are based on theoretical beliefs of morphologists about the best way to build models.
Therefore, if morphological models contribute to the inductive and explanatory successes of
morphology and if morphological models are as theory-laden as I have argued in the sections
above, then the best explanation for why morphological modeling is a reliable methodology is
that the method of morphological modeling is approximately correct for investigating organismal
phenomena. Morphologists get something right when they deploy and employ morphological
models within their disciplinary matrices and morphological explanations, respectively, as reflected by the contributions morphological models make to the instrumental reliability of morphological methods. A diagrammatic representation of the accommodation process involving
multiperspectival models is presented in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Flowchart combining multiperspectival modeling (MPM) with Boyd’s view of reference. MPM tracks causal phenomena to produce the representation, R, which informs the definition of the natural kind, Nk, that is being referred to by the natural kind term, tk, which is also
tracking the same causal phenomena underwriting the definition of Nk and the content of R.
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5. OBJECTIONS TO A REALIST VIEW OF MODELING
Good philosophical method dictates that what one says about,
for example, scientific methods or scientific language generally should be consistent with what one says about the methods
or language of particular sciences, and vice versa. (Boyd,
1991a, p. 3)

In this chapter, I address three objections that could be raised against a scientific realistic view of
morphological modeling. The first objection I discuss comes from the empiricist tradition in the
philosophy of science. I suggest that empiricists could argue against a realist view of morphological models by adapting their claims about the underdetermination of scientific theories to the
underdetermination of morphological models. I shall refer to this objection as the underdetermination of models argument (§5.1.). The second objection I discuss comes from the constructivist
tradition. I suggest that constructivists could argue against a realist view of models by appealing
to paradigm dependent standards of model building and model assessment to support their claim
that morphological models are a mere methodological convention deployed to “investigate” a
paradigm dependent world. I shall refer to this objection as the conventionality of models argument (§5.2.). Lastly, I discuss a worry Barbara Horan (1988) raises against a realist view of
biological models based on what she describes as an inverse relationship between the explanatory power and the predictive success of models that results from modeling complex biological
phenomena. I shall refer to this objection as the complexity problem (§5.3.).
The first two objections are rooted in historical disagreements between realists and antirealists in the philosophy of science. Nevertheless, a realist view of morphological modeling must
be able to answer empiricist and constructivist worries as they pertain to modeling if it is to be a
viable account of scientific modeling. I shall rely on the contributions Boyd has made to the
realist-antirealist debates in the philosophy of science (particularly Boyd (1983, 1985a, 1992)) in

112

formulating my response to the empiricist and constructivist objections. The third worry represents a constant concern for practicing biologists, especially morphologists, namely to what
extent explanations about specific biological systems can be used as a source of predictions about
a general and often unrelated class of biological phenomena. To address this worry, I shall rely
on the philosophical work of Boyd as well as Bailer-Jones’ notion of prototype.

5.1. The underdetermination of models argument
Following Boyd (1983), a simple, yet powerful empiricist argument against a realistic view of
morphological modeling can be sketched as follows:
Suppose that M is a proposed multiperspectival model (an over-all model with requisite submodels) that makes theoretical and observational claims about an organismal feature F, which can
be subjected to experimental testing. A multiperspectival model is said to be empirically equivalent to M just in case it makes the same observational predictions about F that M does. Now it is
always possible, given M, to construct arbitrarily many alternative multiperspectival models which
are empirically equivalent to M but which offer contradictory theoretical accounts of the nature of
F. Since scientific evidence for or against a multiperspectival model consists in the confirmation
or disconfirmation of one of its observational predictions, M and each of the multiperspectival
models empirically equivalent to it will be equally well confirmed or disconfirmed by any possible
observational evidence. Therefore, no scientific evidence can bear on the question of which of
these multiperspectival models provides the correct theoretical account of F. At best, it might be
possible to confirm or disconfirm the claim that each of these multiperspectival models is a reliable instrument for the prediction of observable phenomena. Since this construction is possible for
any multiperspectival model M, it follows that scientific evidence can never decide the question
between multiperspectival models of organismal features. Hence, theoretical knowledge of the nature of organismal features is impossible. 54

According to an empiricist view of models, if the representations of two different multiperspectival models differ in theoretical content, yet produce the same observational consequences, then
choosing one model over the other will be merely a pragmatic matter since empirical evidence
will be unable to arbitrate, that is, determine, between the two models. That is, each model will
be equally confirmed or disconfirmed by empirical evidence. This inability to empirically arbi-
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This sketch of an empiricist argument against a realist view of morphological models closely follows the sketch Boyd (1983, pp.
46-48) gives of an empiricist argument against a realist view of scientific theories. I have preserved the structure of Boyd’s formulation in adapting his sketch of scientific theories to apply to morphological models.
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trate between two multiperspectival models is the central thrust of the underdetermination of
models argument (as applied to morphological models).
Before providing a realist rebuttal to the empiricist sketch above, I shall briefly note what the
realist and empiricist share in common and where they disagree. This will help diagnose the
problems with the claims made by the empiricist about the underdetermination of morphological
models. First, both realists and empiricists accept the mind-independence of reality. That is,
both realists and empiricists affirm the no non-causal contribution thesis (2N2C). Recall, 2N2C
states that human social practices make no non-causal contribution to the causal structure of the
world or to the properties of causal phenomena inhabiting the world (Boyd, 1992). Second, both
realists and empiricists affirm the accommodation thesis, which states that our scientific methods
are reliable insofar as they allow the accommodation of our scientific practices to independently
existing causal phenomena under study and that the background theories of our sciences reliably
govern our scientific methods by providing an approximately accurate account of the observable
causal phenomena under study (Boyd, 1992). In other words, empiricists and realists agree that
science explains a mind-independent world.
Realists and empiricists disagree on the role theoretical judgments (or claims) play in regards
to claims about observational phenomena. Scientific realists (like Boyd) hold that judgments
about projectibility, confirmation, experimental setup, and evidential standards are theorydependent judgments such that they represent “inductive inferences from (partly or wholly)
theoretical premises to (partly or wholly) theoretical conclusions” (Boyd, 1992, p. 29). In other
words, the realist holds that theoretical judgments are approximately true inferences from approximately true background theories that inform how best to collect data about, explain, and
predict observational phenomena. Therefore, theoretical judgments are evidential and play an
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important role in the confirmation of models. Empiricists (like Van Fraassen (1980)) disagree.
They claim that while background theories may suggest new alternatives that can be cashed out
using theoretical judgments, there is no reason to believe that these theoretical judgments are
approximately true. For the empiricist, theoretical judgments may serve a pragmatic role, but
they do not serve an epistemic role. A theoretical judgment may help a morphologist choose
between which of two empirically equivalent multiperspectival models to submit to experimental
testing, but a theoretical judgment will not help the morphologist determine which model is
approximately true. For the empiricist, theoretical judgments do not play a role in the confirmation of morphological models; they hold that that role can only be played by observational evidence.
A response to the empiricist can be given by following Boyd (1983, 1985a): The evidence
for or against a multiperspectival model is not just a matter of the accuracy of its (tested) observational predictions. Rather, considerations of its theoretical plausibility in light of currently
accepted morphological theories, biomechanical principles, and background knowledge, as well
as the theoretical plausibility of alternative multiperspectival models, are just as evidential as
confirmatory empirical evidence. Theoretical judgments play an integral role in modeling data
production and data interpretation, which directly informs theoretical judgments involved in the
construction of form-, function-, faculty-, and feature-models. The representations these models
produce are largely based upon theoretical judgments made by the model user about appropriate
model type, model expression, and model relations. Furthermore, the explanatory and predictive
power of multiperspectival models directly depends on the relations between their sub-models,
which can only be established by reference to the theoretical judgments of the model user. Morphologists only adopt those models that are most theoretically plausible. According to Boyd

115

When a theoretical proposal is theoretically plausible in light of the existing theoretical tradition,
what that means is that it is supported by an inductive inference at the theoretical level from previously acquired theoretical knowledge…. The role of experimentation is to choose between the various theoretical proposals which pass this preliminary test for probable (approximate) truth.
(Boyd, 1985a, p. 14)

The only way to make sense of the process of morphological modeling, which involves the
synthesis of observational data with morphological theories, biomechanical principles, and relevant background knowledge, is to view the necessary involvement of theoretical judgments and
claims as evidential; if a model is inadequately constructed, then its observational predictions
will be equally inadequate.
Therefore, the underdetermination of models argument does not adequately reflect the evidential role of theoretical judgments as they are used in scientific practices. When presented
with two multiperspectival models that are empirically equivalent, a morphologist can determine
which model is more theoretically plausible, and therefore more likely to be approximately true,
by reference to the model user’s theoretical claims and by use of her theoretical judgments. The
only way two multiperspectival models can be evidentially indistinguishable when their theoretical claims are taken into account is if they are identical to one another. (See Boyd (1972, 1973,
1976, 1982, 1983, 1985a, 1985b, 1985c, 1989, 1990a, 1991b, 1993, 2010b) for more detailed
arguments against the empiricist view of science.)

5.2. The conventionality of models argument
Unlike empiricists, constructivists and scientific realists agree that theoretical judgments are
indispensable when evaluating scientific theories or models.55 Constructivists and realists also

55

Boyd (1992) identifies three versions of constructivism: science-as-social-practice constructivism (SSP constructivism), debunking
constructivism, and Neo-Kantian constructivism. SSP constructivism holds that science is fundamentally a social endeavor, that is,
science can be politically, sociologically, literally, and anthropologically studied. Debunking constructivism holds that most of the
content of scientific theories is determined by power struggles within the scientific community itself. Neo-Kantian constructivism
(N-K constructivism) holds that the world scientists study is constructed by paradigm dependent theoretical claims (in the sense of
Kuhn (1996) and Hanson (1965)). I am only concerned with N-K constructivism here.
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agree that theoretical judgments play an important role in helping our scientific methods track
causal phenomena in the world. However, the constructivists emphasize the profound dependence of our scientific methods on theoretical judgments such that they deny the independent
existence of causal phenomena. For constructivists, the nature of causal phenomena is largely
determined by paradigm dependent theoretical judgments or convention. In other words, constructivists reject 2N2C. By (again) following Boyd (1983), we can sketch the constructivist
reasoning as applied to morphological modeling as follows:
According to constructivists, the actual methodology of morphological modeling is profoundly
theory-dependent. What morphologists count as an acceptable model, what they count as an observation, which experiments they take to be well-designed, which measurement procedures they
consider legitimate, what problems they seek to solve, what sorts of evidence they require before
accepting a model, …all of these features of modeling methodology are in practice determined by
the theoretical tradition within which morphologists work. What sort of world must there be, the
constructivist asks, in order for this sort of theory-dependent modeling methodology to constitute
a vehicle for gaining knowledge? The answer, according to the constructivist, is that the biological world which morphologists study must be, in some robust sense, defined or constituted by, or
‘constructed’ from, the theoretical tradition in which the morphological community in question
works. If the world which morphologists study were not partly constituted by their theoretical tradition then there would be no way of explaining why the theory-dependent modeling methods
which morphologists use are a way of finding out what’s true. 56

According to the constructivist, the theoretical judgments deployed by morphologists in the
confirmation of models reflect currently accepted conventions about experimental testing, evidential standards, and data interpretation, which, while certainly functioning as (paradigm dependent) epistemic claims, do not reflect accommodation to independently existing causal phenomena in the world. For constructivists, the methods of morphological modeling are no less
conventional than adopting the conceptual scheme of organismal forms, functions, faculties, and
features. This position is what I refer to as the conventionality of models argument.
The constructivist maintains that the only way to make sense of the central role played by
theoretical judgments within our morphological methods is to assume that the biological world is
56

I have adapted this sketch of a constructivist argument against a realist view of models from a sketch made by Boyd (1983, p. 57)
of a constructivist argument against a realist view of scientific theories and methods in general.
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largely constructed by the paradigmatic morphological tradition which defines those methods.
However, Boyd provides an alternative explanation: “the world might be one in which the laws
and theories embodied in our actual theoretical tradition are approximately true” (Boyd, 1983, p.
65). There are two reasons to believe that Boyd’s answer is correct. First, if the constructivist
denial of 2N2C is correct, then there should be evidence from the social practices in science to
support their claims. That is, we should be able to find instances in science when acceptance of
the best theories for theory or model confirmation relied on a rejection of 2N2C. But, this is not
the case. According to Boyd,
if people live in worlds whose causal structure is determined noncausally by their local beliefs and
practices in the ways contemplated by N-K constructivism, then the laws governing the relations
between social practices and other conditions of human life are quite different from what they
would be were 2N2C true.
We may reasonably ask, in the light of the best available scientific theories, whether or not, for
example, the general causal structures of matter would be different if chemists and physicists engaged in different social practices. The answer is ‘no,’ and the answer would be ‘no’ for any of
the alleged cases of social construction appropriate to N-K constructivist philosophical packages.
That is evidence for 2N2C, or at least (what is enough) against those denials of 2N2C essential to
the constructivist’s project. (Boyd, 1992, p. 176)

By denying 2N2C, constructivists reject what is in their own view paradigmatic evidence in
favor of 2N2C’s acceptance! A large part of our scientific practices, including morphological
modeling, are premised on the truth and acceptance of 2N2C, since to hold otherwise would be
(scientifically) just as implausible as thinking “that social practices in gem-cutting noncausally
contribute to the determination of crop yields in Missouri” (Boyd, 1992, p. 177). Rather, scientific practices seem to be dialectically accommodating to independent causal phenomena in the
world in accordance with 2N2C. Only the scientific realist view can explain this process in a
way coherent and consistent with actual scientific practices.
The second reason why Boyd’s explanation given above should be accepted is that constructivists are unable to adequately explain the instrumental reliability of morphological modeling.
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Remember, Boyd’s abductive argument for scientific realism is built upon its supremacy over
empiricism and constructivism to explain the instrumental reliability of scientific theories and
methods. If constructivism aims to be a serious alternative to scientific realism, then it must be
able to offer an equally adequate explanation for the instrumental reliability of our scientific
practices, including morphological modeling. However, Boyd maintains that such an explanation is not available to the constructivist. According to Boyd, “the instrumental reliability of
particular scientific theories cannot be an artifact of the social construction of reality” because “it
cannot be that the explanation for the fact that airplanes, whose design rests upon enormously
sophisticated theory, do not often crash is that the paradigm defines the concept of an airplane in
terms of crash-resistance” (Boyd, 1983, p. 66).
Any philosophical theory that aims to explain the instrumental reliability of scientific theories and methods must also explain why those theories and methods are sometimes unreliable.
According to Boyd’s view, the best explanation for why our theories and methods are unreliable
is that they are imperfectly, yet dialectically, accommodating to independently existing causal
phenomena in the world. Hence, the best explanation involves the acceptance of 2N2C. Constructivists cannot explain the instrumental reliability of our sciences because they cannot explain their occasional unreliability. Boyd points out that the anomalous observations which
(sometimes) lead to “scientific revolutions” in the sense of Kuhn (1996) and the resistance that
the world exerts on paradigms in the sense of Feyerabend (1989) can only be explained by accepting 2N2C. “Anomalies” and “resistance” are effects of the ongoing dialectical process of
accommodation between our scientific practices, including morphological modeling, and independently existing causal phenomena, and it is this practice that best explains the instrumental
reliability of our sciences and the occasional unreliability caused by Kuhnian anomalies and
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Feyerabendian resistances. Therefore, the conventionality of models objection should be rejected in favor of a realistic view of morphological modeling. (See Boyd (1982, 1983, 1989, 1990b,
1992, 1999b, 1999c, 2001a, 2010b) for more detailed arguments against the constructivist view
of science.)

5.3. The complexity problem
Barbara Horan (1988) raises an important worry for a realist view of morphological modeling.
Her concern involves what she perceives as an unavoidable antagonism between the predictive
success and the explanatory power of models. According to Horan, this antagonism is a consequence of competing aims to (on the one hand) produce a model that makes successful predictions about the class of phenomena in which its focus is a member and (on the other hand) to
produce a model that can explain other less similar (and often unrelated) classes of phenomena.
She argues that this is problematic for a realist view of models, writing:
The more robust a model becomes, that is, the more it can successfully predict what will be observed in different, more general cases, the less realistic it will be, for the trade-off of generality
for detail is greater. That is, the greater the coincidence of results (the greater the predictive success of the model), the less likely it is that the model puts forward what is the actual explanation in
each case. Similarly, supposing that explanatory power were the primary goal, the more realistic
the model becomes (the more attention it pays to the details of a particular case in order to ascertain the actual causes of the result to be explained), the less robust the model will be. To the extent that the model is sufficiently complex to incorporate enough of the details of a particular case
to make probable the identification of the actual causes of the result to be explained, the less able
it will be to make predictions about other, different cases, simply because their details will differ.
(Horan, 1988, p. 274)

Horan’s worries concern morphological modeling for the following reasons: Organismal phenomena are complex and diverse. When modeling a particular focus, a morphologist must decide whether to construct her model to realistically represent its focus at the cost of its general
applicability to other foci, or to construct her model less realistically to represent other foci at the
cost of producing a realistic representation of its focus. In other words, the realism and the
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general applicability of models are inversely related; emphasizing the former increases a model’s
representational adequacy of organismal complexity, whereas emphasizing the latter increases a
model’s explanatory scope.
There are two ways to respond to Horan’s worries. The first way is by reference to the notion of prototype as described by Bailer-Jones (2009). According to Bailer-Jones, models are
often intended to represent a class of phenomena, say a particular organismal feature shared by
members of a species, of which many specimens can be found in the world. Most of these specimens are potential prototypes. A prototype, according to Bailer-Jones (2009), is
not any odd specimen of a phenomenon, but a typical one. Often this involves imagining the object of consideration as having ‘average’ or ‘typical’ properties, and this ‘prototypical’ object or
phenomenon may not even exist in the real world. The point is that it could typically exist in just
this way and that there probably exist many very much like it. So the prototype is selected or ‘distilled’ from a class of objects. The prototype has all the properties of the real phenomenon; it is
merely that the properties are selected such that they do not deviate from a ‘typical’ case of the
phenomenon. It is then this prototype that is addressed in the modeling effort. The assumption
behind this process of prototype formation is nonetheless that the model is not only a model of the
prototype, although there is a certain amount of deviation from the norm. (Bailer-Jones, 2009, p.
145)

Bailer-Jones maintains that prototypes are just as concrete as any individual specimen because
none of the properties belonging to a phenomenon are abstracted away when a prototype is
formed.57 By modeling a prototypical organismal feature, morphologists avoid issues with the
specificity of models to a particular specimen. Modeling prototypical features allows morphologists to successfully predict and explain relevantly similar members within a given natural kind
FeatureD. The degree to which a given multiperspectival morphological model can apply to
other natural kinds that may share some of the same properties is a concern of determining that

57

This is not to suggest that a prototype is intended to represent an “ideal” specimen. Rather, there is a “typical” specimen relative to
a given class of phenomena. I think Bailer-Jones’ point is analogous to a practice found in nursing. Nurses are instructed not to
record a patient’s blood pressure as “normal” or “abnormal” since there is no such thing as normal human blood pressure. Rather,
nurses are instructed record that their patient’s blood pressure is either regular or irregular relative to a patient specific base-line.
Analogously, prototypes are “typical” relative to a contingently clustering family of properties used to define their kind or class. (I
thank Claiborne MacKnight for the information about nursing practices.)
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model’s explanatory power. And, according to Boyd, “assessments of explanatory power are
just one species of assessment of indirect theory-mediated empirical evidence” (Boyd, 1985c, p.
87). Hence, at least for relatively similar phenomena, Horan’s worries will be addressed by the
theoretical judgments (in the sense of Boyd) of morphologists, who will determine (in the language of Bailer-Jones) what function their models shall fulfill, be it predictive, explanatory, or
some combination of both.
Bailer-Jones’ notion of prototype will not answer Horan’s worries about the use of models
that have a high degree of predictive success for one class of phenomena to explain a significantly different and unrelated class of phenomena. However, I think Horan’s worries can be addressed by appealing to what Bailer-Jones (2002a, 2009) calls metaphorical models. According
to Bailer-Jones, we can think of a metaphor as “a linguistic expression in which at least one part
of the expression is transferred from one domain of application (source domain), where it is
common, to another (target domain) in which it is unusual, or was probably unusual at an earlier
time when it might have been new” (Bailer-Jones, 2009, p. 111). Scientific models can act as
metaphors by organizing information in their source domain, that is, about their focus, to help
make connections and to help organize information in a target domain that differs significantly
from their focus. In fact, this is just how models are used when they are deployed to represent
“model” organisms, which are organisms such as mice that are easy to study, yet provide a
wealth of information about the biology of other organisms, such as humans (see Ankeny (2000);
Ankeny and Leonelli (2011)). Models of model organisms are types of metaphorical models,
and the extent to which they can be used to explain unrelated organismal phenomena will be
dependent upon the theoretical judgments of morphologists.
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Boyd (1993) offers an additional way models can be thought of as metaphorical when applied to unrelated phenomena. He claims that scientific metaphors help address the problem of
catachresis by introducing theoretical terms in domains where none previously existed. Nevertheless, Boyd claims that “the use of metaphor is one of many devices available to the scientific
community to accomplish the task of accommodation of language to the causal structure of the
world (Boyd, 1993, p. 483). In similar fashion, metaphorical models introduce theoretical information into a target (and phenomenologically unrelated) domain where little to none existed
previously. The appropriateness for the use of one model’s representation as a metaphorical
representation of another phenomenon will be determined by the theoretical judgments of the
model user. Like metaphorical language, metaphorical models are one of many devices scientists use to accommodate their practices to the world.
In summary, morphological models can be defended against the objections of empiricists and
constructivists by appealing to the arguments in favor of scientific realism developed by Boyd.
This has the consequence that the realist view of morphological models I have developed will be
dependent upon the realist view of science Boyd has developed; if Boyd’s arguments for scientific realism fail, then my arguments for a realist view of morphological modeling also fail.
Other objections to a realist view of models are available, but responding to them involves an
analysis of the relationship between morphological models (and models similar to them) and the
semantic view of scientific theories. Limited space prevents me from responding to those objections here. And, while Horan’s concerns are important for practicing biologists, her philosophical worries are easily addressed by reference to Boyd’s accommodation thesis: biological methods, whether predominantly predictive or explanatory, will be assessed by how well they con-
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tribute to the satisfaction of the accommodation demands of the disciplinary matrices in which
they are employed.

124

CONCLUSION
I have attempted to provide a positive account for a realist view of scientific modeling using the
methods of morphological modeling. While I think my account can be used to address antirealist
conceptions of scientific models, doing so would require a thorough analysis of the variation in
antirealist notions of models, which range from the notion of models employed in the semantic
view of scientific theories to the notion of models as autonomous agents. Like each version of
antirealism in the philosophy of science, such as constructivism and empiricism, each antirealist
notion of scientific models will demand a unique realist response, and therefore cannot be treated
in full.
I have also restricted my treatment of scientific modeling as it is deployed in biological
morphology, but I think my views of morphological modeling can be easily adapted to other
scientific disciplines ranging from quantum mechanics to psychology. If I am right, then scientific modeling can be incorporated within a realist view of science across disciplines (although
the details require a discipline specific analysis). This would be a significant achievement and
would anticipate a realist interpretation of peripherally situated scientific disciplines that utilize
modeling as a primary method for investigation and understanding such as architecture and
history.
Within biological morphology, models play an important role not only in investigating and
explaining extant organisms, but also in investigating and explaining their evolution. A likely
next step in my investigation of morphological modeling will be to explore the use of multiperspectival models for the reconstruction of evolutionary history, which involves the amalgamation
of models representing both extant and fossilized organismal features across taxa. The estab-
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lishment of evolutionary relationships has been a principle endeavor of biology since Darwin,
and I think multiperspectival modeling has played an integral role in this undertaking.

126

REFERENCES
Achinstein, P. (1968). Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis. Baltimore, MD: The Johns
Hopkins Press.
Ankeny, R. A. (2000). Fashioning descriptive models in biology: of worms and wiring diagrams.
Philosophy of Science, 67, S260-S272.
Ankeny, R. A., & Leonelli, S. (2011). What's so special about model organisms? Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science, 42, 313-323.
Ayer, A. J. (Ed.). (1959). Logical Positivism. New York: The Free Press.
Bailer-Jones, D. M. (1999). Creative strategies employed in modelling : A case study.
Foundations of Science, 4, 375-388.
Bailer-Jones, D. M. (2000). Modelling extended extragalactic radio sources. Studies in History
and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 31(1), 49-74.
Bailer-Jones, D. M. (2002a). Models, metaphors and analogies. In P. Machamer & M. Silberstein
(Eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science (pp. 108-127): Blackwell.
Bailer-Jones, D. M. (2002b). Scientists' thoughts on scientific models. Perspectives on Science,
10(3), 275-301.
Bailer-Jones, D. M. (2003). When scientific models represent. International Studies in the
Philosophy of Science, 17(1), 59-74.
Bailer-Jones, D. M. (2005). Models, theories and phenomena. In P. Hajek, L. Valdes-Villanueva
& D. Westerstahl (Eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of
the Twelfth International Congress [2003] (pp. 243-255). London: King's College
Publications.
Bailer-Jones, D. M. (2009). Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science. Pittsburgh, P.A.:
University of Pittsburgh Press.
Bailer-Jones, D. M., & Bailer-Jones, C. A. L. (2002). Modelling data: Analogies in neural
networks, simulated annealing and genetic algorithms. In L. Magnani & N. Nersessian
(Eds.), Model-Based Reasoning: Science, Technology, Values (pp. 147-166). New York:
Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
Black, M. (1962). Models and Metaphors. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Bock, W. J. (1989). Organisms as functional machines: a connectivity explanation. American
Zoologist, 29, 1119-1132.

127

Bock, W. J. (2000). Explanations in a historical science. Proceedings of the 7th International
Senckenberg Conference, Organisms, Genes, and Evolution(Evolutionary Theory at the
Crossroads).
Bock, W. J. (2004). Explanations in systematics. In D. M. Williams & P. L. Forey (Eds.),
Milestones in Systematics (Vol. 67): CRC Press.
Bock, W. J. (2007). Explanations in evolutionary theory. Journal of Zoology, Systematics, and
Evolution Research, 45(2), 89-103.
Bock, W. J. (2010). Multiple explanations in Darwinian evolutionary theory. Acta Biotheor, 58,
65-79.
Bock, W. J., & von Wahlert, G. (1965). Adaptation and the form-function complex. Evolution,
19(3), 269-299.
Bogen, J. (2011). 'Saving the phenomena' and saving the phenomena. Synthese, 182, 7-22.
Bogen, J., & Woodward, J. (1988). Saving the phenomena. The Philosophical Review, 97(3),
303-352.
Bogen, J., & Woodward, J. (1992). Observations, theories and the evolution of the human spirit.
Philosophy of Science, 59, 590-611.
Bogen, J., & Woodward, J. (2005). Evading the IRS. In M. R. Jones & N. Cartwright (Eds.),
Idealization XII: Correcting the Model. Idealization and Abstraction in the Sciences
(Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities) (Vol. 86, pp. 233267). Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi.
Botha, M. E. (1986). Metaphorical models and scientific realism. PSA, 1, 374-383.
Boyd, R. N. (1972). Determinism, laws, and predictability in principle. Philosophy of Science,
39(4), 431-450.
Boyd, R. N. (1973). Realism, underdetermination, and a causal theory of evidence. Nous, 7(1), 112.
Boyd, R. N. (1976). Approximate truth and natural necessity. The Journal of Philosophy, 73(18),
633-635. doi: 10.2307/2025819
Boyd, R. N. (1982). Scientific realism and naturalistic epistemology. PSA: Proceedings of the
Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1980, 613-662. doi:
10.2307/192615
Boyd, R. N. (1983). On the current status of the issue of scientific realism. Erkenntnis, 19, 45-90.
Boyd, R. N. (1985a). Lex orendi est lex credendi. In P. M. Churchland & C. A. Hooker (Eds.),
Images of Science (pp. 3-34). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

128

Boyd, R. N. (1985b). The logician's dilemma: deductive logic, inductive inference and logical
empiricism. Erkenntnis, 22, 197-252.
Boyd, R. N. (1985c). Observations, explanatory power, and simplicity. In P. Achinstein & O.
Hannaway (Eds.), Observation, Experiment, and Hypothesis in Modern Physical Science.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Boyd, R. N. (1988). How to be a moral realist. In G. Sayre-McCord (Ed.), Moral Realism (pp.
297-356): Cornell University Press.
Boyd, R. N. (1989). What realism implies and what it does not. Dialectica, 43(1-2), 5-29.
Boyd, R. N. (1990a). Realism, approximate truth, and philosophical method. In W. Savage (Ed.),
Scientific Theories (Vol. 14, pp. 355-391). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Boyd, R. N. (1990b). Realism, conventionality, and "realism about". In G. Boolos (Ed.),
Festschrift for Hilary Putnam (pp. 171-195). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boyd, R. N. (1991a). Introductory Essay to Section I: Confirmation, Semantics, and the
Interpretation of Scientific Theories. In R. N. Boyd, P. Gasper & J. D. Trout (Eds.), The
Philosophy of Science (pp. 3-36). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Boyd, R. N. (1991b). Realism, anti-foundationalism and the enthusiasm for natural kinds.
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition,
61(1), 127-148.
Boyd, R. N. (1992). Constructivism, Realism, and Philosophical Method. In J. Earman (Ed.),
Inference, Explanation and Other Philosophical Frustrations. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Boyd, R. N. (1993). Metaphor and theory change: What is "metaphor" a metaphor for? In A.
Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and Thought (2 ed., pp. 481-532). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Boyd, R. N. (1999a). Homeostasis, species, and higher taxa. In R. A. Wilson (Ed.), Species: New
Interdisciplinary Essays (pp. 141-186). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Boyd, R. N. (1999b). Kinds as the 'Workmanship of Men': Realism, Constructivism, and Natural
Kinds (S. f. A. Philosophy, Trans.). In J. Nida-Ruemlin (Ed.), Rationalität, Realismus,
Revision: Proceedings of the Third International Congress, Gesellschaft für Analytische
Philosophie (pp. 52-89). Berlin: de Gruyter.
Boyd, R. N. (1999c). Kinds, complexity and multiple realization: comments on Millikan's
"Historical kinds and the special sciences". Philosophical Studies: An International
Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 95(1/2), 67-98.

129

Boyd, R. N. (2001a). Reference, (in)commensurability and meanings. In P. Hoyningen-Huene &
H. Sankey (Eds.), Incommensurability and Related Matters (pp. 1-63). Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Boyd, R. N. (2001b). Truth through thick and thin. In R. Schantz (Ed.), What Is Truth? (pp. 3859). Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.
Boyd, R. N. (2003). Finite beings, finite goods: the semantics, metaphysics and ethics of
naturalist consequentialism, Part 1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66(3),
505-553.
Boyd, R. N. (2010a). Homeostasis, higher taxa, and monophyly. Philosophy of Science, 77(5),
686-701.
Boyd, R. N. (2010b). Realism, natural kinds, and philosophical methods. In H. BeeBee & N.
Sabbarton-Leary (Eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds (pp. 212-234):
Routledge.
Boyd, R. N. (2013). What of pragmatism with the world here? In M. Baghramian (Ed.), Reading
Putnam (pp. 39-94). London: Routledge.
Brainerd, E. L., & Owerkowicz, T. (2006). Functional morphology and evolution of aspiration
breathing in tetrapods. Respiratory Physiology and Neurobiology, 154, 73-88.
Cartwright, N., & Le Poidevin, R. (1991). Fables and models. Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, Supplementary Volumes, 65, 55-82.
Chakravartty, A. (2010). Perspectivism, inconsistent models, and contrastive explanation.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 41, 405-412.
Chin, C. (2011). Models as interpreters (with a case study from pain science). Studies in History
and Philosophy of Science, 42, 303-312.
Darwin, C. (2004). The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. New York: Barnes and
Noble Books.
De Regt, H. W. (2005). Scientific realism in action: molecular models and Boltzmann's
Bildtheorie. Erkenntnis, 63, 205-230.
Eldredge, N., & Gould, S. J. (1972). Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism.
In T. J. M. Schopf (Ed.), Models in Paleobiology (pp. 82-115). San Franciso: Freeman,
Cooper & Co.
Feyerabend, P. (1989). Realism and the historicity of knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, 86(8),
393-406.
Field, H. (1973). Theory change and the indeterminancy of reference. Journal of Philosophy, 70,
462-481.

130

Field, H. (1974). Tarski's theory of truth. Journal of Philosophy, 69, 347-375.
Fung, Y. C. (1990). Biomechanics: Motion, Flow, Stress, and Growth. New York: SpringerVerlag.
Gans, C. (1974). Biomechanics: An Approach to Vertebrate Biology. Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippincott Company.
Gemci, T., Ponyavin, V., Chen, Y., Chen, H., & Collins, R. (2008). Computational model of
airflow in upper 17 generations of human respiratory tract. Journal of Biomechanics, 41,
2047-2054.
Giere, R. N. (1988). Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
Goodman, N. (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (4 ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Gould, S. J., & Lewontin, R. C. (1979). The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian
paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme. Proceedings of the Royal Society in
London B, 205, 581-598.
Greaves, W. S. (1995). Functional predictions from theoretical models of the skull and jaws in
reptiles and mammals. In J. J. Thomason (Ed.), Functional Morphology in Vertebrate
Paleontology (pp. 99-115). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gutmann, W. F. (1988). The hydraulic principle. American Zoologist, 28, 257-266.
Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of
Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ham, K. (1982). The Fossils Say What? Creation Magazine, 4, 33-38.
Hanson, N. R. (1965). Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hardy, A. C. (1956). The Open Sea: The World of Plankton. Boston, M.A.: Houghton Mifflin
Company.
Harré, R. (1960). Metaphor, model and mechanism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 60,
101-122.
Harré, R. (1970). The Principles of Scientific Thinking. London: Macmillan.
Herring, S. W. (1988). Introduction: how to do functional morphology. American Zoologist, 28,
189-192.
Hesse, M. B. (1953). Models in physics. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
4(15), 198-214.

131

Hesse, M. B. (1966). Models and Analogies in Science. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press.
Homberger, D. G. (1986). The lingual apparatus of the African Grey Parrot, Psittacus erithacus
Linne (Aves: Psittacidae): Description and theoretical mechanical analysis.
Ornithological Monographs, (39).
Homberger, D. G. (1988). Models and tests in functional morphology: the significance of
description and integration. American Zoologist, 28, 217-229.
Homberger, D. G. (2001). The Case of the Cockatoo Bill, Horse Hoof, Rhinoceros Horn, Whale
Baleen, and Turkey Beard: The integument as a model system to explore the concepts of
homology and non-homology. In H. M. Dutta & J. S. D. Munshi (Eds.), Vertebrate
Functional Morphology: Horizon of Research in teh 21st Century (pp. 315-341). Enfield,
NH: Science Publishers, Inc.
Horan, B. L. (1988). Theoretical models, biological complexity and the semantic view of
theories. Philosophy of Science Association 2, 265-277.
Hume, D. (2005). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hume, D. (2007). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Other Writings.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hutten, E. H. (1954). The role of models in physics. The British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, 4(16), 284-301.
Kant, I. (2009). Critique of Pure Reason (P. Guyer & A. W. Wood, Trans.). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Kardong, K. (2009). Vertebrates: Comparative Anatomy, Function, Evolution (5 ed.). Boston:
McGraw Hill.
Kripke, S. (1981). Naming and Necessity. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Kuhn, T. S. (1996). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3 ed.). Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Lamarck, J. (1963). Zoological Philosophy: An Exposition with regard to the Natural History of
Animals (H. Elliot, Trans.). New York: Hafner Publishing Company.
Lauder, G. V. (1995). On the inference of function from structure. In J. J. Thomason (Ed.),
Functional Morphology in Vertebrate Paleontology (pp. 1-18). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Liem, K. F. (1988). Form and function of lungs: the evolution of air breathing mechanisms
American Zoologist, 28, 739-759.

132

Locke, J. (1996). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc.
Love, A. C. (2008). From philosophy to science (to natural philosophy): evolutionary
developmental perspectives. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 83(1), 65-76.
Love, A. C. (2010). Idealization in evolutionary developmental investigation: a tension between
phenotypic plasticity and normal stages. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society
B, 365, 679-690.
Maxwell, G. (1962). The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities. In H. Feigl & G. Maxwell
(Eds.), Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time (Vol. 3, pp. 3-15). Minneapolis:
Minnesota Press.
Mayer, E. (1963). Introduction to Dynamic Morphology. New York: Academic Press.
Mayr, E. (1982). The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance.
Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Mayr, E. (1988). Towards a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McAllister, J. W. (1997). Phenomena and patterns in data sets. Erkenntnis, 47, 217-228.
McMullin, E. (1985). Galilean idealization. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 16,
247-273.
Morrison, M. C. (1998). Modelling nature: between physics and the physical world. Philosophia
Naturalis, 35, 65-85.
Morrison, M. C. (1999). Models as autonomous agents. In M. S. Morgan & M. Morrison (Eds.),
Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science (pp. 38-65).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morrison, M. C., & Morgan, M. S. (1999). Models as mediating instruments. In M. S. Morgan &
M. Morrison (Eds.), Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science
(pp. 10-38). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Murad, M. H. S. b. A. (2011). Models, scientific realism, the intelligibility of nature, and their
cultural significance. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 42, 253-261.
Nagel, E. (1961). The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.
Nakayama, A., Kuwahara, F., & Sano, Y. (2009). Why do we have a bronchial tree with 23
levels of bifurcation? Heat and Mass Transfer, 45, 351-354.
Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge

133

Portides, D. P. (2005). A theory of scientific model construction: the conceptual process of
abstraction and concretisation. Foundations of Science, 10, 67-88.
Portides, D. P. (2011). Seeking representations of phenomena: Phenomenological models.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 42, 334-341.
Psillos, S. (1999). Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth: Routledge.
Psillos, S. (2000). The Present State of the Scientific Realism Debate The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 51, 705-728.
Putnam, H. (1972). Explanation and Reference. In G. Pearce & P. Maynard (Eds.), Conceptual
Change. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Putnam, H. (1973). Meaning and reference. The Journal of Philosophy, 70(19), 699-711.
Quine, W. V. O. (1969). Natural Kinds. In W. V. O. Quine (Ed.), Ontological Relativity and
Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
Sanders, R. K., & Farmer, C. G. (2012). The pulmonary anatomy of Alligator mississippiensis
and its similarity to the avian respiratory system. The Anatomical Record, 295, 699-714.
Schmidt, A., Zidowitz, S., Kriete, A., Denhard, T., Krass, S., & Peitgen, H. (2004). A digital
reference model of the human bronchial tree. Computerized Medical Imaging and
Graphics, 28, 203-211.
Shapere, D. (1969). Notes Toward a Post-Positivistic Interpretation of Science. In P. Achinstein
& S. F. Barker (Eds.), The Legacy of Logical Positivism (pp. 115-160). Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press.
Singer, M., & Morrison, P. R. (1948). The influence of pH, dye, and salt concentration on the
dye binding of modified and unmodified fibrin. Journal of Biological Chemistry, 175(1),
133-145.
Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Spencer, H. (1899). The Factors of Organic Evolution Essays: Scientific, Political, and
Speculative (Vol. 1, pp. 389-466). New York: D. Appleton and Company.
Standring, S. (Ed.). (2008). Gray's Anatomy: The Anatomical Basis of Clinical Practice (40 ed.):
Churchill Livingstone Elsevier.
Suarez, M. (1999). The role of models in the application of scientific theories: epistemological
implications. In M. S. Morgan & M. Morrison (Eds.), Models as Mediators: Perspectives
on Natural and Social Science (pp. 168-196). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Suppe, F. (1972). What's wrong with the received view on the structure of scientific theories?
Philosophy of Science, 39(1), 1-19.

134

Suppe, F. (1977). The search for philosophic understanding of scientific theories. In F. Suppe
(Ed.), The Structure of Scientific Theories (2nd ed., pp. 3-15). Chicago: University of
Illinois Press.
Suppe, F. (2000). Understanding scientific theories: An assessment of developments, 1969-1998.
In D. Howard (Ed.), PSA 1998, Philosophy of Science Supplement 67 (pp. S102-S115).
Suppes, P. (1960). A comparison of the meaning and uses of models in mathematics and the
empirical sciences. Synthese, 12, 287-300.
Tarski, A. (1935). Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen. Studia Philosophica, I,
261-405.
Van Fraassen, B. (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Wimsatt, W. C. (1987). False models as means to truer theories. In M. H. Nitecki & A. Hoffman
(Eds.), Neutral Models in Biology (pp. 23-55). New York: Oxford University Press.
Woodward, J. (1989). Data and phenomena. Synthese, 79, 393-472.
Woodward, J. (2000). Data, phenomena, and reliability. Philosophy of Science, 67
(Proceedings), S163-S179.

135

VITA
Bradley Morgan Wood, a native of Zachary, Louisiana, received his B.A. in Philosophy and his
B.S. in Biology at Louisiana State University in 2011. Due to his interests in philosophy of
science and philosophy of biology, he decided to enter graduate school in the Department of
Philosophy and Religious Studies at Louisiana State University. He will receive his M.A. in
Philosophy in May 2013 and plans to begin work on a Ph.D. in comparative and evolutionary
anatomy upon graduation.

136

